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Root Causes and Consequences of the Recurring Violent Conflicts in Somalia

Introduction

Eighteen years have gone by since the Somalia war erupted with the fall of Siad Barre's regime. The severity of the conflict, the type of people engaged, and its aspects and dynamics changed over this period. The battle is now raging amongst the militarily inferior Transitional Federal Government (TFG) soldiers and their allies and Al Shabab together with other fundamentalist organizations on the other. Though the TFG relishes international legitimacy and the sustenance of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), antagonist forces, mainly Al Shaabab, purportedly get funding from other nations in the Middle East. The TFG, assisted by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), manages only a tiny portion of Mogadishu's city (Mohamed). Al Shabab and other rebel troops manage large swaths of south-central Somalia, including sections of the city. While clan politics and competition among various warlords used to fuel and perpetuate the conflict, in recent years, it has progressively taken the form of a battle between people who purportedly advocate different kinds of Islam. Another significant development is the conflict's expansion from interior regions to the coast of Somalia. Somalia's coastal waters are currently the most pirate-infested globally, presenting a severe danger to maritime security and commerce.

Numerous attempts have been made to end this lengthy dispute. There have existed 15 international-led peace progressions thus far. Since early 2008, the United Nations has been launching fresh peace negotiations. The African Union preserves AMISOM, a minor diplomacy mission. The signature of a memorandum of understanding between the ARS-Djibouti and the TFG, which resulted in the selection of a novel leader together with the extension of the TFG Parliament in January 2009, was one of the new UN-led reconciliation progression's accomplishments. Although this raised hopes for a ceasefire in Somalia, the repudiation of the harmony process and the new administration by Al Shabab and resistance groups and the increased concentration of violence generate worries that the new administration may fall. As the war continues, the Somalia crisis tests the inventiveness and goodwill of those seeking to resolve it. This dispute has not erupted unexpectedly and incomprehensibly. As an alternative, it is the creation of the collaboration of many chronological, societal, and political forces that molded Somalia's administrative and socio-economic structure. To fully understand the war and its magnitudes for mediation and mediation exertions in Somalia, it is necessary to investigate the procedures or variables that underpin Somalia's complex and prolonged conflict.

This paper aims to create a small effort to ascertain and explore the procedures/influences and the undercurrents and character of the war and determine how they affect initiatives for peaceful coexistence and peacekeeping in Somalia. Therefore, the primary focus of this paper is to investigate the major causes and repercussions of the Somali war, for instance, appropriation of clan identities, power struggles, corruption, and the militarization of clan militias, political, economic, and social inequalities, extreme poverty, and high unemployment. Furthermore, the paper will examine the implications of the conflict in Somalia

Conflict resulting in mass migration, a loss of Somali unity and identity, violent extremism, and a pirate emergency.

Root Causes of the Somalia Conflict

Historic Basis of the Conflict

Even though colonialism cannot be understood solely, most African wars may be traced back to the region's colonial past. Somalia's war is no exclusion to this rule. As Osman points out, the sources of modern hardship, particularly in the South of the country, were sown at the culmination of the nineteenth era. Like every African government, the Somalian government arose from Africa's European invasion and occupation during the late nineteenth century. Although the Somali nationals have lived in the territory that is now a portion of the Somali state from the past, the Somali state as it is known currently was established only afterward the inception of European expatriate power. The natives of Somalia were unilaterally separated into five distinct colonial entities once the European colonial government was formed in the territory.

British Somaliland, the self-proclaimed sovereign state of Somaliland now, gained independence in late June 1960, primarily populated by the Issaq clan. When Italian Somaliland, which now encompasses central and southern Somalia, gained independence in early July 1960, the two zones merged to become the Republic of Somalia. There exist some ramifications of Somalia's colonial past. At least four such effects may be identified that account for the Somalia issue in significant ways. To begin with, the colonial government formed in this area resulted in the partition of Somalia's nationals into numerous independent entities. This continued to have an impact not only on Somalia's local politics but also, and most significantly, on its ties with its neighbors, notably Ethiopia. This was manifested in post-independence Somali leaders'

nationalist goal to construct Greater Somalia by uniting Somalis from all areas, comprising Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya.

Indigenously, the colonialist familiarity gave rise to an autonomist administration involved in a vast military buildup. At the national scale, Somalia pursued a stance that contradicted the 1964 OAU Cairo Pronouncement, which dedicated colonial boundaries, and looked further hostile towards bordering Djibouti, particularly towards Ethiopia and Kenya. Somalia confronted Ethiopia in 1977 and was lost, a setback that had far-reaching political ramifications for Somalia. Somalia's expansionist agenda is also at the core of neighboring nations' involvement in Somalia, such as Ethiopia. Peacemaking measures in Somalia must effectively address the security problems that Somali irredentism usually causes in the area. In this context, it is critical that the continuing Djibouti peace process address Ethiopia's legitimate complaints, particularly the acknowledgment of Ogaden in place of a fair portion of Ethiopian zone and the cessation of Somalian assistance for unorthodox organizations hostile to the administration in Addis Ababa. Certainly, as the records of several unsuccessful projects show, this is one of the litmus criteria for practically each peacemaking incentive in the country.

Moreover, Shir et al. argue that foreign control established a centralized governmental structure modeled after the European sovereign state like in additional areas of the zone. It brought political and social systems unfamiliar to Somalis' religion and tribe-centered partisan heritage and communal association, and it destroyed and changed native traditions. Because the government wielded prevailing control over radical power and economical possessions across the entire region, its institutionalization as the principal focus of economic and political authority set the stage for enmity and resentment as various sets contended to control the national machinery or radical supremacy. In Somalia’s perspective, outdated social institutions such as

the clan and sub-clan structure suited political tools in the conflict. The colonial structure altered the function of tribes and the form of intra- and inter-clan competition or war in Somalia. This also clarifies the role of 'clannism in the present Somalia crisis. Consequently, the public perceives the government as an object of clan opposition, a weapon for administrative and socio-economic exaggeration – other than a shared outline for all Somalis' socio-economic and radical growth, regardless of clan allegiance. This clearly shows that providing institutional safeguards for every Somali set against segregation and marginalization should be portion of the equation in evolving the framework for solving the country's ongoing war.

Third, Somalia inherited the disparate foreign legacies of the Italians and the British. Even though the interest and rhetoric of Somali unison masked this dualism in the initial years of the Republic's inception, the variance in colonial supervision and, consequently, political customs became a foundation of contention for leaders from the two provinces. The clan distinctions of the inhabitants in the two areas have exacerbated this split. The Italians' extremely interventionist and strong-handed rule included the enrollment and elevation of affiliates of indigenous tribes, notably those from the Majertinai and Mudgu districts, to the colonial government. The advancement of tribe affiliates from the selected states prescribed the colonial and postcolonial regimes exploitative and extractive policies (Osman, 2007:94). Because of their exposure to colonial government administration and political mobilization via the founding of the Somali Youth League, the governing administrative class of postcolonial Somalia had primarily emerged from the clans. The individuals of the north remained marginalized; however, they were also exposed to state-sanctioned brutality and suppression. This highlights the separatist aspirations in Somaliland, which finally led to its proclamation of independence in 1991.

Lastly, the disparity built-up from uneven dispersal of modern possessions and political supremacy between affiliates of several tribes amid the grandly fabricated Somali government is linked to the previous two issues. The colonial state, notably under Italian colonial authority, was run so that residents of certain designated groups or areas preferred admittance to colonial powers, learning, and other modern commodities. As previously stated, this resulted in the dominance of the government by associates of the sets eligible to acquire those goods that were critical in controlling municipal supremacy following the departure of the colonial ruler during the postcolonial period. As a result, the colonial-era inequity has become even more entrenched in postcolonial Somalia. The resulting inter-clan distrust and hostility form the basis of the conflict and is also one of the critical causes of the conflict. It had significant consequences for both conciliatory and diplomatic determinations. It raised the inquiry of the political organization form adapted to solve this task for peacemakers, advancing the question of how peacekeepers may efficiently carry out peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts devoid of being regarded as supporting the enemy group by adherents of the fighting factions.

The Social Foundations of the Conflict

The clan is the most significant cultural organization in Somali civilization. For generations, it has been the solitary most essential feature in defining Somali identity and social interactions. The majority of Somalis identify with their clan or lineage. Historically, it served as the foundation for decree and order and social deeds inside and among clans.

The politicization of the tribe system all through and after colonial law resulted in its use in the battle for control of the massive political authority and economic possessions obligatory on Somali nationals by colonial sanction. For General Siaad Barre's tenure, tribe tensions were exploited and deepened as some clans controlled Somali political affairs while others stayed

excluded and exposed to harsh, even murderous treatment. This condition deteriorated once resistance to Barre's leadership grew following Ethiopia's conquest of Somalia troops and the 1978 tried coup d'état to remove the regime. While Barre's government actively used the clan model of political benefaction to solidify its grasp on power, on the contrary, it marginalized various clans, including main ones. It took ferocious action against the clans answerable for the attempted coup d'état and dreaded positioning a significant risk at the government. The maladministration issues had substantial ramifications in terms of Somalis' attitudes toward the central regime and the inter-clan nature ties. Whereas Saad Barre's harsh administration (1969-1991) instilled broad skepticism of principal government, the divide and rule approach, he left a legacy of inter-clan solid hatred. It culminated in a series of clan-based revolts. Whereas the clan system offers essential social services such as justice, social security, and physical protection, it has also been a source of separation and conflict as competing political groups use it for political reasons. Additionally, it is one of the primary elements fueling the war going. Several fighting clans continue to employ it to pursue political domination and government monopoly or prevent the development of a powerful state-led by another clan. According to some, this is the problem that both scholars and policymakers must confront to end the Somali internal strife and construct a sustainable state.

Additionally, a sociological aspect that led to the existing Somali issue is the postcolonial Somalian state's incapacity to create the rule of law and the militarization of the public. Barre's administration was among the most aggressive in Africa. His administration received armaments from Cold War camps and African and Arab countries like Ethiopia, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt. As previously stated, some of the clans were armed with these weapons. Countries in the area also contributed weaponry to the resistance forces that arose during the latter years of Barre's

tenure. With the loss of the administration's role in allocating physical protection, the utmost fundamental of traditional tasks of the government, and the ultimate collapse of the state, the numerous tribes and the majority of Somalis turned to weaponry. This creates critical difficulties for mediation operations, specifically disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR). It asks for sophisticated ways to efficiently and successfully disarm and reorient all gun owners into noncombatant life, reconstructing self-governing security mechanisms, and restoring communal trust in the rule of law and government assured peace.

Political Foundation of the War

Various factors in the administrative sector also led to Somalia's eruption in 1991. Many of them are inextricably linked to the numerous elements outlined above. The most significant of these was the formation of authoritarian leadership under Siad Barre, Somalia's reliance on Cold Conflict allies and socialist monetary policies, the unethical and patrimonial scheme of government, and local power politics. Saad Barre's regime illegally rose to power, ousting the elected government. Somalia recognized a democratic system of governance founded on legislative fairness upon independence. However, the country did not have the human resources, utilitarian values, and social foundation needed for such a structure to succeed. Notwithstanding the prevalence of corruption and slow or stationary economic growth, which disenchanted Somalis, administrative liberties, comprising freedom of connotation, remained permitted, and dual legislative and executive polls were conducted. However, this trial with western form social equality resulted in close to 60 politically aware parties that did not last. It came to an end in 1969, when a military coup overturned the Somali Youth League administration, resulting in the foundation of Saad Barr's government.

Although the population first supported Barre's ascension to power because of the restoration of the economy and the idea of nationwide unity, the administration quickly turned authoritarian and totalitarian. As Osman put it plainly, the new dictatorship curbed liberties and outlawed all social and political groups, used heavy-handed tactics against the opposition, and engaged in extrajudicial detentions and human rights violations. Similarly, Ayittey remarked that the regime's signatures were torture, mass killings, looting, and bloodshed. The post-independence democratic advances were overturned, and the constitution was postponed. Like most African administrations that were clienteles of the east or west during the Warfare, Barre's dictatorial administration maintained both administratively and cautiously by a foreign army and monetary backing other than domestic validity and economic progress (Silvestri 15).

Nevertheless, Barre's government's distinguishing features were its dependency on peripheral funding and failure to establish an indigenous monetary foundation. The majority of the state's actions were reliant on aid from Cold War allies. The funds were primarily used to recompense regime allies and develop the government's safety apparatus, notably the army, as grounds for legality and control over the population. Consequently, when the sources of such foreign help dried up after the war's culmination, the government was deprived of resources to maintain those, as mentioned above. The emergence of other administrative obstacles, notably the advent of fortified movements, hastened and ensured Somalia's demise. In terms of economic policy, the Barre government pursued a socialist approach. Despite some early triumphs, this economic approach suffocated existing private projects and slowed economic development. Over the decade 1965–87, living standards remained unchanged,' writes Ayittey. The nationalization of acreage and control over agricultural production and delivery resulted in a fall in agricultural output.

During Barre's reign, an unethical and patrimonial form of domination emerged. Despite the original objective of national accord, the administration turned to tribe politics to consolidate control. It elevated the Darood clan household associates throughout governmental configurations, and elites from this assemblage also well-ordered all economic bars. Throughout Barre's tenure, the proportion of followers of his Darood tribe in the Cabinet increased. The state apparatus was employed to promote the political and economic status of the dominant clan while alienating others from the state's economic and political processes. This patrimonial style of government fostered political and socio-economic inequality and cynicism and hostility between clan members. It did not alter the common certainty in the country that the government existed as only a vehicle for acquiring political and economic supremacy for someone's tribe. As an alternative, it aggravated the situation. It eventually contributed considerably to the dissolution of the Somali national. The suggestion for exertions to reconstitute Somalia is that the determinations should not entice the sustenance from several administrative factions like a feasible selection which they will gain but also persuade Somalis in general that such a national structure is to work as a principal tool for the socio-economic and radical progression of every Somali national. Another conclusion is that Somalis must cultivate and reestablish trust, mutual respect, and peaceful cohabitation. Another crucial cause that triggered the conflict and eventually led to Somalia's demise was regional power politics. Somalia's ties with its neighbors, notably Ethiopia, were strained, mainly owing to the policy of its postcolonial regimes of integrating all Somalis under one authority. The collapse of Siaad together with the breakdown of the Somali government was not merely consequences of tribe politics but furthermore traceable in portion to the country’s extraneous rule, particularly the component of its Ethiopian orientation.

The two nations were included in the backing of insurgent factions battling one other. Ethiopia offered armed assistance and a ground for Somali resistance activities, whereas Saad Barre's administration equipped and installed Somali armed assemblages fighting against Addis Ababa from Ethiopia's Ogaden area (Cilliers). The War in 1977 remains the most severe component of this battle between the two nations. The Saad Barre military occupied the Ogaden region to annex it against Ethiopia forcibly. Barre's Cold War associate, Moscow, condemned his actions and supplied aid in Ethiopia. In the ensuing conflict, Ethiopian forces repulsed the assault, together with the Somali forces, failing to get US help, suffered a crushing loss. 31 This was a significant political blow to Barre, resulting in the failed coup d'état in 1978 and the following growth of armed antagonism organizations that finally removed him from office in 1991.

Consequences of the Conflict

Mass migration resulting from the Somali Conflict: One of the primary effects of the extended Somali conflict has been widespread displacement and migration, resulting in the world's fourth-largest refugee population. Some Somalis moved before the military regime's demise. However, the majority of the exiles fled the nation as refugees when the civil war broke out. This mass exodus began in the northern areas (now Somaliland) in late 1988. It was followed by the southern provinces in 1991 when the battle against military rule became strong and evolved into a civil war. There were 478.3 thousand Somali immigrants globally in the 1990s, compared to 20.7 thousand in 2005 and 52.1 thousand in 2019. Data show that 6.6 percent of international migrants were Somalis in 1990, then declined to 0.2 percent in 2005 and rebounded to 0.3 percent in 2019. (Ingiriis 76). Somali migration took several forms, with some migrating to Europe, North America, and Arabian nations, while others moved to neighboring

countries. The Somali migrants experienced several difficulties adjusting to and living in their new countries, including prejudice, humiliation, and racism.

Furthermore, thousands of Somali nationals have migrated to neighboring states, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen. Since today, these refugees have been living in deplorable conditions. The need for shelter for Somali refugees fleeing civil conflict, starvation, and drought sparked the construction of the Dadaab refugee camp in 1991. The camp was built in the northeastern part of Kenya. The Somali refugees, on the other hand, outnumbered and overloaded the camp. According to recent estimates, the present populace of the Dadaab site (463,422) exceeds the camp's acclaimed original aptitude of 90,000 individuals. The Somali refugees have significant challenges acquiring appropriate shelter, water, education, and health care, essential for survival.

Violent Extremism: Over the last three decades, there has been an increase in violent extremism on a global scale. Extremism based on a misunderstanding of religion arrives in Somalia as one of the primary outcomes of the Somali conflict. Following the fall of the military authority in Somalia in 1991, religiously inspired and insurgent organizations arose. Because Somalia had no or a weakly functioning government, several religious organizations entered the political arena. In 1991, the urgency of radical groups in Somalia became apparent, with the most notable groups being Al Ittihad Al Islami, Al Tabligh, and Al Islah. Sheikh Abbas bin Omar, the commander of Jihad Al Islam in 1995, commanded by appeared in Mogadishu and issued an ultimatum to the two significant generals, Ali Mahdi and General Mohammed Farah Aideed to halt their dissenting strife (Glazzard et al.). The set stated that they are present in various nations, including Sudan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Kenya, and that they have offices in those countries. Some members of the organization created the Sharia (Islamic law) Implementation Club in

1996. (SIC). The primary goal of the SIC was to create Sharia courts throughout the country. According to Glazzard et al., key actors in establishing these courts were representatives of Somalia's Transitional National Government.

The collapse of Somali Unity and Nationalism: Nationalism has historically been a driving element in the growth of a nation. Nevertheless, in the early twentieth century, Somali nationalism emerged as a resisting movement aiming at uniting Somalis and responding to colonial forces. Furthermore, nationalism gained political clout during the foundation of the Somali state and diminished throughout the early stages of the civil war. The Somali war has a negative relationship with nationalism. The early phases of the battle were marked by grievances and grudges, which led to a fall in patriotism. The evolution of the Somali war undermined nationalism over time, eventually leading to the demise of the central authority. As a result, other unneeded affiliations, tribalism, and fanaticism supplanted nationalism.

The urgency of piracy: Piracy has been a concern for hundreds of years and has progressed through different phases depending on the circumstances. One of the most severe effects of the Somali war is piracy. The absence of a functional government in Somalia for over two decades has added to the urgency of piracy. Some argue that piracy is a reaction by Somali fishers to foreigners fishing illegally in Somali seas. The threat that illegal fishing presented to the livelihoods of subsistence and commercial fishers along the shoreline was the fundamental cause of Somali piracy (Cilliers). Whatever the reasons, whether overfishing by foreigners or selfish Somali pirates, the breakdown of the Somali government is what gives birth to all of these effects.

Conclusion

The primary focus of this study was to investigate the major causes and repercussions of the Somali war. As a result, the article discovered that the ongoing conflict in Somalia had interconnected reasons such as the appropriation of clan identities, power struggles, corruption, and the militarization of clan militias, political, economic, and social inequalities, extreme poverty, and high unemployment. Furthermore, the paper examined the implications of the conflict in Somalia and discovered that the war has resulted in mass migration, a loss of Somali unity and identity, violent extremism, and a pirate emergency. Nonetheless, the crisis in Somalia has far-reaching regional implications, including political, economic, and humanitarian effects. In the final half of this essay, we presented inclusive peacebuilding tactics that we believe can assist Somalia in regaining its position in Africa and its pursuit of peace and long-term stability. Ultimately, it is evident that if the Djibouti procedure was to forge ahead and lecture all facets of the dispute in Somalia exhaustively, a sustained and a reliable and positive multilateral cooperation in Somalia from all global actors, including the UN, EU, and Arab League is required. Provided the hostility that the Djibouti procedure and government have received from Al Shabab troops, the opinion that the international community can display an advanced level of motivation than ex-belligerents is especially relevant (Solomon et al.). It promotes and emphasizes all Somalis the importance of backup and participating in achieving long-term harmony in their region and state. Furthermore, short of such a degree of global participation that harnesses and broadens international community involvement, hope about the Djibouti procedure and the unison of administration cannot be unrelenting. The chance of settling the war may be lost once more.

While the attention should be on accomplishing a ceasefire, bringing al-Shabaab into the peace procedure, and combining the role and influence of the international force existing in the

nation, it is also critical that struggles be focused both to relieve the misery of millions of Somalis and to undertake a comprehensive and integrated tactic to solving the conflict's various scopes. Along with the effort for a complete settlement and nation-building activities, an equivalent quantity of work must be done to encourage new and combine current native initiatives for supplying essential commodities and amenities. The relevance of customary institutions, such as clan affiliation and faith, should be recognized and suitably exploited. When it comes to stopping the ongoing war, outsider involvement is arguably the single most challenging aspect. This dimension needs much effort as the conflict's inner diameter. The continuing efforts for reconciliation and diplomacy are often guided by the conflict's present facts and dynamics. The urgency of building peace in Somalia also necessitates addressing the core causes and donating features that impact attempts to make peace and conduct peace operations in Somalia. The paper demonstrated that considering all aspects of the Somalian conflict and an extensive and anonymized or detailed evaluation of the potential ramifications of all and for peace negotiations and mediation attempts is precarious for successfully and holistically answering the Somali recession.

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