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THE CHALLENGE OF REGIONALISM

ERNST B. HAAS

I.

The organization of the world's ninety-odd states into various systems of competing and overlapping regional associations has now been a fact of international relations for over ten years. It cannot be said that as a fact it has gone unnoticed. On the contrary, regionalism has given rise to a floodtide of literature bitterly critical of the development or determined to justify it as a necessity for world security and a support for a sagging UN structure.¹

Among the voices critical of the advent of regional organizations and regional programs of action for economic development, military security, trade liberalization, and the protection of human rights a number of substrains can be isolated. The committed universalist tends to argue that economic welfare, like collective security, is indivisible and he adds that economic unions and common markets distort the logic of a universal division of labor and therefore are not in the long run conducive to production and trade increases. Advocates of global peace and order maintain that emphasis on extra-UN regional political and military organizations downgrades the

role of the UN, evades its obligations and potentialities, and recommits the world to the very balance of power-cum-alliances system which collective security was to obviate. Still other critics maintain that regional military planning is made both impossible and obsolete because it involves the participating states in conflicting and irreconcilable policy commitments and because the advent of ICBM's renders such measures pointless.²

Arguments derived from a monistic theme of international law and morality dominate among the critics of regionalism: they deplore the fact that departures from the universal focus of organization are almost uniformly justified by virtue of Article 51 of the Charter, the massive escape clause in the global scheme of obligations. The defenders of the pattern, however, derive most of their support from the day-to-day preoccupations of national policy. Directly and indirectly they invoke the necessities of the cold war—either in the role of participants or as would-be abstainers—as justifying economic and military arrangements removed from UN control, while maintaining simultaneously that such steps actually tend to strengthen a global struc-

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¹ See Norman J. Padelford, "A Selected Bibliography on Regionalism and Regional Arrangements," *International Organization*, November 1956 (Vol. 10, No. 4).

² For a comprehensive critique of the assumptions underlying regionalism see Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., "A Re-examination of Regional Arrangements," *Journal of International Affairs*, 1955 (Vol. 9, No. 2). Economic regionalism is sharply challenged by Gunnar Myrdal, *An International Economy*, New York, Harper and Bros., 1956. Extra-UN regional military arrangements are treated critically by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Regional Arrangements for Security and the United Nations*, Eighth Report, June 1953.

ture otherwise condemned to impotence.

I have argued elsewhere that the co-existence of regional with universal organizations, though certainly derogating from the legal and moral superiority of the UN, does not in fact undermine the UN as long as the politico-economic game implied is played within the limits of cold war thinking: states as units in the global policy-making process are eliminated in favor of voting blocs representing regional associations of varying cohesion.³ Collective security, while no longer obtainable through the assumptions and techniques written into the Charter, can nevertheless be attained through an interbloc balancing process operating within the institutional limits imposed by the rules of the General Assembly. To explain regionalism, however, is not to justify it as a desirable instrument of order. Regional pacts may be a useful temporary anti-Soviet device, even though this proposition is more than doubtful in terms of the revolution in weapons technology, but they do not therefore contribute in principle to the strength of global institutions and procedures to maintain stability and provide for peaceful change.⁴

In any event, it may be suggested that the utility of the policy-oriented defense of and the universal morality-oriented attack on regionalism has now been exhausted. The positions have been clearly stated and, given the general texture of international relations in our era, it may

be doubted whether much of interest can still be added. Of what service can the study of regionalism be to us in that case?

The most interesting challenge inherent in the study of regionalism lies in the potentialities of the field for insights into the process of community formation at the international level. Regional relations, meetings, decisions, administrative devices, bureaucracies, and inter-ministerial, inter-expert, and inter-parliamentary institutions provide a mass of data on the process of "denationalization" of normal government functions with their delegation to regional decision-making units. While it is true that universal institutions can be used for precisely the same kind of study, it is likely that the data will prove more instructive at the regional level, if only because of the greater bulk of activity. I shall take advantage of the recently published pioneering work of the Princeton Center for Research on World Political Institutions by stating its conclusions and the context to which they apply.⁵ While the authors derive their information from a study of closed historical cases in the Atlantic area, they also seek to project them in an assessment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). I shall then proceed to discuss the possibility of generalizing these propositions by applying them to the study of supranational economic integration in contemporary Europe and to state the lessons to be de-

³ Ernst B. Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism and Universal Organization," *World Politics*, January 1956 (Vol. 8, No. 2); "Regional Integration and National Policy," *International Conciliation*, May 1957.

⁴ For thoughtful recommendations strengthening universal over regional procedures and ties see Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, *Strengthening the United Nations*, New York, Harper and Bros., 1957.

⁵ Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichtermann, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light*

of Historical Experience, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1957. The conceptual and methodological principles applied in this study are treated in Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, New York, Wiley, 1953; and Karl W. Deutsch, *Political Community at the International Level*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1954. The first-mentioned work provides the substance of the discussion of Part II of this article. In my summary and assessment of this work I have used the technical terms employed by the authors in order to avoid doing violence to their definitions and hypotheses.

rived from this regional experience.⁶ Our examination will close with proposals for applying this type of analysis to other regional settings.

II.

On the basis of an examination of ten closed cases of successful and unsuccessful unions of states in Europe and North America the Princeton study advances a series of general and specific findings on how "security-communities" are attained.⁷ A "security-community" is a "group of people which has become integrated" and "integration" is defined as the "attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population".⁸ For practical purposes, however, the study proceeds in terms of two sub-types of security-community permitting of greater institutional specificity. Integration may be achieved through an "amalgamated" security-community, which implies the creation of a governmental structure, whether that of a unitary, federal, or personal union type of state being immaterial. Roughly, the concept of the amalgamated security-community corresponds to the kind of regional arrangement which provides for a heavy dose of central decision-making, whether "federal" in the more restricted legal sense or not. On the other hand, integration may also be achieved through a "pluralistic" secur-

ity community, any arrangement in which no true central decision-making unit is created and in which the constituent states retain their independence but which nevertheless provides for the kind of social interaction thought conducive to integration.

With commendable caution, the authors eschew a rigorous statement of which factors or conditions must be considered "necessary and sufficient" to bring about integration. They doubt that the successful isolation of a number of recurrent historical themes amounts to a truly "scientific" statement of a process. "When we call certain conditions '*essential*,'" they note, "we mean that success seems to us extremely improbable in their absence. Though essential, they also seem to us insufficient: even if all of them were present, we do not know whether any other conditions might be required which we may well have overlooked. A similar consideration applies to those conditions that we called *helpful* but not essential: we found that integration occurred in their absence, and might well recur in this way in future cases."

Within this methodological context, the general findings are as follows. Pluralistic security-communities are easier to attain and maintain than more formal unions, provided that the central aim is merely the preservation of peace among the participants. This conclusion is not true if socio-political aims other than peace predominate. However, the actual attainment of either type of security-

⁶ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces, 1950-1957*, London, Stevens & Sons; and Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958. The otherwise undocumented empirical material on group behavior in western Europe which appears in Part IV of this article is presented in detail in this book. The theoretical conclusions derived from this material, however, appear in print here for the first time.

⁷ The study abstracts its findings from the examination of these cases: United States, 1789-1877; England-Scotland, middle ages to 1707; England-Ireland, until 1921; German unification, early 19th century until 1871;

Italian unification, early 19th century until 1860; Hapsburg Monarchy, middle ages until 1918; Norway-Sweden, 1814-1907; Switzerland, 13th century until 1848; England-Wales, late middle ages; English unification, middle ages. The cases were selected to include both pluralistic and amalgamated security-communities, successful and unsuccessful attempts at unity. The authors assumed all their cases to be "closed" historically.

⁸ Deutsch *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12-13.

community cannot be judged readily by the passage of some "threshold" of integration. Successful integration is attained when the subjective criterion of certain elite expectations is met: if the expectations of key elites in the region converge toward demands for peaceful change and other benefits thought to be obtainable only through the union, integration is underway. Objectively speaking, integration can be considered achieved when the states in the region cease to prepare for war against one another, a condition which can be easily verified from military statistics and plans.

A range of conclusions was derived from the concept of social communication. First of all, successful integration is held to depend on the prevalence of mutually compatible self-images and images of the other actors participating in the process of unification. This involves first and foremost successful predictions on the part of one nationally identified elite of the behavior pattern of other elites active in the region. It is this type of sympathy-feeling among the crucial actors which is held to be of importance, not verbal commitment to common symbols and propositions, such as "freedom", "peace", or "welfare". Further, successful integration tends to take place around a "core area", a region possessing superior administrative skills, military power, economic resources and techniques, as well as capacity for receiving and assimilating the demands of other regions so as to satisfy them. Actors in the weaker areas look to the core area for leadership and help in the satisfaction of their demands; sympathetic response on the part of the elites active in the core area then begets progressive integration without in the least implying any "balance of power" among participating units. A great deal of stress is

placed on the "capacity" of the administrative system and the attitudes prevailing in the core area actively to respond to the needs expressed by others.

The Princeton authors note that successful integration for both types of security-community is more likely if improvement of the communications network takes place before the actual burdens are spelled out in terms of political demands. They note also that war among the participating actors should cease to be a respectable mode of policy before the achievement of political union. Further, the nature of the elite structure is singled out as being of crucial importance. It is desirable for successful integration that in each political unit, before the act of union, rigid social stratification be weakened and that mass participation in public life be increased. But it is equally desirable that "international" contacts among elites of similar status and outlook in all the political units be made to flourish. Hence internal democratization was a prerequisite for the successful integration of Switzerland, Germany, Italy, Canada, or the United States; but close "international" ties among political parties, trade associations, labor unions, religious organizations, and the like are essential for larger regional integration. Put another way, the conditions and consequences associated with democracy and pluralism in modern western society emerge as crucial elements in the process of international integration.

"Take-off", a concept adapted from the theoretical literature on economic development, is a central point in this explanation of growing regional unity. Whenever a given doctrine associated with integration has been adopted by a politically crucial elite as its own and thus lifted from advocacy initially confined to

literary and philosophical circles, integration has acquired a momentum of its own; it "has taken off". Under what conditions does this happen historically? The Princeton authors argue that it happened in the cases they studied whenever a young generation developed aims implying a "new way of life" (e.g., the attainment of individual freedom and civil liberties), the realization of which was thought to depend on a revolutionary change in established governmental institutions and on similar action by like-minded groups in neighboring states. Often such visions include claims for new governmental services which cannot, for administrative and ideological reasons, be satisfied by the established structure. Naturally such developments imply the prevalence of mutually compatible images among the internationally allied elites, complementary values, a skill for compromise and for de-emphasizing issues which might strain the alliance. The use of force is more often an obstacle than an aid, and the movement profits if its leaders de-emphasize integration for its own sake and present it merely as a means to other, more immediately desired, ends.

Such are the general findings applicable to regional integration, irrespective of institutional refinements. For "amalgamated" security-communities, the authors also argue that certain additional "essential" requirements could be isolated. Some of the initial expectations of elites—though by no means all—have to be satisfied to anchor the union. Some concrete "bonuses" may have to be paid to "persuade" hesitant elites to identify themselves with the union, usually specific financial or economic rewards. Administrative and economic growth in the core area must continue in order not to disappoint initial expectations. Leader-

ship groups must continue to practice skill in de-emphasizing divisive values and in stressing common aspirations, in advancing successful mutual prediction of behavior patterns and to facilitate easy interchange in group and personal roles in common tasks. And a generous range of all kinds of inter-personal, inter-group, and international transactions (mail, trade, meetings, etc.) must continue to multiply non-national contacts, eventually implying a larger measure of institutional standardization.

As for essential requirements for successful "pluralistic" security-communities the authors stress merely the need for compatibility among the major value systems involved, the attendant capacity to receive, understand, and sympathetically deal with demands of allied governments and elites—mutual responsiveness—and the need for successful mutual predictions of behavior patterns. Diplomacy by *fait accompli*, shifts in policy without consultation, or unilateral threats and warnings are all incompatible with this requirement for successful regional growth among states retaining their independence.

These conclusions were drawn from historical cases outside the social context in which we live today. The revolution in weapons technology making possible total war with a minimum of manpower had not occurred. Involvement in all corners of the globe for most of the participating units was less pronounced. The world was not divided into warring camps in disagreement on almost every aspect of life and thought. The industrial revolution had not yet affected equally most of the states in question. Mass democracy and mass participation in politics were only a factor at the very end of the historical period under study and the concern with the welfare state

was still to come. The "mass man" had not yet been discovered as an important political figure, and the refinements of manipulation associated with totalitarian government were confined to the literature of political philosophers. In view of the difference in variables governing the Princeton cases and our own period, can we assume the validity of the conclusions for the study of regionalism in our time? For instance, the Princeton authors note, *inter alia*, that unions based on initially non-political aims do not necessarily lead to political security-communities, thus throwing some doubt on the Mitrany thesis of functional international organization leading to peace and order;³⁰ elsewhere they affirm that the existence of an external military threat may be a helpful condition to aid in regional integration, but that it is certainly not essential. If these conclusions apply to our own era, much of the logic underlying contemporary regional organizations and efforts seems misapplied if not fallacious. Without arguing dogmatically that the presence of the variables just listed *must* beget different conclusions, I suggest that the difference in context is sufficiently striking to make checking of these conclusions a necessity in the contemporary setting.

III.

In our effort to check these historically derived findings in the context of contemporary efforts at regional integration it is first essential to raise a number of methodological points. One of these refers to the problem of *time*. When must mutual responsiveness among the interacting elites and actors come into existence? Before, during, or after the onset

of integrating relations? When must core area capability be well developed, before or during the "take off" period? Is an increasing flow of mail, trade, migration, and personal contacts the cause or the result of integration? The question of *when* these conditions are thought to come about is vital when we seek to set up a rigorous conceptual scheme to explain the causes of integration. Especially in relation to indicators hinging on social communication we must know whether the transactions measured prevail among the elites to be integrated before the process starts or whether they come about as a result of events which characterize the region after the process has gone on for some years. If the latter is the case, we have merely defined an already functioning political community in terms of communications theory, but we have not explained the steps through which it had to proceed before getting there.

Another fundamental question refers to the hierarchical *level* at which social action relating to integration is thought to take place. Does successful mutual responsiveness, communication, and the de-emphasis of divisive issues rest on mass participation in politics or on its minimization? Are numerically small groups of economic, industrial, administrative, and military elites the crucial actors, or must the analytical focus be put on political parties and their constituencies? What is the role of doctrine, ideology, and mere issue-oriented pragmatic rationality in the inter group contacts relating to integration?

These problems of analytical method are exemplified in a paradox patent in the field of international organization:

³⁰ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System—An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization*, London, National Peace Council, 1946,

p. 9 and 51; also David Mitrany and Maxwell Garnett, "World Unity and the Nations," London, National Peace Council, n. d.

ambitious institutional structures exist, but there are few obvious integrative consequences flowing from them. Are such structures the cause or a result of integration, or perhaps even unrelated to the process? Do they represent consensus at some elusive elite level or do they correspond to mass aspirations? Are they one of the background conditions from which community may develop, do they channel the process, or are they irrelevant to this whole range of inquiry? The North Atlantic area, singled out by the Princeton authors for a contemporary application of their historical findings, illustrates the difficulty.

There can be no doubt that the physical existence of NATO coincides in time with the prevalence of a *de facto* pluralistic security-community among the major member states: since 1948 these countries have been more closely united in the pursuit of the totality of policy aims than any other recent regional conglomeration and there has been no use of force in the settlement of disputes among them. However, when tested against the findings summarized above, the NATO score is poor.

Thus, while there is an adequate comparability of major national values (with the exception of Portugal), the pattern of mutual responsiveness is pockmarked with complaints of inadequate attention by the United States, France, the United Kingdom, west Germany and Turkey to each other's and their allies' objectives. If the Marshall Plan was the highpoint of United States responsiveness, a fairly consistent deterioration has set in since. Nor is there unambiguous evidence that the demand for a new way of life uniformly characterizes the younger generation in most of the member countries. Such a way of life may be made up of concurrent demands and expectations re-

lating to growing welfare services, rationality, and constitutionalism in government, applying the lessons of the sciences to social relations and technology, forswearing war among the members as a practical means to settle disputes, and admitting that military defense solely by the national state is impossible and too costly in terms of competing welfare commitments; but if it is, Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain would probably have to be omitted from the membership list. The core area requirement is met in part by the Canadian-United States complex; but its responsiveness is open to doubt. Among other background conditions held out as helpful for pluralistic security-communities, but essential for the amalgamated variety, the authors note a very great range of mutual transactions at all levels of inter-group relations, with the exception of personal mobility. National social mobility seems to be growing and interchanges take place on an increasing scale horizontally, though the Princeton study is uncertain whether actual horizontal communication links among like-minded groups in separate national settings are adequate for continuing community development.

The inferences to be drawn from this picture are thus uncertain. The institutional structure of the North Atlantic area and the over-all context of international relations within it satisfy the formal requirements of a pluralistic security-community. The social processes isolated as being historically of significance in the development of such a community, however, are only imperfectly represented in it. Further, if effective decision-making is introduced as a criterion of community, it could be argued that in the military realm at least, and perhaps also in the relations of the NATO countries with the Soviet Union

in Europe, the members of the alliance adhere to centrally made decisions with remarkable fidelity. But according to the social processes thought productive of community relations, this should not have been expected. A final incongruity of NATO as a regional community is that the scope of total inter-personal and inter-group relations and responsiveness is probably greater in it than in several of the other historical situations studied, situations which led eventually to political amalgamation. But who would predict such an outcome for NATO after the decline in inter-allied consensus since 1956?

What, then, is cause and what is effect? Was it mutual responsiveness or something else which led to the conclusion of the Atlantic Pact, to the establishment of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE), to the common infrastructure program, the annual review, and all the other institutional evidences of community? It was indeed mutual responsiveness, but a responsiveness limited to one factor: a common perception of an outside threat. This made possible extensive common planning and standardization of national habits and institutions as long as the participating actors were essentially members of the military elite.¹¹ It could go on as long as the conflicts between NATO military planning and welfare commitments were explained with reference to the external threat. It could remain non-controversial and removed from the main-stream of national politics

because the issues in question were treated as being severely technical. It required few of the major social communications variables isolated in other contexts. But it is condemned to failure if the common perception of the external threat gives way to dissident assessments.¹²

This methodological digression into the NATO experience, as seen in the focus of the Princeton findings, illustrates that lessons of the past should not be automatically applied to contemporary situations. It suggests that the "background" and "process" factors be identified, separated, and sorted according to a time sequence and that the social groups thought to be carriers of the movement toward integration be specified. To my mind, the true challenge of regional studies lies in the establishment of causative relations between these aspects of the political process and the institutions through which they are channeled. The results, far from invalidating the findings of the Princeton group, will nevertheless enable us to restate these in the context of modern social conditions. I shall attempt to do this by analyzing supra-national economic integration among the "six" continental European countries, seeking to combine institutional and behavioral indicators.

IV.

In identifying the background factors found to be directly related to continental European economic integration, emphasis will be focused on those ideologies, attitudes, and expectations of articulate

¹¹ It should be noted that the NATO military elite comes very close to meeting the characteristics listed by Morris Janowitz for professional military men "selling" their plans to civilian leaders in a democratic institutional setting. This process implies decreasing differentiation between formerly typical civilian and military tasks, as well as a shift in the basis of military authority away from command and toward discussion, negotiation, and ideological persuasion. See his "Military Elites and the Study of War," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, March 1957 (Vol. 1, No. 1), p. 9-18.

¹² On the basis of a series of different behavioral propositions, Harold Guetzkow comes to the same conclusion. See his "Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of Inter-Nation Relations," *ibid.*, p. 64-67. The motivational hypotheses presented by Guetzkow in his *Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization*, Princeton, N. J., Center for Research on World Political Institutions, 1955, are strikingly borne out by my findings.

organized groups which prevailed between the end of World War II and 1950, the date of the first official federative proposal, Schuman's call for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Expectations will include "identical" aims, implying identical demands based on identical reasoning patterns regardless of the nationality of the group. These will be contrasted with "converging" expectations, *i.e.* aims based on a reasoning pattern peculiar to a given national group but sufficiently similar in aim to result in support for integrative proposals. Converging expectations make for regional unity instrumental in nature rather than being based on principle. Identical and converging expectations must finally be contrasted with aims of groups opposed to integration.

Thus we find that certain voices in all countries concerned advocated closer unity or federation because division of Europe was held responsible for military, cultural, and political weakness, dependence on the United States, inferiority to the Soviet Union, and therefore inability to deal with internal aspects of the communist threat to established and generally held European values. The same voices tended to defend a "third force" doctrine for a future United Europe and to preach economic revival through a regeneration of competition in a larger continental market, including the abolition of trade barriers and the destruction of cartels. Still others, sometimes identical with the groups just summarized and sometimes not, equated a United Europe with a general economic, social, and cultural regeneration, achieving a new synthesis beyond the old issues of national hatreds, wars, and class conflict.

These expectations were identical throughout the continent. They were

defended by the dedicated federalists, for the most part intellectuals and professional people *not* overlapping with practical politics, industry, labor, agriculture, or other entrenched elite groups. Among the political parties, only certain Christian-Democrats and a few Socialists subscribed to these ideas, including some Christian-Democrats but no Socialists in leading positions. It is fair to say that identical expectations united only certain politically peripheral persons. While they included the organized federalists of all religious and secular persuasions, it cannot be demonstrated that these people influenced the actual course of integration unless—as in the case of Adenauer, Schuman, Monnet, De Gasperi, Beyen, and Pella—they also were active as politicians and negotiators.

Background conditions were otherwise when we focus on converging expectations. Here we find that German trade associations, trade unions, and political parties—except the Socialist Party (SPD)—were one in favoring economic unification *if* this were the means for regaining German economic equality, *i.e.*, if remaining allied occupation controls were removed simultaneously, including the ban on cartels. But we also find certain French trade associations, trade unions, and the political parties of the center and moderate right embracing economic federalism as a means for controlling an economically resurgent Germany, maintaining in force allied decartellization and deconcentration measures under "European" auspices, and assuring for French industry non-discriminatory access to German coke and the southern German export market. All non-Marxist Italian parties and trade unions favored closer European unity, because they saw in it the possibility for capital imports, unhampered exports of goods which could

find a ready foreign market, and above all the right for Italian workers to migrate. The general argument of freer trade appealed to organized business in Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, but a very specific economic "bonus" was necessary to create a pro-integration bias among certain Belgian and Italian industrialists who feared extinction in a free, larger market.

Opposition to economic federalism characterized trade associations convinced that without the protection of national tariffs and subsidies they would decline. It also applied to right-wing political parties (the Rassemblement du Peuple Français in France) whose attachment to the militarily independent national state is an important ideological tenet and applied to left-wing parties (the SPD and many of the Belgian Socialists) who saw in economic federalism merely a regionally cartellized but otherwise unreformed capitalism, whose impact on the national working class and national welfare was thought to be harmful. Opposition also characterized all major groups in industry, agriculture, and politics in the United Kingdom for reasons too well known to require recapitulation.¹³

The major conclusion on background expectations is one which the Princeton authors also discovered: a marked fragmentation in national attitudes prior to the initiation of the process of integration. The United Kingdom showed little disunity, and hence non-participation in ECSC negotiations was not very controversial.

Fragmentation into opposing group opinions in each nation facilitated the *eventual* establishment of close links on a regional basis of communication among

ideologically allied political and economic elites. In contrast to the Princeton findings, however, it must be stated that with the exception of the close ties among a few important Christian-Democratic politicians, the growth of this now striking communications network was the *result* of the establishment of federal institutions and not its cause. Contacts among trade unionists, industrialists, administrators, and parliamentarians certainly existed before 1950; but they were lacking in intensity, in concrete programs, in consensus, and in results. The background requirement of inter-elite responsiveness, of mutuality of values, and of willingness to de-emphasize clashing aspirations was in evidence only among a very narrow group of administrators and certain key politicians; it was not then a general phenomenon of regional inter-group relations.

My findings support the argument that the existence of a "core area" can be a vital consideration in regional unification. However, in the European context this meant a desire to unify in order to *control* such an area—the Ruhr—not to rely on it. On the other hand, many supporters of unification regarded the United Kingdom as a sympathetic "core area" around which unity should develop; their disappointment in the United Kingdom's refusal to accept this role was important in defeating EDC, but not in stopping regional integration in the economic field.

Nor do my findings support another key conclusion of the Princeton authors, the notion of the "new way of life". If the "new way of life" demanded by the younger generation is specified as a dedication to regional welfare economics, cultural regeneration, and political media-

¹³ Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, p. 152-161, 163-213, 219-239.

tion between Moscow and Washington, such a strand of thought can indeed be isolated among the background conditions surrounding European economic federation. However, it is typical of federalists who are peripheral to the political process and therefore not consistently applicable to the policy-making elites. On the contrary, these seem often to have embraced unity as a device to protect an "old" way of life. If the "new" way be identified merely as a dissatisfaction with European international relations of the inter-war variety, however, then it becomes an important background factor, typical, however, of the old as well as the new generation.

These conditions and attitudes prevailing before 1950 clearly explain why Schuman's proposal for a federal approach to economic unity was eventually adopted. In view of the dominant national fragmentation of aspirations, the scheme was a direct way to realize a new dispensation for a few, and instrumental toward achieving some very concrete and immediate economic benefits to many others. A definite change, or a "take-off" did not take place until after the actual institutions of ECSC had been established. New modes of conduct and new channels of communication among elites did not develop until *after* the institutional constitutive act. It was then that a closer rapport among trade unions, trade associations, political parties, and senior civil servants began to develop, a process which eventually "spilled over" from the realm of coal and steel to the field of general economic unification—or the European Economic Community

(EEC)—and acquired an independent momentum perhaps in 1955.¹⁴ This finding re-enforces the proposition that institutions are crucial causative links in the chain of integration, a consideration inadequately singled out by the Princeton authors.

The new institutions were called upon to realize the benefits expected of a common market restricted to coal and steel, while being fully cognizant of the economic impossibility of acting meaningfully unless such related areas as foreign trade, taxes, wages, monetary policy, and counter-cyclical measures were also subject to regional regulation. In this setting each nationally organized group began to search for regional allies to aid in the implementation of a program for coal and steel considered beneficial to it. Interest groups coalesced in their efforts to influence the policy of the ECSC High Authority, as did the parliamentarians selected by national legislatures to control the High Authority in the ECSC Common Assembly. More important perhaps in the context of a "pluralistic" security-community, a special set of relations and a new code of conduct came to characterize the Council of Ministers and the associated national administrators, the organ to which the High Authority often deferred and which came to exercise the fundamental decision-making role in the expansive aspects of ECSC. Unlike the pattern in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and other intergovernmental organizations, a presumption developed toward reaching consensus at a higher level of central action than that favored by the

¹⁴ The briefest, and yet accurate, descriptions of the ECSC and EEC Treaty rules are to be found in John Goormaghtigh, "European Coal and Steel Community," *International Conciliation*, May 1955, and Serge Hurtig, "The European Common Market," *ibid.*, March 1958. The economic issues of the common market are analyzed by Raymond Bertrand, "The European Com-

mon Market Proposal," *International Organization*, November 1956 (Vol. 10, No. 4), and the political process of negotiation by Miriam Camps, *The European Common Market and Free Trade Area*, Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1957. See also the Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., *Britain and Europe*, London, 1957.

least federally minded member government. This resulted in progressive inter-governmental compromise toward more and more central economic planning, entrusted often to the High Authority. Eventually the process produced the Messina Conference of June 1955 and the Brussels Conference of Experts appointed to draft the EEC and Euratom agreements.

It could be argued, then, that a "take off" mentality did develop when significant decision-makers and elites realized that more economic benefits than sacrifices would develop as a result of further federal unity, and when they sought to influence the central institutions accordingly. The "take off" became an operational reality when groups previously indifferent or hostile toward integration turned to the advocacy of further unity by way of EEC, on the basis of their experience in ECSC institutions and with the effects of ECSC economic policy.

Successful "take off" is a manifestation of a previously successful "spill over": demands and expectations for further integrating measures are voiced as a result of performance in previously federated spheres of governmental activity. Performance is held inadequate because of an insufficient grant of powers or timid policy on the part of central authorities; hence the claim for new federal powers to achieve better performance is a direct outgrowth of the earlier institutional system and the realignment of group expectations produced through it. It becomes of the essence for the accurate statement of a regional process of political integration to state these realignments.

National trade associations affected by the initially created federal institutions may in principle persist in the positions

analyzed in our discussion of the pre-federal background, but experience with European groups indicates that they adapt to new rules by changing policies, if not aims. Thus the initially anti-ECSC Belgian collieries became firm supporters of the federal authorities merely because they expected a more sympathetic treatment from them than from their national government. Other trade associations initially hostile become conditional supporters of the new system as they realize that the supranational authorities may be instrumental in achieving certain of their aims. This is illustrated by the eagerness of the French steel and coal industries to use ECSC for purposes of sustaining cheaper access to German coke and for increasing German production costs by "equalizing" social security and wage payments. Still others subscribed to the free market implications of the ECSC Treaty but opposed any granting of manipulative or planning powers to the supranational organs. Five years later such groups—for instance, the German, Belgian, and Dutch steel industries—still favor the same principles and exert themselves politically to minimize public regulation of the free market, especially in opposing anti-trust and anti-cartel measures. Their commitment to this political action compels them to work through the federal authorities. As for a "spill over", these groups favored EEC if it created a general free market but opposed strong central institutions to assert political control over it. Trade associations opposed to the continuation of economic integration, *i.e.* the adding of EEC to ECSC, were easily identified as the industries dependent on national protection, just as in 1950; in France and Italy this included the bulk of medium and small-sized

manufacturing establishments and the major national trade associations.¹⁵

National trade associations experience the necessity to combine supranationally in order to achieve common political goals once the new institutions are installed. While such combinations have occurred on a massive scale in Europe since 1950, there is little evidence that the allied industrialists are consistently receptive to each other's needs, expectations, and values. Compromise occurs rarely; divisive aspirations are not usually de-emphasized successfully by leaders who emerge with a tacit mediating role; subordination of nationally-defined economic interests to common regional positions is not observable among industrialists after five years of experience in ECSC. The supranational alliances, then, remain *ad hoc* groupings for immediate tactical advantage. However, as EEC illustrates, integration is proceeding rapidly just the same.

But the picture is quite the reverse in the ranks of trade unions. All non-communist unions were in favor of economic integration in 1950, though with varying degrees of enthusiasm and by no means unconditionally. One of the conditions was the dedication of the federal institutions to direct measures for raising living and working standards. As ECSC in practice devoted little effort to this aim, the unions were compelled to fashion themselves into a more potent political force in order to lobby more effectively; and in the process they had to achieve agreement on their aims. They successfully de-emphasized divisive aspirations on price policy, cartels, and migration by stressing the aims which unite them: regional collective bargaining for the standardization first of fringe benefits and

eventually of wages and hours. Labor's radical supranational realignment and unity was obtained partly as a result of national economic demands pressing for a supranational equalization of cost factors and partly through the astute mediating role of certain key officials. Unlike the industrialists, the trade unionists display great mutual responsiveness and a good deal of role interchangeability in successfully combining alternating national leadership with consistent supranational compromise on common interests. What is more striking still, it can be easily demonstrated that these features developed rapidly over time and received a further decisive stimulus with the inauguration of EEC.

The process of integration since the debut of ECSC seems to have affected key political parties quite unevenly. The Christian-Democrats did not change in their unswerving support for integration. But about half of the Radicals in France abandoned their former instrumental and conditional support for economic federalism as their fear of Germany grew and their insistence on a French "national solution" hardened. On the other hand, many of the Moderates in France saw even more instrumental benefits in continuing integration than had been apparent in 1950; they supported EEC and even the expansion of ECSC powers—always on the assumption that certain French interests would thereby be favored. The German Liberals, similarly, concluded that growing unity among the Six is an obstacle to German reunification and therefore voted against EEC after having favored ECSC—for anti-allied reasons. The striking changes, however, occurred in Socialist ranks. The SPD maintained its opposition to

¹⁵ Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, p. 283-301, 339-350.

ECSC until 1954 and switched thereafter to become one of the most consistent and forceful advocates of a regional planned economy functioning through democratic federal institutions. The Section Française Internationale Organisation, after overcoming its division on the EDC issue, now takes the same position, as does the Belgian Socialist Party which was split on ECSC and EDC. Finally the Nenni Socialists in Italy, who had opposed all European unity efforts, in 1956 aligned themselves with the, by then, general continental socialist position.¹⁶

Doctrinal consensus on a trans-national basis has developed significantly as a result of activities in the ECSC Common Assembly (since 1958 the European Parliamentary Assembly, with control functions over ECSC, EEC, and Euratom). Largely as a result of the increased opportunities to criticize meaningfully and continuously the activities of a true administrative agency, the Socialist deputies of six nationalities began to function as a supranational political party, showing a consistent record of successful internal compromise, deference to each other's wishes, alternating leadership, and willingness to de-emphasize issues on which a unanimously endorsed doctrine proved unobtainable. Agreement reached by way of supranational activity proved highly significant in begetting the changed socialist positions in the home legislatures. Within the limits of the technical issues so far raised in the context of economic unification, the supranational group of Christian-Democratic deputies shows less doctrinal unity but functions smoothly as a general support for any "European" policy, exercising a role analogous to a national "govern-

ment" party, whereas the Socialists tend to act as the "loyal opposition". The Liberal group shows no such unity and is rarely cohesive on concrete policy issues. Nevertheless, all three groups have developed into a permanent parliamentary elite conversant with the problems of integration and respected as such in their home legislatures. Again, however, this increase in trans-national communication and national prestige occurred *as a result* of the institutionalization of democratic parliamentary control functions at the regional level.

Realignments among governments are less patent. In essence, the positions of the three Benelux governments and of Italy are unchanged as compared to 1950: they still favor a maximum of economic unification and the creation of a sufficiently powerful federal political structure to administer the rules of the common market and implement its welfare objectives. Many statesmen in these four countries are frank to admit that they see in economic federalism the precursor to a full political union. These positions were expressed uniformly in the negotiations which resulted in the EEC and Euratom treaties.

Things are otherwise in Germany and France. In 1950 these two governments agreed in favoring a maximum of political federalism for ECSC and a minimization of intergovernmental features. During the EEC negotiations, there was a tendency for the German negotiators to minimize institutions for the common market and to oppose the insertion of provisions facilitating economic planning. The French, by contrast, were concerned mostly with minimizing the federal aspect of EEC so as to permit them to continue unilateral policies in-

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 414-430.

consistent with the EEC rules. However, the fact that an agreement was reached which subordinates national demands for the relaxation of the rules to the consent of EEC organs indicates that the degree of mutual responsiveness in these intergovernmental dealings was extraordinarily high. But it also illustrates the general finding on the process of integration that once governments have committed themselves—for whatever reasons—to certain common measures of fundamental importance to the daily lives of their entire citizenry, they can resolve future problems of implementing the agreement only by means of further delegation of power to the center. This “administrative spill over” is an essential consequence of initial acts of integration in a crucial policy sector. Withdrawal from its implications is not possible—as in the case of NATO—when the external stimulant changes. Since the range of issues which gave rise to the initial step is woven completely into the contemporary preoccupation with welfare, withdrawal would imply a sacrifice of economic advantage—a step not taken lightly by elected politicians.

Given the background conditions we specified, given the initial act of institutional unification based on identical and converging aims and expectations, a realignment of political forces calculated by the actors on the basis of normal political expediency takes place. This realignment will result in the intensification of growth toward a regional political community *if the task of the center is expanded*. But the story of why the supranational task was expanded significantly in Europe since 1950 again confirms the earlier finding, stressed equally by the Princeton study, that demand for increased regional activity is based essen-

tially on instrumental motives and only rarely on principle. If enough task expansion occurs, the eventual condition characterizing the region will be a federal or unitary state, or a “pluralistic” institutional setting in which central decisions of ministerial organs are always implemented because there is no meaningful alternative to them. The lessons derived from the analysis of the process leading toward task expansion can now be summarized:

1. Groups subject to a process of integration are not uniformly responsive to each other's claims even though the institutional pressures are such as to make concerted supranational action politically reasonable and practically desired by most.
2. In the modern European setting, groups previously exposed to active international value sharing find it easier to achieve this responsiveness. In practice, this has meant Socialist and Catholic labor and political groups.
3. Government negotiators and high civil servants working in isolation from political pressures and democratic accountability achieve mutual responsiveness more readily than groups resting on mass support.
4. Despite initial acts of integration, continuing rewards must be held out to participating groups in order not to alienate them. For labor this has meant the promise of an active welfare policy under EEC; for the French conservatives it has meant the “Europeanization” of investment programs in French Africa and the temporary waiving of some common market rules under EEC as applied in France; for Italy it called for the creation of the “European Bank”; for French and Belgian industrialists it resulted in the

promise of some measures for the "equalization" of costs of production through higher social security contributions in the Netherlands and Germany.

5. The contemporary process of integration need not include dedication to and inter-elite agreement on a "new way of life". On the contrary, it is my conclusion that integration is advocated as a means to defend some cherished aspect of an established way of life, even though this "way" may be transformed willy-nilly by the consequences of the integration process. Under modern socio-economic conditions, three types of attitude development can be identified, each of which implies merely the buttressing of previously advocated values in a new setting:

- a. High-cost industries move from initial opposition to integration to strong support of federal institutions with the aim of inducing the new authorities to adopt a protectionist and subsidizing policy for the industries in question. The same is true for trade unions in these industries. The political consequence is a tendency toward regional protectionism resting on firm supranational constituency pressure.
- b. Groups that consider themselves marginal in the nations undergoing integration will, after initial indifference toward or mild support for unity proposals, rally to the new central authorities and seek to induce them to adopt a comprehensive welfare and planning policy designed to protect the interests of the groups in question. They will also seek to penetrate the new institutions as

a means for gaining equality and respectability at the supranational level, which was denied them in the national context.

- c. Low-cost industries initially favor measures of economic integration, provided no ambitious federal regulatory powers are created and industrialists are left free to compete or conclude "agreements" as they see fit. As soon as the federal authorities seek to control cartels and regulate the market, opposition to the *method*, but not necessarily the principle, of integration is voiced, hinging around the argument that standardization of economic rules and practices is not required in a common market. However, in the process of opposing the federal authorities, the dissident low-cost industries are involuntarily committing themselves to channelling their political aims through the new centers of power.

Whether because of growing positive expectations of the new central institutions or because of the negative aim of seeking to block institutional action at the center, the net result of the group realignment is an enhanced role for the center. The tendencies here outlined imply that all important groups are influenced in this fashion, that some opposition to integration is reconciled by its benefits while groups that continue to question central policy do so in the spirit of loyal opposition. This is the pattern uncovered in the five-year experience of ECSC. Whether it will prevail also under EEC is open to some doubt. Political parties consistently identified with the authoritarian Right and the pro-Soviet Left in all member countries have not

changed their attitudes since 1950, continue to oppose integration and use their influence in connection with integrative tasks so as to sabotage them. However, these parties have little following among the groups who have been directly concerned with the work of ECSC, and no evidence of unrepentant opposition to integration has been found among the industrialists, trade unionists, and merchants associated with ECSC. We must remember, however, that so far peasants, small retail businesses, artisans, and family-size manufacturing establishments have remained unaffected by the progress of economic unification. It is these groups which furnish the bulk of the authoritarian and fascist constituency in western Europe, utilizing appeals to exclusive national symbols and often rejecting supranational sharing of values on principle. Whether transitional economic protection and subsidies will suffice to woo these members of Europe's flourishing middle-class movements into the realignment pattern is by no means certain.

V.

Our discussion shows that significant differences in background conditions, in the constituents of the process, in the kind and manner of elite participation can be discovered in the analysis of community formation at the regional level, depending on the historical setting and the functional preoccupation of the decision-makers. Lessons derived from pre-contemporary social contexts do not automatically apply to regional organizations now functioning, and findings derived

from NATO, for instance, cannot be automatically carried over into organizations dedicated to a different kind of task even when they function in the same cultural and time setting. In addition to the cultural and functional differentials between regional organizations, we must bear in mind marked structural variations. Does the integrative impact produced by intergovernmental organizations compare favorably with the role of various kinds of supranational, federal, or confederate arrangements? To shed further light on these problems, the study of regionalism must be so generalized as to take account of the cultural, the functional, and the structural variants in the contexts to be examined.

One approach to the study of regional integration in non-western settings is to focus on the relation of existing regional institutions and legal rules to the underlying social structure. Past and present findings in the European context agree in stressing the importance of fluid social relations and fragmentation of opinion and groups as important background conditions for integration. Do similar conditions exist in the Western Hemisphere setting, in the Arab world, in Southeast Asia, in the Caribbean? Or can the development of entities like the West Indian Federation be attributed to such forces? In all these regions international and federal institutions exist; but do they reflect merely the momentary aims of governments or are they tied to some basic social process whose nature could be studied by using the analogy of the European and Atlantic setting, at least as a point of departure?"

¹⁷ Research hypotheses on differences and similarities in political behavior among western and non-western systems are developed by G. McT. Kahin, G. Pauker, and L. W. Pye, "Comparative Politics of Non-Western Countries," *American Political Science Review*, December 1955 (Vol. 49, No. 4). I consider many of the variables discussed there as applicable to work on international organizations. The same is true of hypotheses

and research designs put forward by comparative politics specialists concerned with western systems. See G. A. Almond, T. Cole, and Roy Macridis, "A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics," *ibid.*, December 1955 (Vol. 49, No. 4). Also Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *The Journal of Politics*, 1956 (Vol. 18).

Existing institutions could serve a further research purpose. Our European lesson drives home the potential role of institutional forces in rechannelling and realigning previous group loyalties and expectations. Have Organization of American States (OAS) bodies, South-east Asia Defense Treaty Organization (SEATO) meetings, Arab League conferences, and the like had similar consequences; or, since the answer is probably negative, why have no such consequences come about? The answer could reveal more information about the nature of background conditions in non-western settings as well as lead to insights on the relation between functional orientation and integrating results in regions other than the industrial-democratic setting analyzed thus far.

For that matter, the differences in the growth of regional cohesion observable from the work of economic organizations with slightly different functional missions but operating in the same region are not yet satisfactorily explained. Why did ECSC lead to EEC and Euratom, and therefore to greatly accelerated integration, and why did OEEC and the European Payments Union, operating in the same context but with different powers and larger memberships, fail to expand? Why is it possible to argue that integration advances more rapidly as a result of decisions made in private by senior civil servants in the ECSC/EEC framework, but that in OEEC the same technique yields no parallel consequences?¹⁸ It might be suggested that

all members of ECSC/EEC are marked by internal fragmentation and political movements looking for new solutions to old problems, whereas the United Kingdom and Scandinavia among the OEEC members are less plagued by this internal situation; but it would require more rigorous research into OEEC decision-making to substantiate this hypothesis.

The social background of the Arab effort at regional unity holds out fascinating questions for studies of this kind. It is here that the demand for a new way of life on the part of the younger generation might be demonstrated to be a background condition and a causative factor in the process of advancing and retarding regional political unity. Did the Arab League fail to produce unity because it was based on the negative consensus of groups identified with the *status quo*? Is Nasserism a more potent stimulus to unification because it self-consciously identifies itself with a new way of life castigating the foreigner and promising domestic abundance? Further, the Arab cultural heritage might offer insights into patterns of achieving mutual responsiveness among elites which have no exact counterpart in the western setting.¹⁹ But systematic research into regional decision-making would be required before adequate answers become available.

In the work of OAS and its predecessor bodies the notion of the core area might be subjected to a rigorous non-European test. To what extent did inter-American cooperation receive encourage-

¹⁸ With very few exceptions, all discussions of OEEC are either institutional or economic in scope and intent. Some indications of political process may be gleaned from Robert Marjolin, *Europe and the United States in the World Economy*, Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1954; Lincoln Gordon, "The Organization for European Economic Cooperation," *International Organization*, February 1956 (Vol. 10, No. 1); René Sergent, "Schritt für Schritt zum Gemeinsamen Markt," *Europa*, October 1955.

¹⁹ To my knowledge, no discussions of political processes in the Arab regional organizations have appeared in English. Much information, however, can be gained from the diplomatic record alone. See T. R. Little, "The Arab League: A Reassessment," *Middle East Journal*, Spring 1956; Paul Seabury, "The League of Arab States: Debacle of a Regional Arrangement," *International Organization*, November 1949 (Vol. 3, No. 4); B. Y. Boutros-Ghali, "The Arab League," *International Conciliation*, May 1954.

ment from the help and sympathy which the Colossus of the North might mobilize? But it might also be asked to what extent OAS has its Latin *raison d'être* in a desire to achieve security *against* the United States by enmeshing the Colossus in a firm network of Latin-inspired legal obligations and institutional safeguards. In short, systematic research into the expectations entertained by Latin American elites with respect to OAS might reveal an anti-United States mutual responsiveness pattern which at the same time would imply a number of non-integrative consequences for the work of OAS. But if this can be substantiated in the legal, social, and economic aspects of the OAS program, would it explain the singular success of OAS efforts at maintaining collective security in the Western Hemisphere? In all likelihood a different range of factors would explain this strikingly integrative aspect of regional activity.²⁰

Mutual responsiveness and the compatibility of elite aims could also be submitted to rigorous analysis in the study of SEATO and of the Baghdad Pact. Is fear of the communist enemy the unifying factor in these alliances? Is it the hope for rewards unilaterally proffered by the United States in the realm of military and economic aid? Or is it some local issue, say Kashmir, which bears no intrinsic relation to the basic function of the alliance? A study of the processes of compromising these aims in a setting of culturally heterogeneous members might prove instructive.

Generally shared expectations of economic gain are constituents of the process of integration found to recur with

monotonous regularity. However, the degree of regional cohesion obtained through this expectation seems to vary sharply. True, in the ECSC/EEC setting it proved dominant and successful. The Princeton authors note that the disappointment of such expectations in the NATO framework may be partly responsible for the slow-down in Atlantic integration. But why did such expectations fail to yield a regional economic planning structure in the setting of the Colombo Plan? Why is their presence in OAS the subject of many words but of little action? Why have essentially military pacts like SEATO stressed economic aid and development more than armaments? The uniformity of economic expectations and policies to meet them varies with the regional setting and the functional preoccupation of the members, factors which themselves may be traced back to underlying conditions of social organization and communication.

Whatever the answers may be, they compel renewed attention to the phenomenon of regionalism as a fixed feature of our time. And to obtain them, there is no alternative to the systematic study of regional integration, combining institutional analysis with the study of political process. In doing so we may hit a rich lode of materials which might explain how nations cease to be nations, how they lose the self-consciousness which comes from having lived within the confines of a fixed set of frontiers, or how they develop loyalties extending over a broader geographic area, but which still display the earmarks of nationalism.

²⁰ Very little discussion of political processes in OAS, as distinguished from institutional analyses and descriptions of actions in specific crises, is available. See, however, A. P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere*

Idea, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1954, and Martin B. Travis, Jr., "The Organization of American States: A Guide to the Future," *Western Political Quarterly*, September 1957 (Vol. 10, No. 2).