

Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds

*A New Agenda for International Studies**

AMITAV ACHARYA

American University

The discipline of International Relations (IR) does not reflect the voices, experiences, knowledge claims, and contributions of the vast majority of the societies and states in the world, and often marginalizes those outside the core countries of the West. With IR scholars around the world seeking to find their own voices and reexamining their own traditions, our challenge now is to chart a course toward a truly inclusive discipline, recognizing its multiple and diverse foundations. This article presents the notion of a “Global IR” that transcends the divide between the West and the Rest. The first part of the article outlines six main dimensions of Global IR: commitment to pluralistic universalism, grounding in world history, redefining existing IR theories and methods and building new ones from societies hitherto ignored as sources of IR knowledge, integrating the study of regions and regionalisms into the central concerns of IR, avoiding ethnocentrism and exceptionalism irrespective of source and form, and recognizing a broader conception of agency with material and ideational elements that includes resistance, normative action, and local constructions of global order. It then outlines an agenda for research that supports the Global IR idea. Key element of the agenda includes comparative studies of international systems that look past and beyond the Westphalian form, conceptualizing the nature and characteristics of a post-Western world order that might be termed as a Multiplex World, expanding the study of regionalisms and regional orders beyond Eurocentric models, building synergy between disciplinary and area studies approaches, expanding our investigations into the two-way diffusion of ideas and norms, and investigating the multiple and diverse ways in which civilizations encounter each other, which includes peaceful interactions and mutual learning. The challenge of building a Global IR does not mean a one-size-fits-all approach; rather, it compels us to recognize the diversity that exists in our world, seek common ground, and resolve conflicts.

The International Relations of Sahibs and Munshis

Does the discipline of International Relations (IR) truly reflect the global society we live in today? Stanley Hoffmann (1977: 41) famously described the field as an “American social science.” That no longer holds in a physical or geographic sense. Over the past decades, IR schools, departments, institutes, and conventions have mushroomed around the world. But the discipline still needs to overcome a central challenge related to its British and North American roots. To elaborate on this challenge, let me turn to an event over two centuries ago. In the year 1800 AD, the Marquis of Wellesley—the Governor-General of British India—set up a college in Fort William, Calcutta (known today as Kolkata), then the hub of the British Empire in India. Underlying the idea of such a college was his belief that the officials of the company were no longer to be regarded as “the agents of a commercial concern,” but as “the ministers and officers of a powerful Sovereign” (Roebuck 1819:iv). Hence, they needed education that was “requisite for the good gov-

Amitav Acharya (www.amitavacharya.com) is the UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and Governance at the School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC. He is currently President of the International Studies Association (2014-2015). Twitter: @AmitavAcharya.

*This essay is a revised version of the Presidential Address to the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), Toronto, March 26–29, 2014. I would like to thank Peter Katzenstein, Swati Parashar, Randolph Persaud, Andrew Phillips, Tom Volgy, Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, Daniel Nexon, Ben Jensen, Louis Goodman, John Vasquez, Paul Diehl, Nils Petter Gleditsch, James Alex Siebens, and Evan Waranowski, for their comments, advice, and assistance with this article.



“An European Gentleman with his Monshee” (1825), Library of the University of California, Santa Barbara. Reprinted with permission.

ernment and stability of the British Empire in India, and for the maintenance of the interests and honour of the Honourable the East Indian Company..." (Roebuck 1819:Introduction, xvi).¹

The Fort William College acquired a potential for becoming the "Oxford of the East" and its faculty the "interpreters of oriental civilization" (Islam 2012:para. 3). Among its activities were a series of public "disputations" (debates) featuring its European students and faculty. These covered such topics as "The Asiatics are capable of as high a civilization as the Europeans," and "The natives of India under the British Government enjoy a greater degree of tranquility, security and happiness than under any former government" (Roebuck 1819: No. II, 14–19). But its faculty fell into two categories: the British Sahibs and the Indian Munshis (Das 1978:xiii; Cohn 1996:51). The College needed the Munshis—a Persian designation for Muslim Indian teachers—principally to teach local languages, as well as the history, customs, and antiquities of India. Wellesley deemed their teaching methods to be "desultory, unmethodical," in contrast to the "regular system of instruction" the Sahibs provided (Roebuck 1819:6). The College paid the Munshis—and their Hindu counterparts called the "pundits"—between 30 to 200 Rupees per month; European teachers and professors received between 1,000 and 1,500 Rupees at Fort William (Das 1978:11,15).

But the difference extended beyond salary. "The Indian scholar knew he was superior to his European master in respect of Indian languages, but...he was primarily an informant, a mere tool in the exercise of language teaching to be handled by others" [the Sahibs] (Das 1978:107). In fact, "it was the British who set the agenda and who had the authoritative voice in determining what was useful knowledge" (Cohn 1996:51).

The College of Fort William did not survive. In 1805, the Directors of the British East India Company decided to set up another college to train colonial civil servants, not in India, but in Haileybury, England. The Fort William College itself persisted for a few decades in a skeletal form, but finally closed down in 1854.²

To many people outside the West, the history of IR seems like something of a replay of the world of the Sahibs and the Munshis at Fort William. To be sure, in teaching and research, there has been a great deal of interaction between Western and non-Western scholars and institutions. But it is the universities, scholars, and publishing outlets in the West that dominate and set the agenda. IR scholarship has tended to view the non-Western world as being of interest mainly to area specialists, and hence a place for "cameras," rather than of "thinkers" (Shea 1997), for fieldwork and theory-testing, rather than for discovery of new ideas and approaches.

I do not mean to imply that this particular underdevelopment of IR stems entirely from Western intellectual neocolonialism. Much responsibility lies with the economic and political circumstances in the developing world. Conditions such as scarce resources, political inter-

ference, and lack of freedom of expression have also stunted the development of IR as a global discipline. But the international studies community also bear responsibility for this state of affairs (Tickner 2003; Acharya and Buzan 2007, 2010; Tickner and Waever 2009).

Peter Katzenstein (2014) observes that "The main event of the twentieth century may well have been decolonization, rather than World War I and II, despite the unspeakable horrors they brought the world over." Yet, how much of IR texts, discourses, and theory is woven around the realities of colonization and decolonization, as opposed to the workings of the European international order, the ascent of the United States, and the Cold War? As a discipline, IR has neither fully accounted for, nor come to terms with, colonialism and its legacy. Thus, the IR community is complicit in the marginalization of the postcolonial world in developing the discipline.

In light of this, let me pose a few questions:

- Why do we view the Cold War as a "long peace"? Because the hundreds of conflicts and millions of lives lost in the battle deaths during the Cold War took place outside Europe, in the so-called Third World?³
- Why do we ignore colonial wars, or extrasystemic conflicts,⁴ in assessing war and peace in the international system, especially in constructing the Democratic Peace theory?⁵ Taking these wars into consideration would challenge claims about the pacific nature of Western liberal democracies.
- When considering the ideas that have shaped IR thinking, why do we make so much of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Kant, but not Ashoka, Kautilya, Sun Tzu, Ibn Khaldun, Jawaharlal Nehru, Raul Prebisch, Franz Fanon, and many others

³ Some scholars have argued that during the Cold War, the superpowers found conflicts in the Third World to be more "permissible," since war in Europe was fraught with the possibility of escalation into nuclear annihilation. The superpowers viewed Third World conflicts "as a way of letting off steam which helps to cool the temperature around the core issues which are directly relevant and considered vital to the central balance and, therefore, to the international system" (Ayoob 1986:14).

⁴ For example, the "Correlates of War" (COW) project, when it was founded at the University of Michigan in 1963, coded wars since 1816 but neglected "extra-state" wars, that is, imperial and colonial wars. It was criticized for reflecting a "historical legacy of Western imperialism and racism that simply did not regard non-Western groups as civilized or as human beings equal to whites" and thus "did not bother to record in any systematic way the fatalities sustained by non-national groupings in imperial wars of conquest or pacification" (Vasquez 1993:27). The COW database later added 129 extra-state wars, with the help of revised methodology and new historical research (COW 2006: News & Notes), but "there is probably still an undercount" (Diehl 2014).

⁵ This criticism is more valid for the monadic version of Democratic Peace theory, which claims that democracies by nature are more peaceful, thanks to the public accountability of its leaders and the habit of peaceful domestic competition than autocracies, than the dyadic version which is concerned with war between democracies and holds that democracies seldom fight other democracies. The monadic claim is especially problematic since democracies found it easy to get public consent for imperialist wars. "In such wars against relatively weak and technologically unsophisticated opponents, the elite and the general public expect an easy victory, and the target is portrayed as racially or ethnically different" (Ravlo, Gleditsch, and Dorussen 2003:522). Democracies have committed genocide and waged wars to prevent national liberation (Haas 1995; Mann 2001). Some defenders of Democratic Peace theory argue that democracies could justify engaging in colonial wars because they perceived their adversaries to be nondemocratic. But this ignores the fact that the colonies or anticolonial resistance movements were in no position to decide on their political system, and the Western democracies, as the colonial masters viewed them not just as nondemocratic but also as uncivilized and racially inferior. The Democratic Peace theory in general (both monadic and dyadic) has also been criticized for being Eurocentric (Barkawi and Laffey 2001), with little relevance for explaining war and peace in the non-Western World (Adem 2007).

¹ Symbolically, Wellesley dated the law founding the college to be May 4, 1800, the first anniversary of the conquest of Mysore (Tipu Sultan), among the last powerful independent Indian states standing on the way of the establishment British supremacy in India (Roebuck 1819:xxiv). He planned to stock the library of the college with the books taken from Tipu's considerable library, seized by the British army when it defeated him (Roebuck 1819:xxv).

² The work of the college did not completely go in vain. It "attracted the attention of European orientalists," many of whose students "turned out to be great orientalists" (Islam 2012:para. 3).

from the developing world (Acharya and Buzan 2010; Acharya 2011a)?

There are many such examples of ethnocentrism and exclusion in IR. They are also increasingly well known (Neuman 1998; Acharya 2000a; Ling 2002; Arlene Tickner 2003; J. Ann Tickner 2011a,b; Chowdhry and Nair 2004; Thomas and Wilkin 2004; Smith 2006; Bilgin 2008, 2013; Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Behera 2010; Shilliam 2010; Tadjbakhsh 2010; Parashar 2013). The study of IR is expanding and generating lots of excitement around the world. Consider, for example, the Annual Convention of International Studies in New Delhi in December 2013, which I attended. This was not a meeting to set up an Indian School of IR, but to discuss issues and themes of IR around the globe, covering all regions and all topics, in a way that could mirror any ISA convention. It included some 300 papers and 70 panels.⁶

Despite its growing popularity, IR's dominant narratives, theories, and methods fail to correspond to the increasingly global distribution of its subjects. Distinctions between the "West" and the "Rest" blur in material terms, but not in the way that we study, publish, and discuss IR. Centers of learning remain clustered in the developed West. Overcoming this disjuncture presents a central challenge for our discipline.

Defining Global IR

In a project undertaken nearly a decade ago, a group of scholars, myself included, addressed the question: "why is there no non-Western IR theory?" (Acharya and Buzan 2007, 2010). The project covered three areas that are highly relevant to the issue of globality of IR.

First, it argued that the main theories of IR are too deeply rooted in, and beholden to, the history, intellectual traditions, and agency claims of the West. They accord little more than a marginal place to those of the non-Western world. Second, it explored the reasons for the underdevelopment of IR theories outside of the West, which include cultural, political, and institutional factors when viewed against the "hegemonic" status of established IR theories. Third, the project identified some of the possible sources of non-Western IR theory, including but not limited to indigenous history and culture, the ideas of nationalist leaders, distinctive local and regional interaction patterns, and the writings of scholars of distinction working on different regions and on world affairs more generally.

Subsequent debates on the state of IR in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other parts of the world took up and further developed these critiques and suggestions. But the non-Western IR theory idea sparked controversy. Some would rather call the new project "post-Western," with a more radical agenda to disavow and displace the existing "Western" IR (Shani 2008; Tickner and Waever 2009; Acharya 2011a).

I regard "non-Western" or "post-Western" as part of a broader challenge of reimagining IR as a global discipline.⁷ I call this project *Global International Relations*. The Global IR project transcends the distinction between West and non-West—or any similar binary and mutually exclusive categories. While these categories might persist as terms of convenience, they lose analytical significance in the world of Global IR.

In using the term "Global IR," I am not calling for a complete renaming of the discipline. So much for so long has been written of and about IR that it can perhaps now claim to be a "heritage site"—one that, in my view, we should preserve. Yet Global IR is not the same as traditional IR as we know it.

I should stress that Global IR constitutes not a theory, but an aspiration for greater inclusiveness and diversity in our discipline. Broadly stated, the idea of Global IR revolves around six main dimensions:

1. It is founded upon a pluralistic universalism: not "applying to all," but recognizing and respecting the diversity in us.
2. It is grounded in *world* history, not just Greco-Roman, European, or US history.
3. It subsumes, rather than supplants, existing IR theories and methods.
4. It integrates the study of regions, regionalisms, and area studies.
5. It eschews exceptionalism.
6. It recognizes multiple forms of agency beyond material power, including resistance, normative action, and local constructions of global order.

Let me briefly elaborate on each of these. First and foremost, Global IR calls for a new understanding of universalism or universality. The dominant meaning of universalism in IR today is what I would call a monistic universalism, in the sense of "applying to all." It corresponds closely to Enlightenment universalism, which may also be called "monistic universalism." As Robert Cox put it, "In the Enlightenment meaning universal meant true for all time and space—the perspective of a homogenous reality" (2002:53). And the Enlightenment also had a dark side: the suppression of diversity and justification of European imperialism (Muthu 2003).⁸ In IR theory and method, such universalism manifests as a way of much arbitrary standard setting, gatekeeping, and marginalizing of alternative narratives, ideas, and methodologies (Jackson 2010; Acharya 2011a). Cox (2002:530) offers an alternative conception of universalism, which rests on "comprehending and respecting diversity in an ever changing world." This formulation rejects the false and politically inspired dichotomy between universalism and relativism. The opposite of monistic universalism is not relativism, but pluralism. Pluralistic universalism allows us to view the world of IR as a large, overarching canopy with multiple founda-

⁷ The terms "West" and "non-West" are often used as terms of convenience, but can also be used for political and ideological reasons, by both non-Western and Western analysts and institutions. For example, the European Union (EU) routinely identifies itself with the West and has returned to "the earlier discourses on civilizational geopolitics" in excluding Turkey (Bilgin 2004b:269) and embracing Ukraine (Nicolaidis, Vergerio, Fisher Onar, and Viehoff 2014).

⁸ Hughes (2010) observes that the "the Enlightenment actually threatened the local, embedded rights that people do possess because its universalism ignored the importance of local culture, seeking to overturn national traditions in favor of global cosmopolitanism."

⁶ Although held at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, this was a national convention (with a few foreigners as well).

tions. J. Ann Ticker (2011a:13), a former ISA President, puts it beautifully when she urges that “rather than searching for one universal history, we need to uncover stories about forgotten spaces that respect difference, show tolerance and compassion, and are skeptical about absolute truths.” This pluralistic universalism provides the foundation of Global IR.

Second, Global IR calls for IR to be more authentically grounded in world history—rather than Western history—and in the ideas, institutions, intellectual perspectives, and practices of Western and non-Western societies alike. Global IR not only transcends the boundary between the West and the Rest, but also recognizes the voices, experiences, and values of all people in all parts of the world. However, “bringing the Rest in” means more than simply using the non-Western world as a testing ground to revalidate existing IR theories after a few adjustments and extensions (Acharya 2001). Global IR requires a two-way process. The problem of ethnocentrism in IR theory will not disappear by using case studies from the non-Western world primarily to test theories generated in the West. Instead, it will merely reinforce the image of area studies as little more than provider of raw data to Western theory. A key challenge for Global IR is to develop concepts and approaches from non-Western contexts *on their own terms* and to apply them not only locally, but also to other contexts, including the larger global canvas.

Third, Global IR subsumes, rather than supplants, existing IR knowledge—including well-known theories, methods, and scientific claims. IR theories are not monolithic or static in dealing with the non-Western world (Acharya 2013a). Some theories are more sensitive to non-Western contexts and experiences. Some critical theories, especially postcolonialism and feminism, have been at the forefront of efforts to recognize events, issues, agents, and interactions outside the West and to draw theoretical insights from them to enrich the study of IR (Ling 2002, 2007; Chowdhry and Nair 2004; Bilgin 2008, 2013; Agathangelou and Ling 2009; Tickner 2011a,b; Parashar 2013). Realism, somewhat ahead of liberalism in drawing insights from the non-Western world, has added new variants: subaltern realism, neoclassical realism, and defensive realism. These have rendered realism more relevant to the non-Western world. Constructivism has been especially important in opening space for scholarship on the non-Western world because of its stress on culture and identity. Increasing trends toward economic interdependence, multilateral cooperation, and democracy in the non-Western world make it more amenable to liberal explanations of war and peace.

At the same time, Global IR does not leave the mainstream theories—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—as *is*. Instead, it urges them to rethink their assumptions and broaden the scope of their investigations. It challenges realism to look beyond conflicts induced by national interest and distribution of power and acknowledge other sources of agency, including culture, ideas, and norms that make states and civilizations not clash, but embrace and learn from each other. It challenges liberals to look beyond *American hegemony* as the starting point of investigating multilateralism and regionalism and their institutional forms. Liberalism also needs to acknowledge the significant variations in cooperative behavior that exists among different local contexts, such that no single model of integration or interaction

accounts for all or most of them. It challenges constructivism to fulfill its unrealized agenda in terms of taking stock of different forms of agency in the creation and diffusion of ideas and norms.

Fourth, designating the field as “Global IR” does not mean downgrading the importance of regions and regionalisms, nor the contribution of area studies. Instead, Global IR gives the center stage to regions and the area studies tradition and approach. While the world is not fragmenting into regions, it is also not moving inexorably toward a seamless globality. Global IR calls for the acknowledgment of regional diversity and agency. Global IR views regions not as fixed physical, cartographic, or cultural entities, but as dynamic, purposeful, and socially constructed spaces (Acharya 2007). Regions and regionalism today are less territorially based or state-centric; they encompass an ever-widening range of actors and issues. This reflects the essence of the “regional world” perspective originally developed at the University of Chicago, which sought to redefine traditional area studies and integrate it into a wider global and comparative context. Central to that project was the affirmation that “Multiple regions overlap and contradict one another to form complex webs of power, interaction and imagination that are constantly in motion” (Ranchod-Nilsson 2000:8). The study of regions or areas concerns not just how they self-organize their economic, political, and cultural space, but also how they relate to each other and shape global order. To borrow the words of Arjun Appadurai (1997:6), a key member of the Chicago project areas, or regions “are not just places, but are also locations for the production of other world-pictures, which also need to be part of our sense of these other worlds.” Global IR views regions neither as wholly self-contained entities, nor as purely extensions of global dynamics. Indeed, the traditional divide between regionalism and universalism may be breaking down. The study of regions provides a central mechanism for forging a close integration between disciplinary approaches and area studies. Through its intimate link with the study of areas or regions, Global IR effectively synergizes disciplinary IR (with its theoretical interests and innovations but perceived lack of empirical richness) and the area studies tradition (with its strong emphasis on field research but which is seen by its critics as atheoretical). This new synthesis and synergy gives true meaning and substance to the idea of “international studies.”⁹

As noted above, giving regions a central place in Global IR does not mean assuming that the world is being fragmented into regions or regional blocs. Much recent speculation holds that the global power shift and the relative decline of the United States create a frenzy of bilateralism and regional bloc-building similar to the exclusionary blocs of the pre-World War II period (Ikenberry 2011:310). But regionalism today is much more open, “porous” (Katzenstein 2005:1), inter-regionally interactive, non-hegemonic, and multifaceted than that of the nineteenth century or early twentieth century variety. This is true even of the regional trade groups the United States promotes, such as the Trans-Pacific Partner-

⁹ I use Global IR rather than Global International Studies (Global IS) partly to underscore the narrowness of existing theories, which are usually referred to as IR (rather than IS) theories. I agree that “International studies” connotes a greater engagement with area studies and can be viewed as broader than IR; hence, it is coterminous with the idea of Global IR.

ship (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Such forms of inter-regionalism might help to bridge the gulf between geographic clusters. The idea of “regional worlds,” drawing from a synthesis of area studies and IR literatures, might offer a more probable turn in the future trajectory of regionalism—or at least one that would deserve attention and exploration alongside other more competitive forms of regionalism.

Fifth, a truly Global IR must eschew cultural exceptionalism and parochialism. Exceptionalism is the tendency to present the characteristics of one’s own group (society, state, or civilization) as homogenous, unique, and superior to those of others (Acharya 2001). Claims about exceptionalism frequently fall apart not just because of the cultural and political diversity within nations, regions, and civilizations. Such claims reflect the political agendas and purposes of the ruling elite, as evident in concepts such as “Asian Values,” “Asian human rights,” or “Asian Democracy”—which critics rightly associated with authoritarianism.

Similarly, exceptionalism often justifies the dominance of the powerful states over the weak. American exceptionalism, seemingly benign and popular at home, finds expression in the Monroe Doctrine and its self-serving global interventionism. One strand of Japan’s prewar pan-Asian discourse—founded upon the slogan of “Asia for Asians”—also illustrates this tendency. Some efforts to invoke the Chinese tributary system as the basis of a new Chinese School of IR raise similar possibilities (Acharya 2001, 2011a).

The development of national and regional schools of IR can broaden and enrich IR. But if it takes the form of exceptionalism, it also challenges the possibility of Global IR.¹⁰ While identity-based knowledge, like the knowledge of the Munshis and the Pundits at the Fort William College, deserves its place, it does not preclude the need for comparative and broader understandings of the local context.

Finally, Global IR takes a broad conception of agency (Acharya 2011a, 2013a). Various IR theories have denied the agency claims of the non-Western societies. Not so long ago, as is evident from nineteenth century liberal doctrines and the early English School discourses of the post-War period, agency in IR primarily appeared in terms of a “standard of civilization.” Its decisive elements included the capacity of states to defend their sovereignty, wage war, negotiate treaties, enforce compliance, and manage the balance of power. This self-serving, ahistorical, and brazenly racist formulation by the European colonial powers ignored the fact that even the most sophisticated forms of statcraft already existed in many early non-Western civilizations.

While mainstream IR theories view the so-called Third World or South or Global South (I use these terms interchangeably) as marginal to the “main story” of world politics, some critical theories—including those associated with postcolonialism and dependency schools—actually thrive on this presumed marginality. Their advocates rightly criticize mainstream theories for excluding the Global South, but do little exploration of alternative forms of agency from the latter, since recognizing that agency might risk undermining the central part of their narratives.

While global disparities in material power show no signs of disappearing, we need to adopt a broader view of agency. In Global IR, agency is ideational as well as material. It goes beyond military power and wealth and avoids privileging transnational norm entrepreneurship. Agency is ideational as well as material.

Scholars have long contested the meaning of agency in IR. Some challenge the positivist, statist-anthropomorphist understanding of agency (state as person, state as agent). Scholars increasingly recognize the agency claims of a broader category of actors other than individuals and states—and argue for a more complex understanding of what constitutes the agency of the state (Wight 2006:180–181). Constructivists have viewed agency in terms of how “inter-subjective meanings, operating at the levels of domestic and international society, license and define sovereign, territorial political units, and how the definition of such units constitutes and empowers certain political actors, particularly governments” (Price and Reus-Smit 1998:286). Sikkink (2013:2–3) has called for an “agentic constructivism” that is “concerned with the role of human consciousness in international politics,” and focuses on the struggle for human rights and “new forms of governance...that may, over time create new understanding of the ways states and nonstate actors ought to behave, and new understandings of the national interests of states.”

While we should welcome these broadenings of agency, I call for a still broader conception. The early constructivist conceptions of agency did not tell us much about how the intersubjective meanings or rules might empower political actors in the non-Western world, including individuals, states, and nonstate actors. We need a framework of agency that allows space for recognizing the material and ideational roles of both Western and non-Western agents. To develop such a framework, we need to accept that an act of agency involves resistance and rejection, and not just the strengthening of the status quo in world politics. An agent-oriented narrative in Global IR should tell us how actors (state and nonstate), through their material, ideational, and interaction capabilities, construct, reject, reconstitute, and transform global and regional orders. Some examples might include the role of non-Western actors in the following: (1) challenging great-power dominance in creating and managing global and regional order; (2) reinterpreting the global norms of sovereignty, such as non-intervention and their adaptation and application to the local and regional contexts and more broadly to a wider international setting; (3) constructing new rules of sovereignty to support and strengthen global rules and institutions, especially when these rules are being challenged or undermined by their original formulators to serve their own changing interests; (4) conceptualizing and implementing new pathways to security and development, which reflect the distinctive predicament and

¹⁰ My test for national or regional “schools” of IR is that they must offer concepts and approaches that explain IR not only in that particular country or region, but also beyond. In other words, they must be applicable, at least to some degree, to the world at large. For example, the English School and the Copenhagen School, despite their biases and limitations, has offered concepts such as “international society,” or “securitization,” respectively, which have genuinely broader applicability beyond the UK or Europe and are used by scholars in other parts of the world. Other examples can be found in Southeast Asian specialist Ben Anderson’s analysis of nationalism as “imagined community,” a concept, which reflected a strong, if not exclusively Indonesian context (Anderson 1983; Acharya 2014b). To be credible, a Chinese School of IR must offer concepts and explanations that have relevance beyond China or East Asia, rather than simply capture China’s international behavior or the East Asian international system.

concerns of the victims of insecurity, poverty, and inequality; and (5) creating and maintaining regional institutions and orders that offer a framework for conflict reduction and resolution in different regions and compensate for the limitations of the UN system.

Viewed as such, agency is not the prerogative of the strong. It can manifest as the weapon of the weak. Agency can be exercised in global transnational space as well as at regional and local levels. Agency can take multiple forms. It can describe acts of resistance to and localization of global norms and institutions (Acharya 2004, 2009). Agency also means constructing new rules and institutions at the local level to support and strengthen global order against great-power hypocrisy and dominance (Acharya 2011b). Agency involves conceptualizing and implementing new approaches to development, security, and ecological justice. Recent research shows that developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa played a significant but hitherto unacknowledged role in the creation of postwar norms and institutions related to universal human rights, sovereignty, international development, disarmament, and universal participation (Global Governance 2014:359–417).¹¹ The 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung redefined and broadened the norms of universal sovereignty. Africa created a form of regionalism to maintain postcolonial boundaries (Acharya 2009:70–74, 2011b:116). India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, was the first to propose a nuclear test-ban. And the origins of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, usually attributed to a Canadian-proposed commission, cannot be understood without its African context and advocacy. The ideas of human development and human security were pioneered by South Asian development economists: Mahbub ul Haq of Pakistan and Amartya Sen of India (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007). From the climate change negotiations, we see the developing countries offering the idea of the “common but differentiated responsibility” norm.

Some of these acts of agency—which have involved rejecting attempts by the major Western powers to create privileged space for their interests as well as collaborating with them to organize and manage global governance—are not just for specific regions or for the Global South itself, but are important to the world order as a whole. Using this broader framework of agency, we can find that the South has had a voice. While Spivak's (1988) portrayal of the marginalization of southern voices remains pertinent, we find examples where the “subaltern could indeed speak,” as well as resist and act. Mainstream IR theories can no longer afford to ignore them. The idea of Global IR recognizes the voices and agency of the South and opens a central place for subaltern perspectives on global order and the changing dynamics of North–South relations.

A Global IR Research Agenda

I urge and challenge scholars of Global IR to:

- Discover new patterns, theories, and methods from world histories.
- Analyze changes in the distribution of power and ideas after 200 plus years of Western dominance.
- Explore regional worlds in their full diversity and interconnectedness.
- Engage with subjects and methods that require deep and substantive integration of disciplinary and area studies knowledge.
- Examine how ideas and norms circulate between global and local levels.
- Investigate the mutual learning among civilizations, of which there is more historical evidence than there is for the “clash of civilizations.”

These six areas are part of the Global IR agenda and form the core of the 2015 ISA New Orleans Convention theme. They are by no means exhaustive. To some extent, they reflect the intellectual challenges and questions that I have faced and tried to address. The idea of Global IR should remain a broad umbrella, open to contestation, interpretation, elaboration, and extension. But the six themes are a good starting point for discussions and debates that are necessary for the broadening of our discipline. Let me elaborate them briefly.

Discover New Patterns, Theories, and Methods from World Histories to Challenge Current Stereotypes

Global IR scholarship is founded on a comparative historiography of international systems and orders. This calls, first and foremost, for discarding the Westphalian mindset when it comes to analyzing the past, present, and future of IR and world order. As Hui (2004) argues, the tendency among Western IR theorists to regard centralization (hierarchy and empire, for example, the Chinese empire after the Warring States period) as aberrations, while decentralization (the Westphalia model) is seen as the norm of international system is misleading. Because of the hegemonic position of the Westphalian model, IR scholars have long ignored other types of international systems and orders with a fundamentally different dynamics of power and ideas (Buzan and Little 1994, 2010). Examples of such systems include the Amarna system—the fourteenth century BC interactions among the rulers of Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, Hatti, Mittani, and other independent states—which Cohen and Westbrook (2000:4) call the “first international system known to us,” the East Asian international system among China and its neighbors with its deep sense of legitimized hierarchy (Kang 2007), and the much more decentralized Mandala system of Southeast Asia. This last featured closely interacting political units with a more ritualistic rather than legalistic and proprietorial view of state sovereignty (Acharya 2000b). Historical patterns of interstate relations in the non-Western world should be viewed as sources of IR theorizing, especially if they can be conceptualized in a manner that would extend their analytical utility and normative purpose beyond a particular region. As the relatively short *durée* of European or Western dominance passes, it is not unreasonable to suppose that more historical and indigenous patterns and practices of IR might induce consequential changes to world order.

Let me offer one example of where such research might lead to. The example involves a comparative analysis of the classical systems in the Mediterranean and the Eastern Indian Ocean, roughly the region of contempo-

¹¹ Entitled “Principles from the Periphery: The Neglected Southern Sources of Global Norms,” this special section of *Global Governance* 20(3) includes contributions by Eric Helleiner (international development), Kathryn Sikkink (human rights), Martha Finnemore and Michelle Jurovitch (universal participation), and this author (normative impact of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung on human rights, sovereignty, disarmament, and the UN).

rary Southeast Asia. For a long while, IR scholars have looked to the Mediterranean region as an inspiration and source for theory development. Examples include balance of power theory—Thucydides's account of the Peloponnesian War, the Rome-Carthage rivalry, etc.—the republican security theory originating with the Roman republic (Deudney 2008), and constructivist contributions on constitutive norms and culture of IR (Reus-Smit 2001; Lebow 2008).

By contrast, IR scholars pay no attention to classical interactions in the Indian Ocean region. Yet comparing the classical Mediterranean region and classical Indian Ocean challenges us to rethink the concept and practice of power, legitimacy, and international orders, all of which are central concepts in IR. The two regions displayed very different approaches to provision of collective goods by the leading power. The Roman Empire promoted trade by conquering all littoral states and directly controlling the trade routes, with Rome itself as the major if not the only beneficiary. By contrast, the Indian Ocean trade, until the advent of the European imperial powers in the sixteenth century A.D., remained open. Trade flourished without the direct intervention of a hegemonic power. The Chinese Tributary system, which encompassed the Southeast Asian segment of the Indian Ocean (sometimes called the "Asian Mediterranean" because of similarities in maritime geography), was more indirect in operation with its benefits more equitable between China and the tributary states. Hence, the Indian Ocean system suggests a less coercive role of material power in the making of international systems and orders.

Second, the two regions displayed different patterns and modalities when it came to the flow of ideas. While there are some similarities between the spread of Greek ideas and culture in the Mediterranean ("Hellenization") and that of Indian ideas and culture in Southeast Asia ("Indianization") during the classical period, the latter involved less confrontation and was more the product of the voluntary initiative of the local rulers (Acharya 2013c).

The two cases thus offer two different images of hegemony and legitimacy in the making of international systems. The Mediterranean example conforms to the mainstream Western theories that stress how a materially hegemonic power creates and manages international systems and orders. The Indian Ocean suggests how local agency and localization of ideas and institutions (including religious, cultural, and political) shape international systems and orders. We can thus challenge the Western stereotype contrasting the open, decentralized, "free," dynamic, and enlightened West on the one hand, and the closed, static, and absolutist Orient (Acharya 2013c).

Analyze Changes in the Distribution of Power and Ideas after 200 Plus Years of Western Dominance and its Implications for World Order

A second theme for Global IR scholars relates to the shape of international change. A key question here is whether the emerging world order will be either a reconstituted form of American hegemony or a replay of nineteenth and early twentieth century European multipolarity (or Cold War bipolarity for that matter). The real question is not whether the United States itself is declining, but whether the world order the United States created and managed is ending irrespective of the

decline or revival of the United States as a nation. Some argue that the American-led liberal hegemony (Ikenberry 2011:345) will persist and might even co-opt its potential challengers like China and other emerging powers. But it may be more plausible to think of fundamental shifts in the rules and institutions of global order, including the possibility of a decentered world where no single power, be it United States or China, exercises hegemony.

Scholars base a good deal of the speculation and debate over international order since the end of the Cold War on patterns and lessons derived from Europe before World War II (Mearsheimer 1990; Layne 1993; Wohlforth 1999). Yet this Eurocentric understanding, which sees a return to multipolarity, may turn out to be quite wrong. The world today is much more complex than the European state-system. Its great or rising powers are more diverse and geographically more dispersed (just think of the BRICS or the G-20 members). And these rising powers are also predominantly *non-European*. They have distinct and diverse cultural and historical experiences that inform their conceptions of and approach to world order. Hence, the tendency to conceptualize the emerging world order in terms of European history is wrong-headed.

The emerging world order is better described as a multiplex world (Acharya 2014a). As with a multiplex theater, there would be a variety of plots (ideas, world-views), actors, producers, and directors of world politics. A multiplex world comprises *multiple* key actors/producers/directors (including shape-shifting villains like terrorist groups) whose relationships are defined by *complex* forms of interdependence. A multiplex world is not a multipolar world, especially of the pre-World War II European kind. The key players in international politics today are not just the great or rising powers. They also include regional powers, international institutions, nonstate actors (good and bad), and multinational corporations. Interdependence in this multiplex world is complex and multidimensional, comprising not just trade, but also financial flows and transnational production. It has multiple layers of governance, global, inter-regional, regional, state, and sub-state. It might give more play to regions, regional powers, and regionalisms than the American-led order.

The advent of the multiplex world order is at least partly a result of the relative improvement in the economic conditions in the non-Western world. Some of these are directly associated with the so-called rising powers or emerging powers, a group spearheaded by the likes of China, India, Brazil, South Africa, etc. The combined GDP of China, Brazil, and India—the three leading economies of the developing world—now about equals the combined GDP of the six major industrial nations of the West—United States, Germany, UK, France, Canada, and Italy (United Nations Development Program 2013:13). By 2050, these three countries are projected to account for 40% of the global GDP, surpassing the combined share of the G-7 industrialized nations—United States, Germany, UK, France, Canada, Italy, and Japan (United Nations Development Program 2013:13).

Economic change extends beyond the emerging powers of the South. There is also evidence of a more general "rise of the South" (United Nations Development Program 2013:13). The South has increased its share of the global output from one-third in 1990 to about half now. Developing countries increased their share of world merchandise trade from 25% in 1980 to 47% in 2010.

And South–South trade has jumped from <8% of world merchandise trade in 1980 to more than 26% in 2011 (United Nations Development Program 2013:2). There has also been a marked success in extreme poverty reduction (below \$1.25 per day): Brazil from 17.2% to 6.1% in 2009, China from 60.2% in 1990 to 13.1% in 2008, and India from 49.4% in 1990 to 32.7% in 2010 (United Nations Development Program 2013:13).

But these positive signs in the South should not blind us to persisting and new challenges. Global poverty remains a significant problem, and inequality is rising. More than three billion people, about half the world, live on less than \$2.50 a day and 80% of world's population lives on less than \$10 a day. And for every \$1 in aid a developing country receives, more than \$25 is spent on debt repayment (Shah 2013). Just 1% of the world's population owns half of the world's wealth (Oxfam 2014:2). Income inequality is rising in all but four member countries of the G20, even while it is falling in many low-income and lower middle-income countries (Oxfam 2012:2). Brazil, Indonesia and, on some indicators, Argentina have recorded significant progress in reducing inequality over the past 20 years. By contrast, China, India, and South Africa have all become less equal over time; inequality levels in Argentina and Brazil still remain high. Inequality in South Africa and Russia has also reached high levels (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 2011).

Of late, the advent of groups like the G-20 is redefining the nature of North–South relations. Solana (2010), the former NATO and EU foreign policy chief, has called the G20 “the only forum in which world powers and emerging countries sit as equals at the same table.” But the G-20 is a remarkably unrepresentative group of the developing nations. The West dominates it, with too many European members and not enough representation from the developing world. And while pitched as an effort to bridge the North–South divide, it creates a new polarization within the South: between the Power South and the Poor South. There are increasing disparities within the South caused by the rise of some emerging countries, with the result that there is now “a ‘south’ in the North and a ‘north’ in the South” (United Nations Development Program 2013:2). The euphoria and hubris regarding the “rise of the Rest” in some policy-oriented IR literature must not obscure these inequities—which are shared among the established and emerging powers.

There is a danger that the hubris that marks the “rise of the Rest” discourse in the study of IR will lead us to ignore these persisting forms of marginalization. A key challenge for Global IR is to avoid such hubris and investigate marginalization in its broader and newer forms. We must attend to marginalization in the context of relations between states, within states, within groups, and within various subdisciplines and movements in the field.

Explore Regional Worlds in Their Full Diversity and Interconnectedness

A revisionist genealogy of comparative regionalism is a third area of concern for global IR scholarship. While regionalism is a worldwide phenomenon, the theoretical literature on regionalism narrowly frames the phenomenon in Eurocentric terms. Historically, regionalism takes a variety of forms and functions, including the following:

- Great-power spheres of influence, such as the US Monroe Doctrine, the German *Mitteleuropa*, the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the Concert of Europe.
- As an approach to conflict-management: a subset of, or alternative to, the universalism of the UN.
- As an expression of cultural identity and autonomy, for example, Pan-Americanism, Pan-Europeanism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Africanism, and Pan-Asianism.
- As an approach to suppress nationalism and prevent return to war through economic and political integration (Western Europe after 1945).
- As a platform for advancing decolonization and national liberation, for example, The Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi (1947 and 1949) and the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955.
- As a forum for organizing resistance to great-power intervention, for example, historical Latin American regionalism resisting US intervention, and the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) during the Cold War.
- To promote economic development through regional self-reliance and intraregional linkages, for example, most regional economic groups among developing countries.
- Fragmentation of the global liberal order into trading or economic blocs (as is currently being feared by the defenders of US hegemony).

The true pioneers of regionalism were not European, but Latin American. Latin Americans promoted regionalism at least a 100 years before the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor to the EU. They were the most vocal advocates of regionalism in the framing of the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference, where the United States expressed a strong preference for universalism. Later, regionalism and inter-regionalism found expression alongside nationalism in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, as exemplified in the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 and 1949, the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, as well as in the formation of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Arab League, and the OAU, the predecessor to the African Union (AU) within the first two decades after World War II. Ideas of regionalism were by no means confined to Europe, even though some of these ideas did not initially find concrete or durable institutional forms.

Eurocentrism in comparative regionalism emerged not simply because of the relative success of the EEC/EU. The theories of IR applied to regional institutions and interactions—such as liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism—as well as theories of regionalism *per se*, such as functionalism, neofunctionalism, and transactionalism, are for the most part derived from the Western context, ideas, and practices. Since the 1950s, theories of regionalism have closely paralleled the origins and evolution of the EEC/EU. They have not proven to be of much value in explaining the evolution and performance of regionalisms in the non-Western world.

Recent perspectives, such as the “new regionalism” literature, and the application of constructivism to study norm diffusion and community-building at the regional level, have expanded our understanding of regionalism. But even these advances fail to adequately capture what

Bilgin (2004a:25) calls the “multitude of contending perspectives” on regional orders “that have their roots in alternative worldviews.” In the meantime, not only have regional groups proliferated in the non-Western world, but the purpose and functions of regionalism have expanded considerably. Regionalism is no longer geared mainly to achieving trade liberalization or conflict-management, but also to managing transnational issues such as the environment, refugees, migration, human rights, counter-terrorism, internal conflicts, etc. The proliferation of regional groups and the expansion of their tasks introduces a greater variety and diversity to the design and operation of regional bodies. Not only is there greater variation between the EU model and the rest of the world, but also between and among regionalisms in different parts of the world, such as Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. For example, African regionalism embraces the R2P norm, while Asian regionalism resists it. Asian economic regionalism is more market driven than that associated with Europe’s intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. Latin America’s is more geared to democracy promotion than Asia’s. Africa’s regionalism has done more in the area of security and collective intervention, Asia’s in market integration, and Latin America’s in democracy promotion.

Global IR scholars should conceptualize and investigate these diverse forms of regionalism. Regionalisms in the multiplex world should no longer be judged in terms of how well they achieve EU-style integration.

Engage with Subjects and Methods that Require Deep and Substantive Integration of Disciplinary and Area Studies Knowledge

Global IR scholarship should rise above the false divide between area studies approaches and IR as a discipline with its distinctive theories, methods, and empirical terrain. “Area studies versus the discipline” is a peculiarly American debate. In many other parts of the world, IR has evolved on the back of area studies (Alagappa 2011). It is more productive to seek ways of building convergence and synergy between the two approaches.

Many scholars in the social sciences today combine disciplinary approaches (theory and method) with area studies knowledge. Two new directions in the mutual engagement between IR and area studies may be termed “disciplinary area studies” and “transnational and comparative regional studies” (Acharya 2014b). The former includes scholars whose main interest is in IR broadly, but who also study specific regions because of some novel and interesting trend or phenomena, such as new patterns of economic change, geopolitics, and cooperation. These scholars were not trained in the area studies tradition, which assumes a lifelong devotion to a country or region, and mastery of its languages and culture, but they offer novel insights and develop tools of analysis that are useful to both area specialists and disciplinary IR scholars.¹² Their work compliments the contribution of those whose primary training might be in area studies but who may see the value of theoretical approaches. Indeed, a growing number of such scholars now recognize the need to move beyond a traditional area studies approach focusing on a single country or region and

embrace theoretical and comparative investigations. While their primary focus remains area studies, they also contribute to the conceptual and analytical development of IR as a discipline.

A challenge for such scholarship is to come up with concepts and insights from one regional context that may also have analytical relevance beyond that region. This is by no means an impossible demand. As Kang (2007:199) points out, “For too long, IR scholars have derived theoretical propositions from the European experience and then treated them as deductive and universal.” If European and North Atlantic regional affairs could be turned into IR theories, why couldn’t the affairs of other areas?

The second category of convergent scholarship may be called “transnational and comparative regional studies.” Issues such as development, democratization, human rights campaigns, as well as the challenges posed by pandemics, financial meltdowns, environmental degradation, and terrorism reflect the dynamic of globalization even if they disproportionately affect particular regions. Increasingly, we have a growing number of scholars who are interested in the comparative study of such transnational issues in different countries and regions, employing theoretical tools and methods from a variety of disciplines. Then, there are those scholars who are trained as specialists on one country or region, but investigate such issues comparatively and across traditional area boundaries. Indeed, as Katzenstein (2005:xi) notes, “area-based knowledge has been at the forefront of analyzing transnational relations, the global operation of nongovernmental organizations, and social movements spanning national borders.” This sort of scholarship blurs the boundary between area studies and discipline-based investigations, promotes interdisciplinary approaches, and opens up much creative space for Global IR.

Examine How Ideas and Norms Circulate Between Global and Local Levels

A fifth concern of Global IR scholarship that deserves greater attention is the diffusion of ideas and norms. Early constructivist theory privileged transnational norm entrepreneurs, who usually came from the West, and regarded non-Western societies and actors as passive targets, or norm takers.

This view has begun to change with new wave of norm diffusion scholarship (Acharya 2004, 2009, 2011b). This literature gives more play to the role of local actors, which may include both state and nonstate (knowledge networks, social movements) actors at regional, national, and substate (municipal, village, etc.) levels. Though materially weak, these actors cannot simply be dismissed as norm takers. Their preexisting local ideas and norms do not entirely disappear because of some “civilizing” impact of foreign norms, but are enmeshed into a broader hybrid normative matrix. They adapt and create norms in accordance with or to give expression to their own beliefs, values, and aspirations. They may do so to challenge their exclusion or marginalization from the norm making processes at higher levels. They defend norms which are threatened by the hypocrisy of the major powers or the incompetence of global institutions.

These and other forms of local agency in norm creation and diffusion are increasingly being recognized in recent norm scholarship (see for example, articles by

¹² Such scholars in the US might include Peter Katzenstein, Etel Solingen, Vinod Aggarwal, Miles Kahler, and John Ikenberry; in the UK, Barry Buzan.

Sikkink, Finnemore, and Jurovitch, Helleiner, and Acharya in Global Governance 2014). For example, Sikkink's (2014) notion of "norm protagonism" describes the pioneering role of Latin American countries in promoting the idea of universal human rights. Such work constitutes a rich and promising area of enquiry for studying the life cycle of different types of ideas and norms, be they "bad" ones that sustain violent extremism, or good ones such as the idea of universal human rights, where the role of regional or local agency has been often neglected.

Investigate the Mutual Learning among Civilizations, of Which there is More Historical Evidence than there is for the Clash of Civilizations

A sixth area of investigation for Global IR scholars is to explore and conceptualize the multiple and different ways in which civilizations encounter each other and the result of such encounters. This involves, first and foremost, questioning the narrow, ahistorical, strategic view of civilizations popularized by Huntington (1996). That thesis sidesteps the richer and more complex set of questions about civilizations (Acharya 2013b). What is the relationship between civilizations and power? Do civilizations always clash with each other or do they also (and perhaps more often) interact peacefully and engage in mutual learning?

Katzenstein (2010:2) observes that "Civilizations exist in the plural. They co-exist with each other." The "clash of civilizations" thesis ignores the varieties of ways, including pacific ways, in which civilizations have borrowed and exchanged ideas and engaged in mutual learning. Some of the more important historical examples include the borrowings by classical Greece and the Hellenistic kingdoms spawned by Alexander the Great's conquests, from the Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Persian civilizations, by Rome from the Greek civilization, by China and Southeast Asia from the Indian civilization, by India from the Persian, Arab and central Asian civilizations, by the West from the Islamic and Chinese civilizations, and by Japan from the Korean and Chinese civilizations. While conventional accounts assert the superiority of the Western civilization, with its Greek and Roman foundations, they ignore the borrowings of scientific ideas by the Greeks from Egypt and Mesopotamia or the European borrowing of Arabic science and technology. What is also interesting is that some of these borrowings were initiated by materially more powerful civilizations from weaker and subjugated civilizations, such as Rome from their subjects Greece and Egypt, and the Hellenistic rulers from Egypt and Persia which had been conquered by Alexander the Great. But not all the intercivilizational exchanges occurred through conquest. As I have already noted, classical interactions between India and Southeast Asia were for the most part marked by pacific exchanges in which Indian ideas were borrowed and localized by the Southeast Asians to empower *themselves*, not the Indians (Acharya 2013b). If one takes the long-term view, the nearly 2,000 years of recorded interaction between Chinese and Indian civilizations has been overwhelmingly pacific. The history of civilizations may thus be told not in terms of blood, treasure, and conflict, but of convergence of ideas, identity, and mutual benefit.

Islam has been at the epicenter of the "clash of civilizations" debate and the "war on terror." But a historical perspective reveals that Islamic civilization not only served as a "successor civilization" (Braudel 1993:41) to the ear-

lier civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia but also as a "bridge of the world," and as the pioneer of the world economy (Hobson 2004:29–49). Islamic scholars and rulers during the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad and in subsequent periods not only translated and preserved Greek, Roman, and Indian scientific and philosophical ideas, but also contributed to that knowledge through their own innovations. These ideas played their part in the making of the European Renaissance and modern Europe (Carboni, Trinita, and Marwell 2007; Saliba 2007). This is reminiscent of the crucial role of Chinese translations of Buddhist texts from India, which preserved them for the posterity after Buddhism more or less disappeared in India itself.

An idea that is as false and pernicious as the "clash of civilizations" thesis is the aforementioned "standard of civilization" idea, which accompanied and justified European colonialism. In imposing that standard, the European traders, missionaries, and colonial officials abandoned their initial admiration and respect for the long-standing and accomplished civilizations in India and China, and adopted a policy of exclusion, chauvinism, and racial superiority which contrasted sharply with the experience of other intercivilizational encounters. As Phillips (2014:716) points out, "Where Mughal and Manchu civilizing missions centered on processes of ritual incorporation, and sought to embrace rather than efface cultural difference through practices of cultural borrowing and bricolage, proponents of the classic [European] civilizational standard were far less plastic and permissive in their accommodation of cultural difference." This observation reinforces the need for Global IR scholars to study alternative narratives about how civilizations encounter each other.

Despite Huntington's warning, which provided considerable intellectual justification for the war on terror and blinded many people to its excesses, there is little evidence today of a clash of civilizations taking place. For the most part, civilizations continue to coexist and learn from each other. This is evident, as noted earlier, in the development and diffusion of ideas such as human development, human security, and responsible sovereignty, which were developed by non-Western policy intellectuals and actors in collaboration with their Western counterparts. Such mutual learning among civilizations is likely to accelerate as the non-Western countries continue to catch up. Changes to the global distribution of ideas will increasingly accompany changes to the global distribution of material power.

Conclusion

In his well-known 1963 commencement speech at American University in Washington, DC, President John F. Kennedy stated: "if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity" (Kennedy 1963). Three decades later, Nelson Mandela echoed Kennedy by committing himself to the promotion of "institutions and forces that, through democratic means, seek to make the world safe for diversity" (Mandela 1993).

The study of IR should not obscure, but celebrate the differences among its different theoretical, epistemological, and methodological approaches. But in so doing, it should also strive for greater respect for diversity in our knowledge sources and claims, historical experiences, and beliefs and approaches about world order. The challenge

is not just to make the study of IR “safe” for diversity but also be enriched by that diversity.

In addressing this challenge, Global IR scholars should be especially aware of the problem of “neomarginalization” in IR scholarship. Neomarginalization occurs when attempts to respect diversity and become more inclusive in IR theories have led to opposite outcomes. Take, for example, the study of race in IR. Race was the basis of “the first global attempt to speak of equality” (Persaud and Walker 2001:374). But the two major theories of IR, realism and liberalism, stand accused of ethnocentrism and racism (Hobson 2012; Henderson 2013). And while race has been receiving attention in IR (Bell 2013:1), there remains a problem with “the manner of its current inclusion which is basically one of paternalism” (Persaud 2014). Yet another example of neomarginalization can be found in feminist scholarship. There has been inspiring progress in overcoming the exclusion and marginalization of women from mainstream IR. This has been accomplished through the contribution of scholars from both the North and the South. But as Parashar (2014a) notes, “Despite widespread postcolonial ideas and general scholarship emerging on the global south and women; despite the third wave feminist commitment to recognizing that there is no global sisterhood and diversity and difference, empirical experiences are important in the construction of knowledge, most academic spaces are still occupied by Western feminists,” and “the notion of multiple voices and diversity is lost in the cacophony of white Western privileged voices.” What is needed in the cases of scholarship on race and women, as with the field of IR more generally, is “a degree of self-introspection, reflection and a genuine and not token commitment to diversity” (Parashar 2014b).

The IR of Sahib and Munshi is over. The time for Global IR has come. I invite you to discuss and debate the project of Global IR and help move our discipline to a new frontier which leaves behind arrogance and exclusion and “where humility and learning drive one’s engagements with others” (Ling 2010:225). Together, we must ensure that the Global IR project does not suffer the fate of the Fort William College in British India, but becomes a vibrant, innovative, and inclusive enterprise that reflects the voices, experiences, interests, and identities of all of humankind.

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