

exist independently of people behaving. To dance a waltz is simply to dance in a certain way. Similarly, to have simply to behave in a certain way. Ryle provides the following illustration of the linguistic confusion behind the body problem.

Thought Experiment

Ryle's University Seeker

A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments, and administrative offices. He then adds "But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of your university." It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories, and offices which he has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their coordination is understood, the University has been seen. His mistake lay in his innocent assumption that it was correct to speak of the Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum, and the University, to speak, that is, as if "the University" stood for an extra member of the class of which these other units are members. He was mistakenly allocating the University to the same category as that to which the other institutions belong.³³

Ryle's university seeker makes what Ryle calls a "category mistake" in assuming that the university exists in the same way that libraries, museums, and laboratories do. Similarly, dualists make a category mistake in assuming that minds exist in the same way that bodies do. Minds, like universities, are simply complex patterns of behavior. To believe otherwise is to accept what Ryle calls "the dogma of the ghost in the machine." For Ryle, there's nothing more to having a mind than having a tendency to behave in certain ways.

Since logical behaviorism maintains that there's nothing more to having a mind than having certain behavioral dispositions, it has no trouble admitting the possibility of intelligent robots. If a robot's behavior were indistinguishable from that of a normal human being, it would have a mind, even if it were made of silicon and steel. Whether it had any feelings would be irrelevant. All that matters from a logical behaviorist's point of view is the sort of behavior it exhibits. As long as that behavior is sufficiently similar to our own, it would have the same mental states that we do.

According to the criteria of adequacy, then, logical behaviorism is a better theory than Cartesian dualism. To see whether it's an acceptable theory, though, we'll have to see whether it can explain all the relevant aspects of mental phenomena.

Since logical behaviorism maintains that having a certain set of behavioral dispositions is both necessary and sufficient for being in a mental state, it is committed to the following two claims: (1) if something is in a mental state, then it must have a certain set of behavioral dispositions (this is the necessary part) and (2) if something has a certain set of behavioral dispositions, then it must be in a mental state (this is the sufficient part). To refute logical behaviorism, then, all we have to show is (1) that it's possible to be in a mental state and not have a certain set of behavioral dispositions or (2) that it's possible to have a certain set of behavioral conditionals and not be in a mental state. Let's put logical behaviorism to the test and see whether either of these situations is possible.

Many mental states, such as pain, love, and fear, have certain feelings associated with them. What it feels like to be in one of those states is known as its subjective character or its **qualitative content**. The qualitative content of a mental state seems to be essential to it; if