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The Study of Appeasement in International Relations: Polemics, Paradigms, and Problems*

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Research in a variety of fields has provided a perspective on policies of appeasement that differs significantly from the simplistic images underlying commonly held foreign policy attitudes. Nevertheless, most journalists, politicians, pundits and even many prominent students of international relations have virtually ignored serious scholarship on the subject of appeasement, relying instead on the highly negative view that emerged after the failed British effort to avert war in the late 1930s. This essay critically analyzes major scholarly contributions in the study of appeasement and divides this research into three general approaches: orthodox/realist; behavioral/utility; and liberal/exchange. While all three shed light on factors that contribute to the inception of strategies of appeasement, the liberal/exchange approach – by far the least developed or known of the three – possesses the most potential for offering a nuanced explanation. More generally, this review seeks to establish a basis for a critical analysis not only of the journalistic dogma that has attached to such cases as Bosnia, China, and North Korea, but also of the policies themselves.

Introduction

Recent foreign policies of the USA and other leading nations have aroused cries of ‘appeasement’.¹ Many of these critiques

have drawn inspiration from the specter of British policies toward Germany in the years leading up to the outbreak of World War II. The highly negative view of appeasement evident in these attacks quickly became a cornerstone of the modern political vocabulary in the wake of the failed British attempt to avert an armed conflict with Germany in the late 1930s. Since that time, the ‘Munich analogy’ has provided rich fodder for the justification of interven-

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¹ Such charges have been most evident in connection with three highly visible policy problems: the Western response to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia (e.g. Biden, 1993; Brzezinski, 1993; Friedman, 1992, 1993; Jacques, 1993;

Kaufman, 1993; Khalilzad, 1993; Lewis, 1993abc; Macrae, 1993; Mead, 1993; Nott, 1994; Pullinger, 1992; Rhodes, et al., 1994; Safire, 1993; Sullivan, 1994; Wokler, 1993); the Clinton Administration’s policy of ‘engagement’ towards China (e.g. Lizhi & Haiching, 1994; Rosenthal, 1994a, b, d, 1995ab, 1996a–c, 1997; Safire, 1994a, b; Zakaria, 1996); and the US–North Korean agreement on nuclear energy (e.g. Bolton, 1996; Dongbok, 1995; Lewis, 1996; McCain, 1994; Plunk, 1995, 1996, 1997; Rosenthal, 1994c; Taylor, 1996).

tions or for attacks on political opponents' 'lack of resolve'.

In contrast, the scholarly interpretation of the pre-war British grand strategy has been much less monolithic. British appeasement has indeed been uncritically accepted by many scholars as 'the attempt to compromise with an imperialism not recognized as such' (Morgenthau, 1985: 77), and it has been defended by others as the inevitable consequence of the British predicament (Taylor, 1961). What we find then, as one historiographer has termed it, is a 'hopelessly partisan record of vilification' on the one hand and veritable 'hagiography' on the other (Fuchser, 1982). The tragic outcome of Neville Chamberlain's policy towards 'the German Problem' in the late 1930s has substantially undermined the usefulness of appeasement as an *analytical* concept, prompting one prominent historian to conclude that appeasement should be added to the list of words no scholar should use (Medlicott, 1962).

Subsequently, after more than 50 years, key questions remain unresolved regarding appeasement. Given the apparent illogic of appeasement, why would any leaders choose appeasement as a strategy for dealing with rogue or aggressor states?

Against this backdrop, it is disappointing if not at all surprising that many observers have ignored serious scholarly contributions in this area. In fact, research in a variety of fields has given a general view of appeasement that differs significantly from the simplistic images in many current perspectives on foreign policy decision-making. This essay will critically analyze major contributions to this research under three general categories: (1) orthodox/realist; (2) behavioral/utility; and (3) liberal/exchange. While all three approaches shed light on some factors that contribute to the development of strategies of appeasement, the little known liberal/exchange approach appears to be the

most helpful basis for research and critical analysis with its synthesis of orthodox and behavioral approaches.

The Study of Appeasement

The Realist School

Although the problem of appeasement should be a common focus of research among international relations specialists, much of what is widely believed about appeasement has been obtained from the work of historians, particularly those writing in the immediate aftermath of World War II.

Historical writing on appeasement has progressed from orthodoxy via revisionism to counter-revisionism and finally to a sort of post-revisionist synthesis. This orthodox view of appeasement was defined initially by the 'Guilty Men' school, which took its lead from the infamous book published under the pseudonym of 'Cato' (Owen, 1940), later reinforced by Churchill (1948), Namier (1948, 1950, 1952), Wheeler-Bennett (1935, 1948, 1954), Middlemas (1972a, 1972b), and others. The revisionist school is best exemplified by Taylor's (1961) controversial effort to relieve Chamberlain from his 'guilt', and later expressed in works by Eubank (1963), Robbins (1968), Thompson (1968), and Gilbert (1966). By some accounts (e.g. Beck 1989), we can also identify an intermediary 'counter-revisionist' school (e.g. Rock, 1966; Bond, 1980) which, while conceding significant constraints on Chamberlain,² still finds signifi-

² Among the possible motivations for British appeasement, Beck cites fear and horror of another war, Britain's state of unpreparedness, fear for the British economy and the Empire, the unprepared state of public opinion, the isolationism of the Dominions and the United States, lack of confidence in France, lack of interest in Central Europe, failure to understand Hitler and Nazism, fear and distrust of the Soviet Union and communism, the absence of a viable alternative presented either by the Conservative opposition or Labour (1989: 168). Indeed, Schroeder concludes that in light of such constraints, the appeasement of Germany was 'massively overdetermined', and that 'any

cant fault with the British handling of the German threat. Finally, several recent efforts (e.g. Adams, 1993; Beck, 1989; Morris, 1991; Post, 1993; Rock, 1988) attempt to achieve a post-revisionist synthesis by identifying the elements of success and failure in British policy-making in the 1930s.

Revisionist accounts do not appear to have had much impact on scholars of international relations, who have relied heavily on the negative interpretation of the British example provided by the orthodox school. Much of this genre of appeasement writing (e.g. Chan, 1984; Hartman, 1967; Holsti, 1967; Morgenthau, 1985/1948; Snyder & Diesing, 1977; Waltz, 1979) emerges in 'realist' texts which partly for that reason have been 'disappointingly limited' (Richardson, 1988: 312). For example, Morgenthau describes appeasement as 'a corrupted policy of compromise, made erroneously by mistaking a policy of imperialism for a policy of the status quo'. 'The appeaser', Morgenthau continues, 'sees in the successive demands of the imperialistic power, rationally limited objectives which must be disposed of either on their intrinsic merits or by way of compromise. His error lies in not seeing that successive demands are but links of a chain at the end of which stands the overthrow of the status quo' (Morgenthau, 1985/1948: 78).

Recent condemnations of the Western 'appeasement' of Serbia echo such judgments. Hoffmann (1994) argues for example that:

The United Nations' resort to international mediation has resulted in a succession of plans, each leaving more and more of Bosnia to the Serbs without satisfying them. Negotiations backed by no credible threat of armed force have turned into appeasement. (Hoffmann, 1994)

A parallel sentiment is expressed by

other policy would have been an astonishing, almost inexplicable divergence from the norm' (Schroeder, 1976: 242, as quoted by Beck, 1989: 168).

Rosenthal (1996b) regarding the Clinton Administration's policy towards China: 'More than a half-century [after Munich] ... President Clinton abandoned the people of China and Tibet ... Communist mercy, in direct betrayal of his own official promise'. Plunk (1996: 20) displays classic anti-appeasement imagery when he argues that 'US flexibility [towards North Korea] merely encourages North Korean belligerence'.

This orthodox view of appeasement seems unchallenged in introductory texts on international relations not only in Cold War era texts (e.g. Grievess, 1977; Hartmann, 1978; Holsti, 1988; Jones, 1988; Lieber, 1988), but also in quite recent volumes (Goldstein, 1996; Kegley & Wittkopf, 1995; Lieber, 1995; Snow & Brown, 1996).

I argue that the chorus of introductory texts is misleading. Many scholars have in fact long since abandoned the Morgenthauian interpretation of appeasement in favor of a significantly more nuanced approach. Thus, a rather different view emerges from an analysis of more serious scholarly work.³

The Utility School

The most puzzling element of appeasement is its inherently self-defeating character of meeting an aggressor's demands without asking for reciprocal advantages (Middlemas, 1972b). The appeaser elects to 'help' even though the prospects for receiving help in return may appear slim. Are we to assume that states and the leaders that represent them deliberately behave in ways that are directly contrary to their interests?

³ Works by George (1993) and Rosecrance & Steiner (1993) are exceptions to this general point. The latter, for example, compares realist and domestic politics explanations of British grand strategy in the 1930s and concludes, not surprisingly, that political considerations conditioned the adoption of appeasement more than economic limitations, while domestic pressures dominated international ones. However, the tone and ultimate conclusion of the argument is quite close to the orthodox view.

One valuable source of ideas on the bases of appeasement is the literature on international negotiation. Much of this work has been perceived as more normative than analytical, suggesting 'the need for reciprocity [in international relations] and the utility of cooperative-reciprocal strategies in at least some international contexts' (Goldstein & Freeman, 1990: 21). This conception, it has been argued, (Goldstein, 1991) is common to game theoretic (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Brams 1985) as well as psychological approaches (e.g. Jervis, 1988; Larson, 1988; Osgood, 1962).

Analytically balanced works have compared and contrasted deterrence strategies or negative sanctions with conciliatory initiatives or positive sanctions as a way of bringing about cooperation (Baldwin, 1971; Luard, 1967). This tradition has carried through to more contemporary research on the conditions likely to favor or hinder reciprocity in interstate relations (e.g. Bendor, 1987; Downs et al., 1985; Goldstein, 1991; Goldstein & Freeman, 1990; Hirshleifer & Coll, 1988; Morrow, 1989, 1994).

Criticizing theories of reciprocity that rest on the existence of communitarian norms, some of this research effort has focused on 'unilateral initiative' as a potential source of reciprocity and cooperation (Druckman, 1990; Patchen, 1987; Rose, 1988). A unilateral initiative is an action of restraint undertaken by one actor without prior agreement by another actor to do anything in return. Druckman identifies three related and overlapping research traditions within the 'utility theory' literature on unilateral initiatives (Rose, 1985 as cited by Druckman, 1990: 554).

One is *learning*, based on a psychological reinforcement process that is largely outside an actor's awareness (e.g. Esser & Komorita, 1975; Kazdin, 1975). A related argument views reciprocity in the form of *Tit-for-Tat* (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Hirshleifer & Coll,

1988; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). However, *Tit-for-Tat* is likely to be effective (as a means of bringing about reciprocity through unilateral initiative) 'only under certain conditions and may be quite problematic under others' (Druckman, 1990: 560). Finally, unilateral initiatives can be perceived as '*starting mechanisms*', whereby variations in communication lead to greater or lesser effectiveness in bringing about reciprocity. Factors favoring reciprocity include clear signaling of demands, lack of internal bureaucratic conflicts regarding response and no threats to political status, security, economic, or military capabilities (see Rose, 1988).

Utility theories of reciprocity share the assumption that 'antagonists must regulate their interactions, even though they are not guided by shared norms', and are thus 'guided largely by cost-benefit considerations' (Druckman, 1990: 559). Druckman therefore discounts the potential usefulness of more normatively oriented approaches because such theories mainly '... define relations among members within a group or society [wherein] reciprocity is regarded as an expectation among people who have positive sentiments toward one another or are members of cohesive groups' (Druckman, 1990: 559). Because adversaries do not share such sentiments, reciprocity must emanate purely from expectations of utility.

Herein lies the chief limitation of the utility theory perspective. The existence of a psycho-sociological community or shared sentiments is not a necessary precondition for the applicability of normatively based theories of unilateral cooperative initiatives. A more determinate explanation of appeasement must explain the sources of unilateral initiatives not only for actors within a cohesive community, but also for actors who believe that they can consolidate or even create such a community. For this reason, theories that seek to marry the normative and interest

bases of interdependent decision making may form the foundations of a useful framework for understanding unilateral initiatives and policies of appeasement.

The Exchange Theory School

Exchange Norms as a Source of Unilateral Initiatives Leng (1993a, b) emphasizes the difficulty of explaining unilateral initiatives on the basis of utility alone. It is simpler, Leng suggests, to analyze the effectiveness of reciprocal influence strategies after they have been employed than to understand why such strategies appeared salient in the first place. For Leng (1993a: 27), possible explanatory factors here include regime type, actors' perceptions of the crisis structure, actors' roles as challengers, and influence strategies employed by the other side. The possible existence of a 'norm of reciprocity' as a predictor of reciprocal influence strategies creates a link between the utility and exchange approaches.⁴

Theories of social exchange focus on why actors do things for one another even when there are few apparent situational incentives to do so. This question is not foreign to students of international relations who attempt to understand anarchic systems of cooperation and reciprocity based on expressed or tacit networks of rewards and benefits.⁵ However, the literature on social exchange

has not been widely consulted by students of international relations.

Both utility and exchange⁶ perspectives see virtually all human relationships as transactions in which self-interested actors attempt to influence each other to realize goals, receive payoffs and balance loss and gain. However, behavior in exchange relationships is by definition voluntary in the sense that it is not constrained by situational incentives to coordinate. Therefore, 'power in exchange relations is the ability to change the other actor's voluntary willingness to do something by exchanging costs and benefits with him' (Baldwin, 1978: 107). Because resources transferred in exchange relationships are inherently ambiguous, questions of perception, attribution and, especially, equity will naturally come to the fore. The norm of equity provides a key link between the utility and normative aspects of social exchanges.

Equity theory (e.g. Walster et al., 1973, 1978) 'highlights the fact that in attempting to predict partners' exchange behavior or their reactions to exchange, attention must be paid to the contributions and outcomes of both participants' (Berg et al., 1993: 173). It views all exchange relationships as being governed by an underlying norm of equity, whereby the participants assume that any benefit that is given will bring a benefit in return and that costs and benefits in their exchange relations will equalize, at least in the medium or long term. When the contributions of both parties are perceived to be equal, there is equity (Buunk & Hoorens, 1992).

⁴ Leng (1993a: 3) cites Gouldner (1960) and Masters (1969) in support for the idea that reciprocity may serve as 'the primary norm for interaction in systems of self-help ranging from primitive communities to the interstate system'.

⁵ Marin (1990a, b) singles out Axelrod (1984) and Keohane & Nye (1977) as the most significant exchange theoretic works in international relations, although neither draws directly upon the social exchange literature. Exchange analysis is implicit in Caporaso's (1978) classic work on dependence and in Larson (1988). Jervis (1976) draws extensively upon the experimental literature in social psychology in his comparison of deterrence and 'the spiral model', but stops short of developing an explicit appeasement framework. The most influential exchange theoretic contribution to international relations has been the work of Baldwin (e.g. 1978, 1979, 1980, 1989), although he

does not attack the problem of appeasement directly. Formal applications of social exchange theory in the analysis of interstate relations appear to be virtually non-existent, although Masters (1969) and Habeeb (1988) come close.

⁶ Baldwin (1989) argues that economists were among the first to develop exchange theory as we now know it, while Ekeh (1974) points out that anthropologists can also lay claim to this distinction. Classic statements of social exchange theory are Thibaut & Kelley (1959), Homans (1961), Emerson (1972), Kelley (1979) and, especially, Blau (1964).

According to equity theory, all participants in exchange relationships will be keenly aware of the contributions they and their partners make (Racine, 1991), and will display a concern for fairness, even in relationships in which one might expect it to be overridden by other concerns, such as love, intimacy, family, etc. As the exchange relationship becomes more instrumental (and less a function of 'closeness', 'love' or similar) questions of equity will become more salient. Carrying this logic through, one could expect that relationships in which the bonds of common interest are absent but in which the actors require each other's resources nonetheless, would be particularly influenced by the actors' perceptions of equity.

The conception of obligation in exchange theory is instrumental as well as normative. Exchange theorists argue that actors who derive benefits from associates become, under specifiable circumstances, indebted and placed under obligation to supply benefits in return. An actor who helps others earns their gratitude and puts them into 'social debt', which is expected to bring rewards in the future. This expectation creates a bond in exchange relationships; from this the expectation of reciprocity emanates. Thus, the instrumental function of obligation in exchange relations is clear and the implications of this process are as simple: the advantageous consequences of bestowing benefits are 'a major reason actors frequently go to great trouble to help others' (Blau, 1968: 453). Networks of mutual exchange operate as functional and self-governing systems wherein 'individuals, in the interest of receiving needed services, discharge their obligations for having received them in the past' (Blau, 1964: 92). In this sense, the equity principle in exchange relations does not appear substantially different from *Tit-for-Tat* or other utility approaches.

Exchange theory's conception of reciprocity differs notably from that of utility

approaches. Because equity is a fundamentally normative construct, any expectations or obligations that result from the receipt of benefits issue necessarily from norms associated with equity. If these norms are not shared or if they are not created through exchange, no effective obligation will be felt and reciprocity will not result. When the norm of equity manifests itself as a key contextual variable, on the other hand, recipients in exchange relations acquire a cost which translates into indebtedness. Indebtedness is an aversive state; the greater the magnitude of indebtedness, the greater the aversiveness and the stronger the subsequent attempts to reduce it (Gergen et al., 1980: 1).

The intended normative effect of providing benefits in exchange relations is that the recipients are placed in an uncomfortable state which carries the obligation to repay. This may derive from a socialization process, wherein actors associate being indebted with restrictions on freedom of action, the loss of position relative to the giver, or anticipated costs of repayment (Greenberg, 1980: 4). Because indebtedness and obligation are sources of power for the giver and sources of constraint for the receiver, actors will go to great lengths to avoid remaining in such a condition. In this way, social exchange processes utilize as it were 'the self-interests of individuals to produce a differentiated social structure within which norms tend to develop that require actors to set aside their personal interests for the sake of the collectivity' (Blau, 1964: 92). Indebtedness and obligation can be expected to create potentially strong indirect restraints on behavior. Accordingly, the (anticipated) power of such restraints may constitute a central source of decisions to employ appeasement in international relations.

Exchange and the Sources of Appeasement
Exchange relations between adversaries

denote interdependence in the absence of common purpose, threat, or interest. Whereas the relations between alliance partners often contain elements of distribution and common interests/aversions, prototypical adversarial relationships lack the common interest that would give the participants an incentive *in their own immediate outcomes* to supply the resources needed by the other. However, because we know that some exchange interactions do display high levels of cooperation and reciprocity, we also know that states do not always seek exclusively to maximize their short-sighted interests.

Exchange theory displays some of the properties of a rational choice approach. It tells us to evaluate any action in terms of some or another conception of expected return. States enter into relationships and make choices with the expectation that they will benefit. The added normative element of the social exchange perspective, however, tells us to look also for how norms of exchange are intended to 'reconstitute the interests' (Klotz, 1995) and utility calculations of the participants. Thus, the real question is not whether states act in ways they perceive to be in their own interests, but rather how their interest calculations manifest themselves, and how those interest calculations are affected by norms, expectations or obligations. Although few of the obligations incurred in interstate exchange can be specified in advance, they establish a bond of interaction, even when not guaranteed by external coercion or by the situation in its given form.⁷

From this general perspective, appeasement can be reconceptualized as a deliberate strategy to bring about the cooperation of

adversaries or aggressors within the context of a normative environment approximating that of social exchange. Belief in the underlying norm of equity helps make a strategy of appeasement salient. Because exchange situations consist of voluntary actions contingent on rewarding behaviors from others, the logic of appeasement derives mainly from the expectation that the target of appeasement will be motivated to return service. In this scenario, decision makers will adopt a strategy of appeasement when they believe that the proper normative environment exists within which exchange related expectations will be fulfilled or when they believe that the proper incentives can bring such expectations and obligations to the fore.

The primary underlying motivation for unilateral initiatives in exchange relations is found in the appeaser's belief either that the proper normative environment exists within which exchange-related expectations will be fulfilled, or (more likely) their assumption that the proper incentives and initiatives can bring such norms and expectations to the fore. Because concessions or unilateral initiatives in exchange relations are offered with the intent of receiving a return of service, strategies of appeasement will persist to the extent that appeasers have a basis for believing that the target of appeasement will reciprocate. Thus, the social exchange perspective can guide our evaluation of the appeaser's rationale, while also pointing us toward the appeaser's ongoing attributions regarding the target's actions. A normative environment approximating that of social exchange functions as the necessary cause for appeasement; a decision maker's belief that the operation of such norms will effectively constrain the behavior of an aggressor serves as the sufficient cause of appeasement.

This conception of appeasement highlights both the counterintuitive and predictable elements of appeasement as a

⁷ Interstate exchange so conceived entails supplying benefits that create only diffuse future obligations to reciprocate (Blau, 1968; Keohane, 1986). Thus, the simple link between service and return of service – and thus between appeasement and the moderation of an aggressor's behavior – can potentially be rather weak.

strategy of conflict avoidance. Decision-makers tend to choose policy options that they think will bring benefits to them or to the parties that they represent, but it is less clear based on a simple power-interest model or a utility model that a policy of appeasement will obtain in a given situation. Similarly, while appeasement may be more likely to emerge in dyads where there is, say, a declining status quo power and a rising revisionist power (Powell, 1996), exchange theory explains the normative conditions under which such a policy will become salient and why such a policy may be pursued even in the absence of tangible, immediate return of service. Thus, what may appear irrational from an orthodox perspective or what may not *necessarily* follow from a utility perspective is potentially explainable from an exchange perspective.

Conclusion

Many observers have accepted uncritically the idea that appeasement only encourages further aggression on the part of recalcitrant actors. This apparent consensus represents merely the most recent evidence that many commonly held ideas about foreign policy continue to be strongly conditioned by Munich, the 'object lesson of our age' (Lammers, 1966: 2). Yet, the ostensible realist consensus remains both predictable and puzzling. It is predictable in the sense that the stark realist imagery lends itself well to hyperbole. Whereas realism as a general theory of world politics has been all but discredited in a world of transnational issues, expanding actors, interdependence and multipolarity,⁸ many retain the rhetoric for its political usefulness.

It is puzzling because for many scholars of 20th century world affairs, the realist in-

terpretation of appeasement has gone the way of realism itself. Since the early 1960s, revisionist efforts in history along with a blossoming of neoliberal standpoints and behavioral methods in international relations have yielded substantially more sophisticated and markedly less normatively tinged findings. Anti-appeasers rely on an outmoded model.

A second source of puzzlement relates to recent cases in which the issue of appeasement has come to the fore. Appeasement is seen not only as counterproductive but immoral. It encourages further recalcitrance on the part of aggressor states but also rewards them for their rogue behavior and often involves a 'sell-out' of oppressed groups. Many of those who moralize on this issue have on other occasions chided their more dovish colleagues' lack of sensitivity to traditional concerns for power in world politics. We seem to have a role reversal on the issue of appeasement.

As a clear example, the Clinton Administration's nuclear energy agreement with North Korea of October 1994, which arguably started the notable 'opening' of North Korea that has taken place over the last two and a half years,⁹ has been the focus of unrelenting criticism by those who claim to know the 'true lessons of history'. But the most surprising flaw of the hawkish position on the North Korean issue is its lack of real-

neoliberal publications now outnumber realist ones, even in journals that have been traditional bastions of realism, such as *International Security*, (DiMuccio & Cooper, 1998; Kegley, 1993).

⁹ The effectiveness of the policy and the true extent of North Korean 'opening' are contested. However, since the signing of the nuclear energy agreement, substantial progress has been seen in North Korean relations with South Korea, the USA, Japan, China and Russia; in North Korean economic liberalization; and in the implementation of the agreed framework itself. Some of the apparent movement is attributable to North Korea's self-inflicted economic and humanitarian woes, but the moderation of North Korean actions may also be the result of the US initiative (DiMuccio & Kang, 1998; Kim, 1995; Mazarr, 1995; Ock, 1995; Paik, 1995).

⁸ Realism appears on the verge of being supplanted by liberal and neoliberal approaches as the centerpiece of debate in the field of international relations. Liberal and

ism. Claiming to know and understand the 'real' nature of power politics, the decriers of 'engagement' are instead swayed by their own conceptions of morality. Seeking to bring North Korea into the international community by offering concessions and ignoring past transgressions may not be the most 'moral' thing to do, but the USA has legitimate interest in stability on the Korean peninsula and it does not have the material resources or the domestic political support to issue credible threats of force towards North Korea and every rogue state in the world simultaneously. The anti-appeasement rhetoric does not provide a clear solution to this conundrum.

Power is the ability to get others to do things they otherwise would not do. One way to accomplish this is to use or threaten the use of force. When the situation dictates that this method is inadvisable, the next best method may be appeasement.¹⁰ Whether engagement, deterrence, or some combination is the option of choice, a sure method to bring foreign policy failure is to employ uncritically standard operating procedures and historical analogies (Hybel, 1990; Jervis, 1976; Neustadt & May, 1986). In the case of the nuclear energy agreement, the Clinton Administration perceived a mutuality of interest between the United States and North Korea, calculating that well-placed concessions could have a powerful controlling effect on a country that needs the world and that has something to give by following the rules of international society. Whether such policies will succeed in the long run is a question well beyond the scope of this review. However, of the three approaches reviewed above, only the orthodox model appears at first glance to be largely incapable

of capturing the logic of recent decisions to employ appeasement as a strategy of conflict avoidance. Rigorous empirical research will be needed to show whether the utility or exchange approaches can offer determinate explanations of these and other cases. The findings of such studies may well lay the foundation for a new view of appeasement and inevitably relieve the term of its inexorable linkage to the caricature that the 'Munich Analogy' has become.

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¹⁰ Shambaugh (1996: 209) argues that while China may be difficult to engage, owing to 'China's [substantial] capacity to disrupt and destabilize the international system, world economy and global environment ... there is no alternative but to try'.

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