Alisse Waterston

ARE LATINOS BECOMING "WHITE" FOLK? AND WHAT THAT STILL SAYS ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA

I use Karen Brodkin's How Jews Became White Folks as an analytic compass to consider the question: Are U.S. Latinos becoming "White"? The purpose of this paper is to meet the question head-on and to help unravel some of the complexity and contradictory issues related to the changing status of a historically marginalized and heterogeneous ethnic group within a society that operates in a Black/White racial binary. My goal is to also describe a social process that may already be under way. The essay explores several indicators that point to this process, including the growing importance of Latinos as consumers for capital accumulation in the neoliberal marketplace, the mounting significance of Latino elites to the American political scene, extant intra-Latino class differences, results of the 2000 U.S. Census, the growing xenophobia against new Latino immigrants, especially racialized indígenos coming across the southwest border, and the enduring power of the American dream, all of which must be interpreted in light of the dramatic and growing decline in the number of "Whites" in America. In this framework, I examine race as racism, and its role in reproducing a class structure where Blackness lurks in the shadows, the marker against which success can be measured and belonging determined. In an effort to anticipate the "dreadfully predictable" patterns and practices of Whiteness, I suggest that the White racial category is likely to expand to include a growing portion of Latinos, particularly those who are "aspiring," assimilated, and "English-proficient." In turn, we are likely to see their ever-growing distance from Blackness as well as from the poorer, "darker," more recent, and undocumented Hispanic indígenos.

KEYWORDS: Whiteness, racism, class, neoliberal economics, immigration

> Whiteness [is] a complexly held political identity . . . a stable and powerful system of oppressive economic and political practices that are sustained by opposition to all manner of nonwhiteness.
>
> —*How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says about Race in America* (Brodkin 1998:23)

This article uses Karen Brodkin's *How Jews Became White Folks* as an analytic compass to consider the question: Are U.S. Latinos becoming White?[1] The article will explore several indicators that suggest the whitening process may be underway, including the growing importance of Latinos as consumers in the neoliberal marketplace, the mounting significance of Latino elites to the American political scene, extant intra-Latino class differences, results of the 2000 U.S. Census, the growing xenophobia against new Latino immigrants, especially racialized *indígenos* coming across the southwest border, and the enduring power of the American dream. These aspects take on more salience when seen in light of the dramatic decline in the number of Whites in America, a threatening situation to a system sustained by racial oppression and to those who currently enjoy the privileges of majority status. Warren and Twine point out that "White Americans" as the "Next Minority" scenario is unlikely, since "the 'White' racial category [will likely] expand . . . to include those previously considered 'non-White'" (Warren and Twine 1997: 200–201). Will Latinos fill that bill?

My purpose in this essay is to expose and describe a social process that may already be underway; it is not to advocate for the whitening of Latinos. Each subsection of the paper begins with an ethnographic vignette that offers a glimpse into the ways this process may be occurring. The examples are suggestive, not conclusive. The discussion reveals this as an unfolding process fraught with contradictions and marked by great complexity and unevenness. In fact, this paper can be seen as a call for research to systematically examine the ways in which the whitening process is or is not occurring,

Alisse Waterston is Associate Professor of Anthropology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, and Editor of *North American Dialogue*, the publication of the Society for the Anthropology of North America. She is author of several works on urban poverty and social suffering, including *Love, Sorrow and Rage: Destitute Women in a Manhattan Residence*, and *Street Addicts in the Political Economy*. Her areas of interest also include the political-economic and psychological aspects of displacement, diaspora, and structural violence.

Transforming Anthropology, Vol. 14, Issue 2, pp. 133–150, ISSN 1051-0559, electronic ISSN 1548-7466.

what happens racially with the post-migration generation by country of origin and class, which Latinos sub-groups are whitening, which are not, and which are being re-racialized, and the social forces that may be at work in the whitening process (Torres-Saillant and Hernandez 1998, Suárez-Orozco 2000, Ramos-Zayas 2001).

The complex of forces involved in this still unfolding story defies easy clarification. There are countervailing, contradictory, and competing forces at work that need to be delineated. In a hegemonic, class-based economy, Whiteness is, as Brodkin notes, a "complexly held political identity . . . a stable and powerful system of oppressive economic and political practices that are sustained by opposition to all manner of nonwhiteness" (Brodkin 1998:23). In this context, we can begin to sort out the complex factors that weigh in on who becomes "White" and who does not: heterogeneity within the ethnic category; phenotypical variations and social hierarchies (with and between groups) based on skin tone, location in the labor force, social status, education, generation, age, language preferences and proficiencies, length of time in the U.S.; and consciousness about and the meanings people attach to being "White" or being a "person of color."

THE CORPORATE EMBRACE OF HISPANICS: A DOOR TO WHITENESS?

> A kind of unholy trinity of corporations, the state, and monopolistic media produces and reproduces patterns and practices of whiteness with dreadful predictability.[2]
>
> —*Karen Brodkin*

Three research consultants enter the offices of a major television network whose executives have found a sudden interest in knowing about ethnic markets in the U.S. The consultants had been getting many such calls ever since the Census 2000 numbers announcing unprecedented growth in the number of Hispanics living in the United States were blasted onto the front pages of newspapers and trade magazines. For their part, the consultants were specialists in consumer behavior related to both traditional and new forms of media, including cable television, digital cable, Internet, and broadband. The trio had for many years urged their clients to pay attention to the opinions and acknowledge the value of those customers these companies had long neglected, especially African Americans and Latinos. Most of the time, those urgings fell on deaf ears. Now, suddenly, there was new money in budgets for such research. The consultants came prepared to pitch the case for research among people who constitute the "multicultural face of America," promoting a kind of "people-of-color unity" paradigm (Sanjek 1994:117) in which issues and interests purportedly common to all non-Whites in the U.S. become an organizing principle and important social force.[3] After all, the researchers had already documented the dollar and cents "value" of African American and Latino customers to these media companies: They spend much more of their money on an array of media services than do other groups. Nevertheless, only a very few among these major media companies had invested research dollars to ask their best customers what they think of their media products and services.

The multicultural pitch hadn't gone well. The clients had already heard the message they wanted to hear: *Hispanics Pass Blacks as Largest U.S. Minority Group* (Associated Press 2003).[4] It did not matter that the 37 million Hispanics were "of any race," that 37.7 million people were "African American" by race alone or in combination with another race, and that there were 36.2 million "non-Hispanic Blacks" reported by the census at that time.[5] It did not matter that these findings indicated that just about the same number of Latinos as African Americans were living in the United States. They only wanted to know one thing. "Tell us about Hispanics," they requested, "and you've got the project."

The trio left the meeting, discussing what had occurred. One talked about how to structure the proposal the group now had to write to win the research contract; the next explicitly expressed her excitement about working on a project with a Latino focus, given her own personal background and self identity as a Jewish Latina, and the third, the anthropologist, walked out of the meeting wondering, "What have we just witnessed? Why are they only interested in Latinos and ignoring African Americans, whose opinions are still unacknowledged and unappreciated? Is this moment reflective of a larger process whereby Latinos are becoming White folk and African Americans remaining in the backdrop, a process that would also effectively dissolve the 'people of color' unity?"[6] The question had come to the anthropologist many times since the 2000 census when the corporate media began embracing Latino consumers as never before, a pattern noted by some African American colleagues whose small advertising and marketing businesses for corporate clients began to flounder in the new environment.

STRUCTURAL FORCES SHAPING THE WHITENING OF LATINOS

The second half of the twentieth century was the epoch of the consumer and consumerism in the United States. Just after the last turn of the century, America became transformed from "a nineteenth-century society with consumerist features to a full-blown consumer

society . . . [in which] new, nationally advertised, branded products became widely available and affordable—products that [not only] alleviated material needs, but became markers of new feelings of 'comfort and ease' and 'new sensations of power and speed' " (Glickman 2000:34). Neoliberalism, a set of economic and development policies characterized by privatization, marketization, and an unregulated, "free" market, promises to ensure that consumerism remains a dominant feature of American cultural life in the twenty-first century (Cross 2000, Duggan 2003).

McChesney calls neoliberalism "the defining political economic paradigm of our time" (McChesney 1998:7). Neoliberal economic policies characteristically "shift away from the interventionist state and toward a free-market social structure" (Kingfisher 2001:178), "encourage private enterprise and consumer choice, reward personal responsibility and entrepreneurial initiative" (McChesney 1998:7), and "advance the market as the solution to most problems" (Farmer 2003:259). Under neoliberalism, the market is king; "instead of citizens, it produces consumers" (McChesney 1998:11). In this social world, an idea system operates whereby those who are imagined as able to consume are virtuous and have value in contrast to those who are not perceived as such (Wolf 1982:390).

The media business provides one example of an industry that operates according to neoliberal economic policies. Media constitute a social practice of central importance under neoliberalism (McChesney 1999) and a key site in the transformation of individual and collective identities (Mankekar 1999, Miller and Slater 2000, Kolko et al 2000, Ginsburg et al 2002, Abu-Lughod 2004). As it relates to the business of media in the U.S., the ascendancy of neoliberalism has resulted in Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policies of deregulation, which have, in turn, resulted in unprecedented consolidation of the industry and concentrated corporate control of the media (Waterston et al 1998, McChesney 1999). These policy and business trends alongside the rapid introduction of a large number of new media tools and technologies in recent years have combined to dramatically advance media consumption in the U.S. These factors have also helped drive media companies to find new, "viable" markets.

Alongside these economic trends, the U.S. has been undergoing an enormous shift in human geography. Referred to as "America's Great Transition," the phrase captures the enormity of this shift. "Minorities will become the majority of Americans by the year 2050," *American Demographics* reported (Edmondson 1996). "The great transition among America's children will arrive even sooner," writes Roger Sanjek. "By the year 2035, fewer than half of children under age eighteen will be [non-Hispanic] White." In the U.S. alone, " 'The Future of Us All' means Americans of Latin American, African and Asian ancestry will [soon] outnumber those of European origin" (1998:1).

But does it? Warren and Twine explain that this assumption rests on "the essentialist premise that Whiteness is a *fixed* racial category. In other words, one can only draw the conclusion that Whites are becoming a minority if one assumes that racial categories are static across time and place" (Warren and Twine 1997: 202). In Brodkin's thesis, the category of Whiteness was reconfigured to include European immigrants (Brodkin 1998:27). Likewise, Warren and Twine posit that the boundaries of Whiteness will continue to stretch in order to envelope groups formerly considered non-White. Looking back and forward, the authors ask, "Given that Whiteness expanded and was transformed so that Slavs, Celts, and Mediterraneans could fit snugly into the White box, why would one assume that this process will come to a halt on the European borders?" (Warren and Twine 1997:211).

In my view, this demographic trend combines with the drive for new media markets to create a powerful force that may actively shape the whitening of Latinos in the U.S. We may look to parallel histories—the Jews, for example (Brodkin 1998), and the Irish (Ignatiev 1995) before them—for clues to the process that may be unfolding before our eyes. Brodkin teaches us that in the Jewish case, "success" was a product of "the removal of powerful social barriers to its realization" (Brodkin 1998:26). The implementation of a powerful "affirmative action" policy for "Euro-males" in the form of the 1944 GI-Bill of Rights was essential to the whitening of these Euro-immigrants (Brodkin 1998:38). In this era of neoliberal economics, it is not state-sponsored policy that would whiten a growing segment of Latinos. Instead, as major market players (in the U.S. and in Latin America) on the drive for capital accumulation "embrace" Latinos into the consumer marketplace, social barriers to Latino "success" may begin to dismantle, evidenced, for example, by the entrée of more Latinos into high level positions in some of the major media companies.[7] These are among the processes that may also be shepherding the changing complexion of Latino identity from "not White" to "White," at least for some among this population.

The process may be already underway, especially as some groups of Latinos are already perceived (and self-identify) as "White," such as the propertied classes of Cubans who arrived in Miami after the 1959 Cuban revolution (Portes and Bach 1985:84–86). The phenomenon of being or becoming White is certainly not limited to the Cubans of Miami, even though that stereotype may be blinding us from seeing it in other places or among other groups of Latinos.

At the same time, not all Latinos will be embraced as "White," nor will all Latinos embrace that identification, even if doing so would be strategic to "secure an advantage in a competitive society" (Ignatiev 1995:2, Torres-Saillant and Hernandez 1998). On that note, it is important to note the tension between choice and ascription in racial identification. In my view, choice is intimately tied to and shaped by ascription, which is hegemonic. For most people, if the choice is between a negative (being racially marked as subordinate, inferior, flawed, deficient and thereby marginalized) or a positive (in Urciuoli's words, being "safely marked" ethnically— "recasting cultural difference . . . as warm and colorful, as a rich tradition, as family solidarity, as a drive to succeed") we might predict that most people would opt for the "positive" side of the equation (Urciuoli 1996:17). It is in this context that individuals who can are likely to participate in the move from a non-White racialized identity into the "Whiteness" of ethnicity. This is one of the areas requiring research: Which Latinos sub-groups are whitening, which are not, and which are being re-racialized?

It is no surprise that different Latinos will have different kinds of experiences, given the heterogeneity of people and populations that fall under that ethnic rubric. Torres-Saillant rightly notes that "a good number of scholars and intellectuals have already warned against the danger of uncritically embracing homogenizing discourses defining the Hispanic subsection of the American population" (Torres-Saillant 2002:435, see also Oboler 1995, Davis 2000). We might be tempted to account for variations in the whitening process by country of origin, the most commonly understood aspects of difference (e.g., "Cubans" versus "Puerto Ricans"). To do so, however, would provide us only part of the story, leaving out other, equally salient factors that play into who *becomes* "White" and who does not. In this paper, I seek to explore what those other factors might prove to be.

The unity of Latino identity, for example, which has loyalists among some Latino scholars and artists, also serves "the Latino portion of corporate America" (Torres-Saillant 2002:447), who use this unity to claim the market as their own and who perpetuate the idea of Latino difference (see also Dávila 2001).[8] This Latino portion[9] of corporate America includes those in the media industry who control which racialized images of Hispanics are viewed by Latinos and non-Latinos alike. As a whole, corporate America is less vested in Latino homogeneity. At the same time, corporate America is searching for a new "mass" category of potential consumers and is certainly not looking for too much complexity or what it considers a "problematic" market, which they perceive as having too many "needs" and not enough spending power. The "big" population numbers (40 million Hispanics as of June 2005) are part of the appeal, leading corporate America to go after Latino consumers.[10] To better compete against their Latino counterparts, corporate America is willing to see some heterogeneity, which is referred to as "segmenting the market," at least by one or two variables. Here we get a glimpse of the complexity of forces operating both within and outside the "group" that, in this aspect of identity, relates to shaping Latino unity and, at the same time, to forging a corporate-defined (and limited) heterogeneity.

Currently, the Hispanic market is being segmented by language preference, divided between those who are "English-oriented" (one out of three urban U.S. Latinos) and those who are "Spanish-preferred" (two out of five urban U.S. Latinos). These segments have an empirical reality, with strong variations in consumer preferences, especially for media products, by these language variables (Surveys Unlimited/HAI Research 2005). At the same time, these labels create a somewhat artificial distinction between two categories of Latinos who are, in fact, differentiated along class lines. A look at income data by these segments offers a clue to these class differences. On average, "English-oriented Latinos" live in higher-income urban households ($47,800 annual income) than do their "Spanish-dominant" counterparts ($28,000 annual income).[11] Moreover, "English-oriented" urban Latinos are more likely to be born in the United States, have a higher education, live in a single family home, own their residence, be single, and have a lower incidence of having children. It is important to note that "English-oriented" Latinos constitute one out of three urban Latinos (Surveys Unlimited/HAI Research 2005).

In my view, it is likely that this differentiation will become more and more racialized, leading to a growing schism between whitened Latinos and those Latinos considered to be "of the darker races." This process too is tied to neoliberal economics, this time on a global scale, as international trade policies such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the proposed Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) create conditions which will ensure continued immigration from Latin America to the United States. These agreements allow for freer flows of capital, though not of labor. In the current U.S. political climate, that migration will continue to be undocumented— "illegal." In noting the growing body of literature on the topic, Suárez-Orozco and Páez explain that "Globalization and economic restructuring have intensified inequality in Latin America, generating unemployment and underemployment—and hence new migratory waves" (Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2002:12, see also Kingsolver 2001, 2002). In places like Chiapas,

Mexico, these policies have exacerbated extant inequalities, leaving the indigenous, rural poor even more destitute than they were before (Farmer 2003). In the coming years, the segregated U.S. labor force will see more NAFTA/CAFTA immigrants. In a likely scenario, these new immigrants may be perceived by Anglos and U.S. Latinos alike as the new "Hispanic" other.

In the context of an expanding White racial category that includes them, will today's aspiring "English-proficient" Latinos, many of whom may or have already claimed "Whiteness," stand in stark contrast to America's poorer, "darker" Hispanic *indígenos*?

RACE AS RACISM

> The eagerness to be white is not hard to understand, since whiteness is a state of privilege and belonging.
>
> —*Karen Brodkin*

"I *have* to be watching TV while on the net," exclaims Yolanda, a 14-year-old Latina New Yorker who participated in a qualitative research project on youth and the media.[12] "When I'm online, I watch MTV at the same time." This 14-year-old is coming of age in a very different time than that of her big sister, Maria, only six years older. Maria thinks her little sister is much more "Americanized," than she is and cites the evidence: Most of Yolanda's friends are not Dominican, and she has grown up in "good times—she's got access to the mainstream. She hasn't felt isolated or shut out by the white world, she feels like she fits in." Maria goes on, "Nowadays, you have to have multicultural friends. You are not hip unless your friends cross over."

"I personally think the Internet is the greatest invention of the twentieth century," says Marlena, a twentysomething Black Afro-Trinidadian who is the oldest of five children now living in Brooklyn with their immigrant parents. She worries about her younger siblings and hopes to one day purchase a computer so that the kids can use it. "It's exciting and disconcerting," Marlena says, "because here it is, we have another pioneer age, the technology age. And it is disconcerting because it is a wide-open playing field, so many people can have a fresh start, so many people who are normally disenfranchised can make a new life and be part of this emerging technology, but it's not there."

Racism may be the subtext in these quotations. By this, I mean to adopt Barbara J. Fields's idea that race, a "purely ideological notion" (Fields 1982:151), is a disguise, a maneuver, and trickery (2003: pars 2, 3). We substitute "race" for "racism," Fields argues, which "transforms the act of a subject into an attribute of the object. Disguised as race, racism becomes something Afro-Americans are, rather than something racists do. A further sleight of hand defines race as identity so that 'White' also becomes a race" (2003: pars 2, 9). Multiracialism does not erase the fact that racism "assigns people to an inferior category" (Fields 2001:5) that in turn determines their life chances.

Blackness lurks in the shadows and is the invisible marker against which success can be measured and belonging can be determined. In that sense, and though she does not necessarily know it, Maria may be engaging in "race talk" (Morrison 1993).[13] By "Americanized," does Maria mean her sister is becoming "White"—the entrée to her fitting in and gaining access? Brodkin explains how it works: "The alternatives available to non-White and variously alien 'others' has been either to whiten themselves or to be consigned to an animal-like, ungendered underclass unfit to exercise the prerogatives of citizenship" (Brodkin 1998:24). To become White is to take part in the privileges of Whiteness. However meager these privileges may turn out to be, they are still a step up from the alternative.

This is not to put the burden of the guilt of racism on Maria, but to locate race/racism in the process by which more and more Latinos can become whitened. People construct their own "ethnoracial identities" but as Brodkin points out, only "within the context of ethnoracial assignment" (Brodkin 1998:3). Dreams of class mobility are not in themselves indicative of a desire among Latinos to "become White," but the interplay of social forces at work today make it more likely that more of them will be. How does racialized self-identity change because it operates in a Black/White racial dichotomy? How do dreams and aspirations and strivings thereby get racialized? How long will it be before girls like Yolanda grow up as Brodkin did, where Latinos, like the Southern and Eastern Europeans before them, are "just one kind of White folks and where ethnicity mean(s) little more to (the) generation than food and family heritage" (Brodkin 1998:26)? It seems to me that Latinos are already being drawn into the "race to Whiteness across Black terrain" as Warren and Twine fittingly put it (1997:206).

Marlena is not Latina, yet like Maria, dreams of class mobility, fetishized in the promise of new technology. But "it's not there," she claims, speaking to the privileges forbidden to those "normally disenfranchised." Though the technology has arrived, something else is not there. Is the playing field really "wide open" or will Marlena's ethnoracial assignment as "Black" keep her among the "normally disenfranchised," as Waters found in her study of West Indian immigrants to the U.S.? (Waters 1999). Also, what will Marlena need to give up so that she and her siblings can "make a new life"? These are questions that come up in a place where the Black and White binary is hegemonic and endures

despite the presence of people of many skin shades and of multiple ancestries.

Racial oppression does not depend on ancestry and depends on color to the degree that the "ideological context tells people which details to notice, which to ignore, and which to take for granted in translating the world around them into ideas about that world" (Fields 1982:146). Fields recounts an anecdote that turns naturalized ideas about race on its head, revealing the absurdity of homogenizing categories on which the binary U.S. racial structure depends:

> An American journalist once asked the late Papa Doc Duvalier of Haiti what percentage of the Haitian population was white. Duvalier's answer, astonishingly enough, was "Ninety-eight percent." The startled American journalist was sure he had either misheard or been misunderstood, and put his question again. Duvalier assured him that he had heard and understood the question perfectly well, and had given the correct answer. Struggling to make sense of this incredible piece of information, the American finally asked Duvalier: "How do you define white?" Duvalier answered the question with a question: "How do you define black in your country?" Receiving the explanation that in the United States anyone with black blood was considered black, Duvalier nodded and said, "Well, that's the way we define white in my country."[14]

If it is so that Maria or Yolanda are now becoming "White," it suggests they had before been assigned to a "not White" ethnoracial category. Like the Jews described by Brodkin, Latinos in the United States have been located in a sort of "racial middleness," giving them a "double vision . . . of an experience of marginality vis-à-vis Whiteness, and an experience of Whiteness and belonging vis-à-vis Blackness" (Brodkin 1998: 1–2). This racial middleness is well captured by Piri Thomas in his classic autobiography *Down These Mean Streets*. As told by Ian Haney Lopez, Thomas describes his experience negotiating racism once his family moved from Puerto Rico to New York's Spanish Harlem: "Once in the United States . . . the family faced the peculiar American necessity of defining itself as White or Black. To be White would afford security and a promising future; to be Black would portend exclusion and unemployment. The Thomas family—hailing from Puerto Rico of mixed Indian, African and European antecedents—considered themselves White and pursued the American dream, eventually moving out to the suburbs in search of higher salaries and better schools for the children. [Because of] Piri's dark skin . . . the pale children scoffed at Piri's claim to be Puerto Rican rather than Black, taunting Piri for 'passing for Puerto Rican because he can't make it for White,' and proclaiming, '[t]here's no difference . . . [h]e's still Black.' [Even so] the family insisted on their own Whiteness as the crucial charm to a fulfilling life in the United States" (1998:10).

Up to now, most Latinos have inhabited an "off-White" race, while officially being referred to as an ethnic group, a word Brodkin says is used to describe such "less-than-White" groups (Brodkin 1998:144). Anti-Latino discourse, including negative and racialized stereotypes, occupational segregation, and social and residential exclusion have been part and parcel of "the Latino condition" and marked the experiences of many of them in the U.S. (Delgado and Stefancic 1998, Suárez–Orozco and Páez 2002). Being "mixed," as many Latinos claim, does not disrupt the binary, even though many hold out hopes that *mestizaje* will "disrupt hegemonic tranquility" (Montoya 1998:42, Anzaldúa 1987).

The choice still comes down to Black and White, despite the "cacophony of polyglot voices" (Montoya 1998:42). Because race is a fraud, and "multiracialism is really multiracism" (Fields 2001), David Hollinger's hope that "the more that mixture is accepted, the less fear there might be of what is being mixed" cannot be realized (Hollinger 2003: par 19). So far, "mixing," whether *mestizaje* or in any other form, has not brought less stigma to Blackness, and could, as Fields suggests and Hollinger fears, "reinforce White privilege . . . and [bring even] more isolat[ion]" to those who remain "Black" (2003: par 19).

Besides, as Torres-Saillant points out, there is a certain fit between White supremacist ideology and the idea that Latinos are cut from a single cloth, however "mixed" that cloth might be. He explains that those who celebrate "*hispanidad* (or *latinidad*)," especially the Latino portion of corporate America, simply "pay lip service to the virtues of *mestizaje* . . . in practice [they] support negrophobic and anti-Indian regimes" (Torres-Saillant 2002:441), which has a long history in Latin America. According to Jorge Cañizares Esguerra, "seventeenth-century learned colonists . . . invented modern forms of racism that scholars have wrongly attributed to the rise of modern science in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I contend that the science of race, with its emphasis on biological determinism, its focus on the body as the site of behavioral-cultural variations, and its obsession with creating homogenizing and essentializing categories, was first articulated in colonial Spanish America in the seventeenth century" (Cañizares Esguerra 2001:35). In the following quotation, Richard Rodriguez comments on the enduring resonance of race in Latin America: "The dream of Mexico is an apotheosis of bleach" (Rodriguez 2002:132).

Latinos who have migrated to the U.S. come with their own deeply entrenched ideas about race, which, in the ways they correspond to the U.S. system, can get reinforced in the new context.[15]

THE MAKING OF LATINO ETHNICITY

> [There is a] reciprocally defining interdependence of racial classification and social class.
>
> —*Karen Brodkin*

Maria, the young woman in the media youth study, offers this description of herself and her identity: "[I am] short, chubby, with tan skin. According to this society, I am considered to be a young Latina woman whose family is from the Dominican Republic. I was born in the Bronx here in New York City, and have been living in Manhattan for the last 19 years. The neighborhood in which I live consists of mostly Dominican-American citizens, the area known as Washington Heights. From the time that I was a little girl, I was speaking the Spanglish language and familiarizing myself with who I was according to this society. I feel like I had to live up to this image of what a Latina girl was supposed to be and act like. But I have grown up in a "Spanglish" community that consists of a variety of generations. Many of the older family members and people in my community speak the Spanish language most of the time. But for the younger and newer generation of the Latino culture, "Spanglish" is the move and is the language to speak."

Suárez-Orozco and Páez write that the term "Hispanic," like "Latino" is "a cultural category that has no precise racial signification" (Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2002:3). In fact, both terms are fictions of a sort, with origins in the civil rights movement, the category Hispanic codified by the federal government in the 1970s. Essayist Richard Rodriguez writes that "Chicanos . . . scorn the term Hispanic, in part because it was Richard Nixon who drafted the noun and who made the adjective uniform" (Rodriguez 2002:108). Yet civil rights groups such as the National Council of La Raza (NCLR, founded in the 1960s) and the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC, established in 1929) were looking to give collective voice to and create a united front for Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, the largest of the "Spanish speaking" groups to experience discrimination in the U.S. (National Council of La Raza 2005, LULAC 2004). In the early 1970s, the Federal Interagency Committee on Education (FICE), itself formed as a result of Executive Order in 1964, devised the five racial and ethnic categories that were used in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Directive No. 15, which includes: "White," a person having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, North Africa, or the Middle East; "Black," a person having origins in any of the Black racial groups of Africa; and "Hispanic," a person of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race" (OMB 1994).

The category, then, has political roots and carved from it was a minority group. "Did [Nixon] really devise to rid himself of a bunch of spic agitators by officially designating them a minority, entitled to all rights, honors, privileges, and obligations thereto appertaining?," Rodriguez asks (Rodriguez 2002:117), coarsely revealing the nature of the political struggle that gave birth to Latinos as we now know them. "You need to come to the United States to meet Hispanics," Rodriguez writes. "What Hispanic immigrants learn within the United States is to view themselves in a new way, as belonging to Latin America entire—precisely at the moment they no longer do," a lesson Maria learned well and early (Rodriguez 2002:117).

"Hispanic" and "Latino" have now come to signify a kind of racialized "culture" or "heritage, marked by a common language." In *Brown*, Richard Rodriguez's reflection on Hispanics in America (Rodriguez 2002:231), the author explores dimensions of the color as a race metaphor. "Brown as impurity," reads the first line of the book (Rodriguez 2002:xi). Rodriguez continues:

> Brown is the color most people in the United States associate with Latin America. Apart from stool sample, there is no browner smear in the American imagination than the Rio Grande. No adjective has attached itself more often to the Mexican in America than "dirty"—which I assume gropes toward the simile "dirt-like," indicating dense concentrations of melanin (Rodriguez 2002:xii).

The history of Latino ethnoracial assignment is intimately tied to class location, although that aspect gets erased in the muddle of language and terminology. Just after the U.S. took half of Mexico in the Mexican American war, the class configuration in the newly annexed territory included propertied Mexicans. Citing Tomás Almaguer's study of the historical origins of Whiteness in California, Brodkin points out that the Mexican landowning elite were officially considered White.[16] The racialization shift began as more and more Mexicans, compelled to the fields, became farm workers beginning in the 1880s (1998:73). By the time of the 1930 federal census, most Mexicans were no longer deemed "White," but considered to be among the "other races" along with Indians, Blacks and Asians" (Martinez 1998:177). According to a report issued by the Census Bureau, it was only in 1930 that a separate race category was created for Mexicans.[17] For the 1950

census, Mexican Americans were again considered White, a classification that remained until the OMB Directive of May 12, 1977 created the "not quite White" ethnic category, Hispanic. Over these decades, the "regime of racialization" (Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2002:3) has corresponded with the growing participation of Latino immigrants from places like Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, and Mexico in the low-wage labor force.

Like most social fictions, the one about Latinos has also developed a life of its own. *Latinidad* matters. For some, the collective sensibility comes from the condition of diaspora. First, there is the experience of being displaced from one's homeland, which resulted in the move to a new land (for immigrants) or in a new status (for Mexicans of the southwest in the nineteenth century). Second, there is the knowledge that one's homeland stands in unequal relationship to the United States, the place to which the travelers have come. Third, there is the sensation and sensitivity that develops from being cast as the other, racialized, marginalized, demonized.

This collective sensibility can give rise to loyalists of a kind who buy into the essentialist categories even as they contest them. We hear this in the "critical reader" titled *The Latino/a Condition*, introduced by its editors with words that reinforce homogenization, duality, and race: "If you are a Latino, how much do you know about your own group? If you are a non-Latino—a member of the majority race, for example—how much do you know about our nation's second largest minority group of color?" (Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2002:xvii). At the same time, there is truth to Latino unity that must be accounted for and appreciated, and there is political strategy to consider, even as such unity gets exploited by corporations and the state.

The other side of unity is heterogeneity, differences of background, experiences, and social location. We need not belabor the fact that Latinos are not "one big happy family" as there is a growing body of literature that looks at aspects of difference within the category, many of which focus on country of origin to frame the exploration. In their volume on *Latinos*, Suárez-Orozco and Páez make the point front and center: "Most of the authors in this book would reject any essentializing—that is, any attempt to discuss all Latinos as one seamless whole. Bluntly, what does an English-speaking third-generation upper-status White Cuban American in Florida have in common with a Maya-speaking recent immigrant from Guatemala?" (2002:3).[18]

To question unity is not simply to acknowledge intra-Latino variation, nor is it just to ward off lapses into essentialism. To question unity is to bring out of the shadows that which has been hidden, to restore that which has been erased. Not just any kind of variation will do—we must train our eyes on class differences. I suspect that in doing so, we might be better able to anticipate those dreadfully predictable patterns and practices of Whiteness.

ARE LATINOS BECOMING WHITE?

> Jewish intellectuals in the postwar decades . . . were somewhere between wannabes and nouveau arrivestes, accepted as white, but not securely. . . . [They] have fought more often to sit at the table with capitalists, even if only as sergeants-at-arms, than to accept kinship with workers who are not white.
>
> —*Karen Brodkin*

The meeting took place in an office building in White Plains, New York. It was 1985, and the ethnographer had come to give a report of her findings of a year-long study of Mexican immigrants living in New Rochelle, a city in Westchester County better known for its suburban bedroom communities.[19] She had been hired by the county to conduct needs-assessment research among low-income Hispanics, whose numbers were growing and who were presumed to have social-service needs that were not being addressed. She was to present the findings to the County Executive's (CE) Hispanic Advisory Board, an eight- to ten-member group appointed by the CE. The researcher gave her presentation, looking forward to a discussion on how the county might contribute to improve the well-being of this vulnerable population and what specific recommendations the Advisory Board might pose to the CE. Instead, the meeting turned sour. Nearly all the members, composed entirely of Latino professionals, were offended by the portrait of Hispanics the researcher had presented. "We're not all poor, you know," a Puerto Rican dentist complained. "I live in New Rochelle, and that's not my life." The researcher failed to convince her audience that the portrait was not intended to be of *all* Hispanics, but a study of the growing Mexican community in West New Rochelle, a low-income area where residents were struggling with housing, employment, legal status, and health-care issues. The dentist, as well as the educator, the psychologist, and the lawyer, rejected the explanation and the study. To press their point, one person commented that if someone were to see the report on a rack in the supermarket, they would get a "bad impression" of Hispanics, thinking they are all low-wage workers. The board members then proceeded to discredit the ethnographer on the basis that she herself is not Latina. For her part, the researcher realized the power of ethnicity in masking class difference and that these leaders were only looking out for their class-based interests. On what

basis, she thought, are they qualified to speak for the Mexicans she had come to know, yet whom they claimed to represent even though they seemed to have little concern for the struggles of their Latino counterparts in the poorer sections of town?

Scholars of ethnic studies in the U.S. have long entertained the possibility that Latinos will become White just as the Irish, Jews, Italians, and other European groups have done before them. In addition to a "Latino as White ethnic" future scenario, Suárez-Orozco and Páez posit two additional possibilities: "[T]he racially heterogeneous Latinos [will] follow different paths as a function of skin color, human and 'social' capital [whereby] lighter-skinned Latinos . . . [will] 'disappear,' becoming de facto, sociologically White. . . . [while] darker-skinned Latinos . . . [will] disappear in the other direction, joining the Black side of the U.S. 'color line,' " or they will "finally break the Black-White binary mold" (Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2002:20–21). Coatsworth is not inclined towards the "White ethnic" scenario since "intergenerational assimilation" and "upward mobility" among Latinos has not happened, at least according to the data he reviews (Coatsworth 2002:95). The "break the binary mold" scenario seems to capture the hope of many writers, artists, and scholars (Anzaldúa 1987, Martínez 1993, Sanjek 1994). Rodriguez tempers his optimism that the binary mold shall be broken, yet it shows through in his words: "Brown bleeds through the straight line, unstaunchable—the line separating Black from White . . . brown confuses" (2002:xi–xiii). Still, he dismisses a friend's prediction that Latinos will become America's "new Italians" since this forecast fails to address the influence of *hispanidad* on the American psyche.

I suggest a fourth scenario, a variation of the "different paths by race" prediction that melds with the "Latino as White ethnic" sequence. In this version, the path will have less to do with phenotype, ascriptive appearance or skin color even though there are correlates to phenotype, especially at the outliers (of very light or very dark-skinned, for example). Within the whole continuum of "brown" Latinos, there will be those who move into Whiteness (joining the elites among them, most of whom may already be there) and others of the same hue who will not.

There are several indicators that point to the fourth scenario, including extant intra-Latino class differences, the growing importance of Latinos to the American political scene as well as to the consumer marketplace already outlined, results of the 2000 U.S. Census, the growing xenophobia against new Latino immigrants, especially those *indígenos* coming across the southwest border, and the enduring power of the American dream.

Whatever the true intentions of those loyal to it, Hispanic unity serves to mask intra-Latino class privilege and belonging, as my own research anecdote illustrates. The Dominican scholar Silvio Torres-Saillant who sees his own group subject to a kind of Latino-scholarship chauvinism (Torres-Saillant 2002:439–441), outlines certain differences between Latinos that should already be obvious: "the varied circumstances under which the various subgroups entered the United States, the differing 'ages' of their relationships with this country, [differences by] subgroup [in] economic and political leadership visibility, [in] access to resources, and levels of empowerment" (Torres-Saillant 2002:436). Yet a confrontation with and examination of Latinos who are already privileged is virtually absent, except for research on Cubans in the U.S. who left after the 1959 Revolution.

But there are many privileged Latinos. Magazines such as *Hispanic Business* or *Latino Leaders: The National Magazine of the Successful American Latino* offer a glimpse of Latino power holders in the U.S. For example, the latest issue of *Latino Leaders* featured the "one hundred and one most powerful and influential leaders amongst Latinos," not all of whom are Hispanic (Ferraez et al. 2005–2006). The list includes Eduardo Castro Wright (Ecuadorian), President and CEO, Wal-Mart Stores, USA; Henry Cisneros (Mexican heritage), CEO and Chairman of the Board, American City Vista; Gustavo Cisneros (Venezuelan), Chairman and CEO of Cisneros Group of Companies; Raul Romero (Panamanian), President and CEO, S&B Infrastructure, LTD.; Oscar de la Renta (Dominican), Fashion Designer; Carolina Herrera (Venezuelan), Fashion Designer; Linda Alvarado (Mexican), President & CEO, Alvarado Construction Co.; Ralph Alvarez (Cuban), President, McDonald's USA; Javier Benito (Mexican), Executive Vice President and Chief Marketing Officer, Starwood Hotels and Resorts, Worldwide, Inc.; and Richard L. Carrión (Puerto Rican), Chairman and CEO, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico.[20]

The list itself may seem meaningless, especially since their numbers are so few. However, it points to the class structure within which Latinos are situated, a basic fact that tends to get lost by our focus on ethnicity. That there are very few numbers of Latinos at the top is also reflective of the class structure in which only a very few of *anybody* are at the top tiers of wealth.

A look at household income distribution in the U.S. can give us an indication, however crude, of the class structure. In an attempt to gauge income inequality, the Census Bureau's findings show that by ethnicity and race, the top 5 percent of income is enjoyed by Asians (7.9 percent); White, non-Hispanics (5.8 percent); Hispanics, any race (2.2 percent); and African Americans (1.5 percent) (Bureau of the Census 2004: HINC-05).

Conversely, those at the bottom two income quintiles are: one out of three (36 percent) non-Hispanic Whites; 31 percent of Asians; half (51 percent) of Hispanics, any race; and over half (56 percent) of African Americans. Put another way, annual household income for *two out of three* Americans does *not* exceed $59,999 (Bureau of the Census 2004: HINC-03). These income data are now available by racial and ethnic group as defined by the Bureau of the Census. A sampling by aggregated group shows that annual household income does not exceed $59,999 for: 58 percent of Italians, 61 percent of Irish, 71 percent of Cubans, 78 percent of Mexicans, and 79 percent of Puerto Ricans (Bureau of the Census 2004:HINC-03).

These aggregate figures show that basic income distribution across ethnic and racial groups is *more similar* than it is different. At the same time, that income distribution is parallel reveals a class structure in which the majority people from *all* groups are congregated at its lower rungs. These numbers bring to mind Ignatiev's observation: "What did it mean to the Irish to become White in America? It did not mean that they all became rich, or even 'middle-class' . . . to this day, there are plenty of poor Irish . . . [but] it meant that they could function outside of a segregated market" (Ignatiev 1995:2).

The aggregate income data also show that a disproportionate number of Latinos in America are poor as compared to their White, non-Hispanic, and Asian counterparts. According to the U.S. Census, one out of five (22 percent) Hispanics of any race live in poverty as compared to 8 percent of White, non-Hispanics and 11 percent of Asians. Nearly one out of four (24 percent) of African Americans live in poverty (Bureau of the Census 2004:Table 4). These data suggest a lack of access to occupational resources for over one out five Latinos (and nearly one out of four African Americans), an important factor affecting their upward mobility. It is these poverty data that lead Coatsworth to reject the "Latino as White ethnic" future scenario. Yet, as these are aggregate figures, they cannot tell us which Hispanics comprise the 22 percent. It would be useful to disaggregate the data by such variables as length of time in the U.S., language preference and proficiency, education, and generation in order to get a better sense of the factors that differentiate the very poor from those who are not.

We might expect that those Latinos granted "the institutional privileges of socially sanctioned Whiteness" (Brodkin 1998:41) are likely to distance themselves from African Americans. In my view, it is less likely that Latinos will join the "Black side of the U.S. color line," as Suárez-Orozco and Páez suggest might occur because they live and work in highly segregated low-income neighborhoods with African Americans (Suárez-Orozco and Páez 2002:21). It seems equally as or more likely that Latinos will follow the Irish model on this score. Although Irish and African Americans lived and worked together in the urban slums of the late nineteenth century, the Irish ultimately opted to enter the White race, gaining the competitive advantage they were looking for (Ignatiev 1995:2, 40). Like the Irish, Latinos will come to discover that becoming "White" will not mean they will become rich or even "middle-class" or even move out of poverty. Even though Whiteness connotes privilege and belonging, in actuality, the benefits of Whiteness accrue only to a few—this is a big trick on everybody, but played "on the backs of Blacks" (Morrison 1993).

Unlike the Irish, Latino entrée into Whiteness is unlikely to come about by the organized racial violence that paved the way to the Irish claim. Instead, theirs is a more subtle reception, marked by growing recognition from economic and political elites—the market place discussed above, as well as the formal governing structure.

The Latino presence in state and national politics is becoming more and more evident. We see it in the appointment of Alberto Gonzales to U.S. Attorney General by George W. Bush and in the recent election of Democrat Antonio Villaraigosa, the first Latino mayor of Los Angeles in 100 years. The number of Latinos elected nationally has grown from 3,063 in 1984 to nearly 6,000 in 2003 (Fraga et al. 1993, NALEO 2003). DeSipio and de la Garza, urging scholars to pay more attention to the ascent of Latino elites and their political action committees (PACs), refer to this rise as a "genuinely new phenomenon" with the potential for bringing "Latino" issues to the table (DeSipio and de la Garza 2002:404). In 1993, Fraga et al put forth the idea that Latino leadership would not necessarily be "co-opted" but could "shape mainstream views . . . Latinos need to take themselves seriously enough to offer their own comprehensive vision of what this democracy should look like—not just about a set of high profile 'minority' issues, but about life for everyone who calls this country home" (Fraga et al. 1993:243–244).[21] In a case study of the struggle for Latino leadership in a small California community, Paule Cruz Takash "documented six years later that achieving this representation resulted in concrete policies that improved the lives of the city's residents, and in particular, the lives of the poor, low income and racialized residents" (1999:50, and personal correspondence). This case study stands in contrast to my research anecdote where Latino leaders in the suburbs of New York were explicit in their disregard for the poor, low-income, and racialized residents.

We must consider the possibility that the influence will go the opposite direction, considering structural power and the logic of capitalist political economy. It will be important to track what happens to progressive

politics and policies as Latino elites become more fully entrenched in partisan politics. If the history of other ethnic groups is any indication, support for progressive politics and policies may shift, leaving them to serve as a "multi-culti-façade" for mainstream politics and class interests (Flanders 2004). This kind of participation and position would signal a gradual move towards racial "invisibility," that racially muted category called White.

Changes in Latino voting patterns serve as a rough indicator of political trends. A 2002 study reports that among registered Latinos, about half identify as Democrats (49 percent), with one-fifth saying they are Republicans (20 percent) and another fifth identifying as Independents (19 percent) (Kaiser Family Foundation and The Pew Hispanic Center). The Pew Hispanic Center reports that George W. Bush took two out of five (40 percent) of Latino votes in 2004, up from 34 percent in the 2000 election (Suro, Fry and Passel 2005:ii).[22] Republican gains with Latino voters might suggest a shift rightward. From this point forward, it will be important to track Latino voting patterns and to assess among which segments and for what reasons they cast votes for Democrats or for Republicans. A 2003 study conducted on Hispanic churches in American civic life offers insight in this area. Documenting significant growth of Pentecostal and Evangelical Christianity among Latinos in the U.S., the authors report that while 26 percent of Latino Catholics planned to vote for the Republican candidate, 35 percent of Latino Pentecostalists and 42 percent of Latino Evangelists had planned to vote for Bush in the 2004 election (Espinosa, Elizondo, and Miranda 2003:11–12, 20). The authors note that Latinos "tend to be politically and economically liberal but morally and ethically conservative. . . . They clearly support traditionally pro-family and conservative Republican moral and social issues like school prayer, school vouchers, and the charitable choice initiative" (Espinosa, Elizondo, and Miranda 2003:12, 23). In what ways, if any, does Latino Christianity relate to Whiteness in the U.S.?

It is also useful to examine Latino spending on political action committees. An article in *Hispanic Business* reports "Data from the Federal Election Committee (FEC) and the nonprofit Center for Responsive Politics confirm the partisan slant of large Hispanic PACs. Latino Alliance, the most active Hispanic PAC in 2004, gave 100 percent of its money to Republicans, while second-place Hispanic Democratic Organization and fourth-place Committee for Hispanic Causes BOLD (Building Our Leadership Diversity) gave all their money to Democrats." The article also quotes Larry Gonzalez, director of the Washington, D.C. office of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO): "If your agenda is business and access to capital, then you need to get involved with that candidate or politician [who shares that agenda],"a telling commentary on the direction of Latino politics (Russell 2005).

Results of the 2000 U.S. Census may also give us clues to a social process of Whitening even though the findings and interpretations discussed here are speculative. Scholars warn that results reflect confusion that comes from inconsistent and faulty race and ethnic categories provided by the census over time combined with subjective experiences of race and ethnicity among Latinos (Hayes-Bautista 2004:31, 73–74; Rodriguez 1992, 2000). At the same time, the 2000 Census provides self-reported race data, even as these self-reports are limited by the choices provided.

Nearly half (48 percent) of Hispanics checked off "White" in the race question provided by the 2000 Census, which also included the options of Black, American Indian, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, and "some other race." Two out of five (42 percent) Hispanics checked off "some other race." Two percent of Hispanics checked off the option "Black." Considering that at least 30 percent of Latin Americans are Afro-descendant populations (Inter-American Dialogue 2003), and considering "the large number of Latinos whose parentage includes combinations of White, African and indigenous ancestries" (Tafoya 2004:3), it is surprising that nearly half chose the designation "White" and only 6 percent chose two or more races (Tafoya 2004:7).[23] For Darity, Dietrich, and Hamilton, census results show that Latinos do indeed have "a strong preference for Whiteness and an aversion toward a Black identity" (2005:103). The net effect of Census 2000 is that the "White" racial category has expanded to include nearly half of all Latinos in the U.S.

In her analysis of Census 2000 data, Sonya Tafoya finds that Hispanics who identify themselves as "White" are more likely than other Hispanics to be registered voters and to consider themselves Republican, an important finding that also suggests the direction to which U.S. Latino citizens may be shifting (Tafoya 2004:2, 20). Tafoya's conclusions, reported below, are based on an analysis of census data, surveys, and focus groups:

> Among U.S.-born Latinos whiteness is clearly and consistently associated with higher social status, higher levels of civic participation and a stronger sense of acceptance. Consistently across a broad range of variables, Hispanics who identified themselves as white have higher levels of education and income and greater degrees of civic enfranchisement than those who pick the some other race category. More importantly, whiteness is clearly associated with distance from the immigrant experience. Thus, the U.S.-born children of immigrants

> are more likely to declare themselves white than their foreign-born parents, and the share of whiteness is higher still among the grandchildren of immigrants. In addition, U.S. citizenship is associated with racial identification. Among immigrants from the same country, those who have become U.S. citizens identify themselves as white more often than those who are not U.S. citizens. The findings of this report suggest that Hispanics see race as a measure of belonging, and whiteness as a measure of inclusion, or of perceived inclusion. [Tafoya 2004:3]

As Latinos become American and become more Americanized, it is likely that more among them will become White, and we will see an ever-growing distancing from Blackness as well as from the *indígenos*, the new immigrants to come. Torres-Saillant reminds us that Latinos "inherit a racist imaginary from both Latin and Anglo America" (Torres-Saillant 2002:452). On the Latino side, we need to track the negrophobic and *güero* (blond/pale) icons as these get produced and reproduced in the U.S. context. Again, Torres-Saillant is perceptive on this note. In his critique of Spanish-language television in the U.S., Torres-Saillant notes corporate resistance to showing Black and Indian faces, which has a specific purpose: "It is through the White faces of our anchorpersons that Hispanic TV networks have chosen visually to represent the homogeneity that our corporate identity is supposed to embody" (Torres-Saillant 2002:443–444). Not only do such bleached images erase Latin America's genocidal history, it fits well with the coming Latino racialized schism in America. Of course, it helps that most in leadership positions "look" White (not Indian, not darker skinned), such as Jorge Ramos, anchorman for *Noticiero Univision* for nineteen years, whose creamy White skin, blue eyes, and gentlemanly—and straight—gray hair grace the cover of his 2005 paperback book, *The Latino Wave: How Hispanics Are Transforming Politics in America.*

TO THE FUTURE

> ". . . the Unbearable Ambivalence of Whiteness . . ." (Brodkin 1998)
>
> Although the nature of jobs and the racial composition of the labor force have changed along with the industries in the economic core, the mass of the working class is still—or perhaps more accurately, once again—not-white, racially segregated, and occupationally segmented.
>
> —*Karen Brodkin*

Historian George J. Sanchez outlines two camps among scholars envisioning the end of race in America, now that *mestizaje* seems to muddle things. Writing that each camp is looking to "a time in which race does not determine social conditions *as much as* it does today," Sanchez suggests the end goal is only partial (Sanchez 2002:55, emphasis added). One group believes that "mixing" itself will undo racial categorization, and that the very embodiment of mixed-race people will destroy the Black/White binary. The other group sees race as racism, a system of exploitation tied to the distribution of privilege, power, and wealth, a position I subscribe to.

However well meaning those in the first camp may be, I believe their dream of *mestizaje* will not bring about the goal. *Hispanidad*, and even forms of *mestizaje*, are becoming mainstream, personified by dark-haired, full-bodied sirens like Jennifer Lopez. Unlike Margarita Cansino, who masked her Mexican heritage by becoming Rita Hayworth in the 1940s, Jennifer Lopez can keep her name and her complexion and still be the "ethereal all-American girl" (Rodríguez 1997:Photos 4.10 and 4.11). Just as being Jewish became a way of being American (Brodkin 1998:142), so is being Latina/o becoming a new form of White Americanness.

For many Latinos, Whiteness, even a peculiar form of *mestizaje*- Whiteness, may already be bringing anxiety over the loss of one's heritage (Brodkin 1998:161), over concern about responsibility to one's roots and over ethical and practical confusion about claims to color (Moraga 1983). Will embracing Whiteness completely obliterate ancestral history or just reveal it as historical fiction? In what ways does Whiteness fit with ethnic nationalism, a form of consciousness tied to country of origin—and in what ways does that consciousness lead to conflicts with Whiteness? Claims to color bring distress either way you go. "Now I feel both bleached and beached," writes Cherríe Moraga over twenty years ago. "I have had a *choice* about making that claim, in contrast to women who have not had such a choice, and have been abused for their color. I must reckon with the fact that for most of my life. . . . I identified with and aspired towards White values, and that I rode the wave of that Southern Californian privilege as far as conscience would let me" (Moraga 1983:33–34). This is the unbearable ambivalence of Whiteness.

The dream of *mestizaje* will not bring about the end of race since racism has proven itself capable of manipulating biology, not truly resting on it. Let me repeat here after Barbara Fields that "Once everyone understands that African descent is not race and that African ancestry differs from others only in the racism with which Euro-America has stigmatized it, the problem changes: what is needed is not a more varied set of words and categories to represent racism but a politics to uproot it" (2003: par 21). As things now stand, we should not expect the end of racism with multiracialism

but anticipate a racialized dimension in the mobilization of indigenous immigrant labor.

There are signs pointing to this development. More undocumented, indigenous immigrants are now crossing the border from Mexico and Central America (Zavella 2001, Fox and Rivera-Salgado 2004, Passel 2005), driven into the "not-White," racially segregated, and occupationally segmented, low-wage labor force. Alongside this migration flow, anti-immigrant sentiment is surging, supported by legislation like California's Proposition 187 in 1994, which, as George Lipsitz explains, "creat[ed] a previously unheard of legal category—the 'suspected' illegal immigrant—and then subjected these 'subjects' to vigilante surveillance, supervision, and invasion of privacy" (1998:48). From the ivory towers of Harvard we get Samuel P. Huntington's nativist diatribe titled *The Hispanic Challenge*, which begins with the ominous words, "The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants *threatens*" (2004:30, emphasis added), though the *real* threat flows the other direction. From less exalted quarters have emerged civilians who are organizing groups with jingoistic names like the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps and the Yuma Patriots, whose mission is to patrol the border for undocumented immigrants.[24] The new racialized configuration is brewing and includes Latinos such as Robert Vasquez, of Mexican heritage and a Republican county commissioner in Idaho, now on a crusade against undocumented immigration and what he calls "an imminent invasion" from the southern border (Egan 2005:A11). These immigrants include the Mixtecans and Zapotecans who, anthropologist Patricia Zavella notes, are experiencing "increased discrimination and exploitation not only by Whites but by Chicanos and mestizo Mexicanos" (Zavella 2001:107). Discrimination and exploitation, reflections of "the possessive investment in Whiteness" (Lipsitz 1998), always require distancing from racialized others. In this way, if and when Latinos enter into Whiteness, racism will live on in the service of an American construct of class.

NOTES

Acknowledgments. The work was supported (in part) by a grant from The City University of New York PSC-CUNY Research Award Program. I would like to thank Howard Horowitz, Adriana Waterston, Louise Waterston, Barbara Price, Lee D. Baker, reviewer Paule Cruz Takash, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on this article. I extend special thanks to Karen Brodkin for her insightful work.

1. The terms "Latino" and "Hispanic" are used in this article to refer to an ethnic minority group in the United States that can purportedly trace its ancestry to one or more Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, or Spain. The term "Hispanic" most directly reflects the construction developed and implemented by government policy and agencies and is used in this article to reflect the ethnic label used by the U.S. Census, the media, and the marketplace (Chapa 2000, Gibson and Jung 2000). "Latino," although nearly interchangeable with "Hispanic" in terms of who is constituted as belonging to the category, is a term, I believe, that better reflects self-identification by members of the group in the U.S. context and is used in this article to signal the interplay between self identity and ethno-racial assignment (see also Oboler 1995).

2. Brodkin also points out that "its continued persuasiveness rests upon the pervasive social spatial, occupational, and residential segregation that makes our bifurcated social structure seem like a natural phenomenon" (Brodkin 1998:177–178).

3. The company began producing a syndicated study based on the "people-of-color unity paradigm" in 1999. One year later and in response to demand from clients representing many of the major U.S. media corporations, the company launched an annual study series titled "Focus Latino" in 2000. The company also offered to produce additional annual studies titled "Focus African America" and "Focus Asian America," but there was too little interest among clients to warrant production. "Focus African America" will be produced for the first time in 2006 and "Focus Asian America" is not slated for production.

4. See also Associated Press. 2003. Census: Hispanics Pass Blacks as Largest U.S. Minority Group. January 21. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933, 76183,00.html.

5. For definitions of census terms and categories, see U.S. Department of the Census (2001).

6. The anthropologist is this author, who for fifteen years was division head of the research firm described; this essay reflects those numbers of years as a participant-observer of the media marketplace. This vignette is a composite of many meetings the author, along with her colleagues, participated in with corporate media clients or potential clients. The author is a culturally referenced Jewish, white woman, the Jewish Latina colleague is the anthropologist's sister, and the third colleague is the author's husband, a culturally referenced Jewish, white man.

7. Mauro Panzera, Senior Director of Multicultural Video, Comcast Corp.; Tony Maldonado, Vice President, Acquisition and Marketing Sciences, Cox Communications; Jorge Consuegra, General Manager, Yahoo! en español; Cesar Cruz, Director of Multicultural Marketing, Cox Communications are examples of these high profile Latino executives.

8. Over the years, the research firm with which the author was affiliated came up against this issue with the major Hispanic television outlets, which were adamant

in their refusal to acknowledge such factors as English-language proficiency and preferences among many Latinos, as well as other indicators of assimilation and heterogeneity.

9. The "Latino portion of corporate America" refers to companies that are ethnic-specific. In the media industry, for example, Galavisión is an ethnic-specific network, directing its programming to Hispanics, and BET is an ethnic-specific network, directing its programming to African Americans (see also Waterston 1999).

10. Yet corporate America remains relatively deaf and dumb to African Americans, whose population numbers fairly match that of Latinos in the U.S. (39.2 million as of June 2005), a clear sign of racism at work.

11. According to Surveys Unlimited/HAI research (2005), average income for Spanish-preferred urban homes is $28.8K; for bilingual urban homes: $41.0K; and for English-oriented urban homes: $47.8K (2005). The research was conducted among 950 Latinos (450 in a random sample of cities with a population of 50,000 or more where the majority of Latinos reside, and 500 in the top 15 Hispanic Metropolitan Statistical Areas).

12. Produced by Surveys Unlimited/HAI Research in 2000, this proprietary study is titled *State of Broadband Urban Markets: An Ethnography of Urban Consumers*; Carla Barrett was the principal ethnographer; this author commissioned and supervised the research and wrote the report.

13. Morrison writes, "In race talk the move into mainstream America always means buying into the notion of American Blacks as the real aliens. Whatever the ethnicity or nationality of the immigrant, his nemesis is understood to be African American" (1993).

14. Fields considers this story of dubious authenticity though she considers it "nonetheless telling" (1982:146).

15. Torres-Saillant tells an anecdote about an INS (U.S. Immigration) Officer of Dominican ancestry who stops, interrogates, and harasses a Haitian woman arriving in New York on a Dominican passport. The author attributes the officer's racialized, "anti-Haitian antipathy" to a "prediasporic experience in Dominican society" (2002:442–443).

16. In an article on water systems in the Río Grande–Río Bravo Basin, Tomás Martínez Saldaña notes that "In the United States, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848, ending the Mexican-American War, allowed for the preservation of certain Spanish and Mexican privileges and customs for at least seventy years" (2005:9–12). Nevertheless, the negative impact of the Treaty on Mexicans and Mexican-Americans remains an issue of contention (Bloom 1999).

17. According to a Census Bureau report, "This population corresponded closely to the population of Mexican ancestry who were born in Mexico or to parents born in Mexico. The 1930 census reports included estimates of the Mexican population for 1910 and 1920 based largely on data on place of birth. The race category of Mexican was eliminated in 1940, and 1930 race data were revised to include the Mexican population with the White population" (Campbell and Jung 2001).

18. Barbara Price notes that the Maya-speaking recent immigrant from Guatemala "is in his own country relegated to a political-economic and racial bottom stratum" (personal correspondence, October 2005).

19. The researcher was this author, at the time a graduate student in anthropology.

20. The author attended a private college-preparatory high school in Puerto Rico with Richard Carrión as well as with many other "high society" children of the professional class of Puerto Ricans on the island.

21. I am grateful to Paule Cruz Takash for alerting me to the report and to this quotation.

22. It is important to note that only 40 percent of the Hispanic population was eligible to vote, which researchers attribute in part to their status as non-citizens. According to their calculations, 18 percent of the Latino population voted in the 2004 election (Suro, Fry, and Passel 2005:i–ii).

23. According to Darity, Dietrich, and Hamilton, "some estimates run as high as 75 percent of the (U.S. Latino) population consist of persons of modern African descent" (2005:103).

24. An AP article published in the *New York Times* reports that Robert C. Bonner, the nation's top border official (Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection) is "exploring ways to involve the citizen volunteers in . . . a Border Patrol auxiliary . . . after noting the willingness of volunteers to help federal agents catch illegal immigrants" (July 21, 2005). The following day, a spokesperson from the Department of Homeland Security announced that no such plan is in the works.

REFERENCES CITED

Abu-Lughod, Lila
2004 Dramas of Nationhood: The Cultural Politics of Television in Egypt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Anzaldúa, Gloria
1987 Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books.

Associated Press
2003 Hispanics Pass Blacks as Largest U.S. Minority. The Miami Herald. January 21.

Associated Press
2005 Border Patrol Considering Use of Volunteers, Official Says. New York Times. July 21.

Electronic document, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2005/07/21/national/ 21border.html? ex=1122868800&en=04749aa7763e56e8&ei=5070, accessed July 24, 2005.

Bloom, John Porter, ed.
1999 The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 1848: Papers of the Sesquicentennial Symposium, 1848–1998. Las Cruces: Do-a Ana County Historical Society and Yucca Tree Press.

Brodkin, Karen
1994 How Jews Became White Folks and What That Says about Race in America. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Bureau of the Census
2001 Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin. Census 2000 Brief. Electronic document, http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01–1. pdf, accessed July 10, 2005.

Bureau of the Census
2004 HINC- 03: Annual Demographic Survey. March Supplement. Electronic document, http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032004/hhinc/new03_000.htm, accessed July 11, 2005.

Bureau of the Census
2004 HINC- 05: Annual Demographic Survey. March Supplement. Electronic document, http://pubdb3.census.gov/macro/032004/hhinc/ new05_000.htm. accessed July 11, 2005.

Bureau of the Census
2004 Table 4: Number in Poverty and Poverty Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin. Electronic document, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/poverty03/table4.pdf, accessed July 11, 2005.

Cañízares Esguerra, Jorge
1999 New World, New Stars: Patriotic Astrology and the Invention of Indian and Creole Bodies in Colonial Spanish America, 1600–1650. American Historical Review 104(1): 33–68.

Chapa, Jorge
2000 Hispanic/Latino Ethnicity and Identifiers. *In* Encyclopedia of the U.S. Census. Margo J. Anderson, ed. Pp. 243–246.Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Coatsworth, John H.
2002 Commentary. *In* Latinos: Remaking America. Marcelo M. Suárez -Orozco and Mariela M. Páez, eds. Pp. 93–96. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Cross, Gary
2000 An All-Consuming Century: Why Commercialism Won in Modern America. New York: Columbia University Press.

Darity, William A. Jr., Jason Dietrich, and Darrick Hamilton
2005 Bleach in the Rainbow: Latin Ethnicity and Preference for Whiteness. Transforming Anthropology. 13(2):103–109.

Dávila, Arlene
2001 Latinos, Inc. The Marketing and Making of a People. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Davis, Mike
2001 Magical Urbanism: Latinos Reinvent the U.S. City. London: Verso.

Delgado, Richard, and Jean Stefancic, eds.
1998 The Latino/a Condition: A Critical Reader. New York and London: New York University Press.

DeSipio, Louise, and Rodolfo O. de la Garza
2002 Forever Seen as New: Latino Participation in American Elections. *In* Latinos: Remaking America. Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco and Mariela M. Paez, eds. Pp. 398–409. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Duggan, Lisa
2003 The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press.

Edmondson, Brad
1996 The Minority Majority in 2001. Special Supplement to American Demographics.

Espinosa Gastón, Virgilio Elizondo, and Jesse Miranda
2003 Hispanic Churches in American Public Life: A Summary of Findings. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame's Institute for Latino Studies. Electronic document, http://www.nd.edu/~cslr/research/pubs/HispChurchesEnglish-WEB.pdf, accessed January 6, 2006.

Farmer, Paul
2003 Pathologies of Power. Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ferraez, Jorge, Kerri Allen, Francis Lora, and Lara Santiago Renta
2005–2006 The List: 101 Top Movers and Shakers in America. Latino Leaders: The National Magazine of the Successful American Latino 6(6):14–68.

Fields, Barbara J.
1982 Ideology and Race in American History. *In* Region, Race, and Reconstruction: Essays in Honor of C. Vann Woodward. J. Morgan Kousser and James M. McPherson, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fields, Barbara J.
2001 Race: The Power of an Illusion. Presentation given at a School for the Producers of Race

(March). Electronic document, http://www.pbs.org/race/000_About/002_04-background-02–02.htm, accessed July 9, 2005.

Fields, Barbara J.
2003 Of Rogues and Geldings. The American Historical Review 108.5 December: 62 pars. Electronic document, http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/108.5/fields.html, accessed July 9, 2005.

Flanders, Laura
2004 Radio Interview with Amy Goodman. Democracy Now. March 9. Electronic document, http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=04/03/09/1518241&mode=thread&tid=25, accessed July 23, 2005.

Fox, Jonathan, and Gaspar Rivera-Salgado, eds.
2004 Indigenous Mexican Migrants in the United States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Fraga, Luis, Herman Gallegos, Gerald P. López, Mary Louise Pratt, Renato Rosaldo, José Saldivar, Ramon Saldivar, and Guadalupe Valdés
1993 Still Looking for America: Beyond the Latino National Political Survey. Stanford: Stanford Center for Chicano Research.

Gibson, Campbell, and Kay Jung
2002 Historical Census Statistics on Population Totals By Race, 1790 to 1990, and By Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990, For The United States, Regions, Divisions, and States. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau. Electronic document, http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056.html, accessed January 5, 2006.

Ginsburg, Faye D., Lila Abu-Lughod, and Brian Larking, eds.
2002 Media Worlds: Anthropology on New Terrain. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Glickman, Lawrence B.
2000 The 'Ism' that Won the Century. The Nation, December 4: 34.

Haney Lopez, Ian F.
1998 Chance, Context, and Choice in the Social Construction of Race. *In* The Latino/a Condition: A Critical Reader. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, eds. Pp. 9–16. New York and London: New York University Press.

Hayes-Bautista, David E.
2004 La Nueva California: Latinos in the Golden State. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hollinger, David A.
2005 Amalgamation and Hypodescent: The Question of Ethnoracial Mixture in the History of the United States. The American Historical Review 108(5):62 pars. Electronic document, http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/108.5/hollinger.html, accessed July 19, 2005.

Huntington, Samuel P.
2004 The Hispanic Challenge. Foreign Policy, March/April(141):30–45.

Ignatiev, Noel
1995 How the Irish Became White. New York: Routledge.

Kaiser Family Foundation and The Pew Hispanic Center
2002 Latino Voters Most Likely to Identify as Democrats, But Party Loyalty is Shallow, and Political Views Defy Easy Categorization. Menlo Park & Washington, D.C.: The Kaiser Family Foundation, and The Pew Hispanic Center. Electronic document, http://pewhispanic.org/newsroom/releases/release.php?ReleaseID=2, accessed January 6, 2006.

Kingfisher, Catherine
2001 Producing Disunity: The Constraints and Incitements of Welfare Work. *In* The New Poverty Studies: The Ethnography of Power, Politics, and Impoverished People in the United States. Judith Goode and Jeff Maskovsky, eds. Pp. 273–292 New York: New York University Press.

Kingsolver, Ann E.
2001 NAFTA Stories: Fears and Hopes in Mexico and the United States. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kingsolver, Ann E.
2002 Stories of Accountability: NAFTA and the Contested Bottom Line. North American Dialogue 5(1):6–8.

Kolko, Beth E., Lisa Nakamura, and Gilbert B. Rodman, eds.
2000 Race in Cyberspace. New York: Routledge.

Lipsitz, George
1998 The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

LULAC
2004 All for One—One for All: History of LULAC. Electronic document, http://www.lulac.org/about/history.html, accessed July 22, 2005.

Mankekar, Purnima
1999 Screening Culture, Viewing Politics: An Ethnography of Television, Womanhood, and Nation in Postcolonial India. Durham: Duke University Press.

Martínez, Elizabeth
1993 Beyond Black/White: The Racisms of Our Time. Social Justice 20(1–2):22–34.

Martinez, George A.
1998 Mexican Americans and Whiteness. In The Latino/a Condition: A Critical Reader. Richard

Delgado and Jean Stefancic, eds. Pp. 175–179. New York: New York University Press.

Martínez Saldaña, Tomás
2005 The Río Grande–Río Bravo Basin: Water Cultures and Water Systems in a Fragile Eco-Zone. North American Dialogue 8(2):9–12.

McChesney, Robert W.
1998 Introduction. *In* Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order. Noam Chomsky Pp. 7–16. New York: Seven Stories Press.

McChesney, Robert W.
1999 Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Miller, Daniel, and Don Slater
2000 The Internet: An Ethnographic Approach. Oxford: Berg.

Montoya, Margaret E.
1998 Masks and Identity. *In* The Latino/a Condition: A Critical Reader. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, eds. Pp. 37–43. New York and London: New York University Press.

Moraga, Cherríe
1983 La Güerra. *In* This Bridge Called My Back. Writings by Radical Women of Color. Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, eds. Pp. 27–34. New York: Kitchen Table: Women of Color Press.

Morrison, Toni
1993 On the Backs of Blacks. Time. December 2. Electronic document, http://www.time.com/time/community/morrisonessay.html, accessed July 9, 2005.

NALEO/National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials
2003 Nation's Elected and Appointed Officials to Hold First "Latino Political Convention": The Bush Administration and the 2004 Democratic Presidential Candidates to deliver messages to the nation's top Latino Leaders at the 20th Annual NALEO Conference. Los Angeles: NALEO News Release. Electronic document, http://www.naleo.org/press_releases/Press050.pdf, accessed January 6, 2006.

National Council of La Raza
2005 Detailed History. Electronic document, http://www.nclr.org/section/about/history/, accessed July 22, 2005.

Oboler, Suzanne
1995 Ethnic Labels, Latino Lives: Identity and the Politics of (Re)Presentation in the United States. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Office of Management and Budget
1994 Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity. Federal Register. Electronic document, http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/fedreg/notice_15.html, accessed July 22, 2005.

Passel, Jeffrey S.
2005 Unauthorized Migrants: Numbers and Characteristics. June 14. Pew Hispanic Center. Electronic document, http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/46.pdf, accessed July 24, 2005.

Portes, Alejandro, and Robert L. Bach
1985 Latin Journey. Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ramos-Zayas, Ana Y.
2001 All This is Turning White Now: Latino Constructions of "White Culture" and Whiteness in Chicago. Centro Journal XIII(2):73–95.

Rodríguez, Clara E.
1992 Race, Culture, and Latino "Otherness" in the 1980 Census. Social Science Quarterly 73(4): 930–937.

Rodríguez, Clara E.
1997 Latin Looks: Images of Latinas and Latinos in the U.S. Media. Boulder: Westview Press.

Rodríguez, Clara E.
2000 Changing Race: Latinos, the Census, and the History of Ethnicity in the United States. New York: New York University Press.

Russell, Joel
2005 Power PACs. Hispanic Business. March. Electronic document, http://www.hispanicbusiness.com/news/newsbyid.asp?id=21211, accessed July 11, 2005.

Sanchez, George J.
2002 "Y tú¿qué?" (Y2K): Latino History in the New Millenium. In Latinos: Remaking America. Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco and Mariela M. Paez, eds. Pp. 45–58. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Sanjek, Roger
1994 Intermarriage and the Future of Races in the United States. In Race. Steven Gregory and Roger Sanjek, eds. Pp. 103–130. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Sanjek, Roger
1998 The Future of Us All. Race and Neighborhood Politics in New York City. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Suárez-Orozco, Marcelo M.
2000 Everything You Ever Wanted To Know About Assimilation But Were Afraid To Ask. Daedalus 129(4):1–30.

Suárez-Orozco, Marcelo M., and Mariela M. Páez
2002 Introduction: The Research Agenda. *In* Latinos: Remaking America. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco

and Mariela M. Páez, eds. Pp. 1–37. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Suro, Roberto, Richard Fry, and Jeffrey Passel
2005 Hispanics and the 2004 Election: Population, Electorate and Voters. Pew Hispanic Center. June 27. Electronic document, http://pewhispanic.org/files/execsum/48.pdf, accessed July 10, 2005.

Surveys Unlimited/HAI Research
2005 Focus Latino™ V. Electronic document, http://www.horowitzassociates.com/flvpro.pdf.

Tafoya, Sonya
2004 Shades of Belonging. Pew Hispanic Center. Electronic document, http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=35, accessed July 10, 2005.

Takash, Paule Cruz
1999 Remedying Racial and Ethnic Inequality in California Politics" Watsonville Before and After District Elections. Berkeley: Center for Latino Policy Research, UC Berkeley Chicano/Latino Policy Project.

Thomas, Piri
1997[1967] Down These Mean Streets. New York: Vintage Books.

Torres-Saillant, Silvio, and Ramona Hernandez
1998 The Dominican Americans. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Torres-Saillant, Silvio
2002 Problematic Paradigms: Racial Diversity and Corporate Identity in the Latino Community. *In* Latinos: Remaking America. Marcelo M. Suárez-Orozco and Mariela M. Páez, eds. Pp. 435–455. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Urciuoli, Bonnie
1996 Exposing Prejudice: Puerto Rican Experiences of Language, Race, and Class. Boulder: Westview Press.

U.S. Department of the Census
2001 Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: Census 2000 Brief. Electronic document, http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01–1. pdf

Warren, Jonathan W., and France Winddance Twine
1997 White Americans, The New Minority? Non-Blacks and the Ever-Expanding Boundaries of Whiteness. Journal of Black Studies. 28(2): 200–218.

Waters, Mary
1999 Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Waterston, Alisse, John T. Barber, and Willis Smith
1998 Minority Ownership: Obstacles and Opportunities in the Media and Telecommunications Industries. NAMIC Research Report.

Waterston, Alisse
1999 A Look Towards Advancement: Minority Employment in Cable. NAMIC Research Report. Electronic document, http://www.namic.com/initiatives/research/ALookTowardsAdvancement_Part1.pdf

Wolf, Eric
1982 Europe and the People without History. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Zavella, Patricia
2001 The Tables Are Turned: Immigration, Poverty, and Social Conflict in California Communities. *In* The New Poverty Studies: The Ethnography of Power, Politics, and Impoverished People in the United States. Judith Goode and Jeff Maskovsky, eds. Pp. 103–131. New York: New York University Press.