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in Hashemite Iraq, 1921-1958**



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Michael Eppel

THE ELITE, THE *EFFENDIYYA*, AND THE GROWTH OF NATIONALISM AND PAN-ARABISM IN HASHEMITE IRAQ, 1921–1958

One of the basic characteristics of the social conditions that marked political life in the Arab states in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s was the complex relationship between the politicians from among the elites of traditional notables of the Fertile Crescent cities and the *effendiyya*, or Westernized middle stratum. These elites consisted not only of traditional notable families, but also of families newly risen since the Tanzimat reforms in the 19th-century Ottoman Empire. Since the end of World War I, these elites had stood at the center of the new states established by the Western powers—Great Britain and France—and it was now the politicians from within those elites who headed the struggle of those states for independence. This relationship, as well as the character of the elite of notables and the *effendiyya*, constituted an important element in the social conditions characterizing the political and ideological environment in which the Iraqi politicians from the elite of notables had operated, and in which Arab nationalism and Pan-Arab ideology became a highly influential factor.

The traditional elite of notables, or *aʿyān*, have been discussed in the works of Albert Hourani, Ernest Dawn, Ruth Roded, Moshe Maoz, Ehud Toledano, and other scholars.¹ Hanna Batatu,² in his monumental study of Iraq, made a vast contribution to the description and analysis both of the elite in Hashemite Iraq and of the new political forces that arose in it. David Pool studied the development of the conservative elite that ruled Hashemite Iraq into a class. Philip Khoury's studies shed light on some important facets of the structure and socio-historical development of Syria under the French Mandate.³ Daniel Lerner contributed to the characterization of the *effendiyya* in Syria during the 1950s.⁴

The *effendiyya* and its place in modern history is discussed in studies by scholars of modern Egypt: ʿAbd al-ʿAzim Ramadan, in his book about the development of the national movement in Egypt; Haggai Erlich in his work on the students in Egypt; Israel Gershoni, who studied the intellectual history and the development of national consciousness in Egypt; Marius Deeb in his book on the Wafd Party in Egypt; and Richard P. Mitchell in his book about the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.⁵

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In contrast to the considerable references to the *effendiyya* in histories of modern Egypt, the *effendiyya* of Iraq, its relationship with the elite, and its influence on the political system have not been exhaustively discussed. Admittedly, Robert Fernea, in his anthropological study,⁶ and Hanna Batatu have mentioned, described, and discussed the relationship between the *effendiyya* and the traditional society composed of the elite and the tribes. Ernest Main, in his book on Iraq in the 1920s, devoted chapters to education and the "*effendi* problem."⁷ It seems to me, however, that there is still room for clarification of the role of the *effendiyya* and its relationship with the elite in Iraq.

Most studies of Hashemite Iraq have emphasized the relationship between the Sunni Arab minority and the ruling elite based on it on one hand, and the Shi'is and Kurds on the other; the development of the ruling elite; British-Iraqi relations; and the economic and social gaps that expanded with the weakening of the old social frameworks and the advent of modernization. Without denying the centrality of these factors to the modern history of Iraq, it is no less important to discuss the effect of the *effendiyya*-elite relationship on the ideological climate and political conditions prevailing in Iraq.

The objective of this article is to examine the role of the relationship between the politicians from the conservative ruling elite and the *effendiyya* in the formation of political conditions in Iraq and the transformation of Arab nationalism and its Pan-Arab ideological dimension into a dominant force in the political-ideological climate of the 1930s and 1940s. The complex relationship between the elite and the *effendiyya*, mutual dependence, and social contradictions created the background for the diffusion of Arab nationalism and Pan-Arab ideology.

THE CHANGES IN THE MEANING OF THE TERMS *EFFENDI* AND *EFFENDIYYA* SINCE THE 19TH CENTURY

The term *effendi* (collective: *effendiyya*) was initially used by the residents of Egypt and the Fertile Crescent to describe those persons who received a modern Western education at any level (elementary school, secondary school, or higher education), and who deviated, to whatever extent, from the traditional frameworks of thought and society, adopting Western clothing and concepts. These terms, *effendi* and *effendiyya*, were adopted by British officials and diplomats, with a meaning close to that given to them by the local population. On the other hand, the Zionists came to understand and use the term *effendi* to mean a rich landowner, an urban or rural notable, who adopted a Westernized lifestyle, and from whom they bought lands in Palestine.

The source of the word *effendi* is a Byzantine Greek word meaning "seigneur" or "master." From Greek, the word worked its way into Ottoman Turkish as a designation for a notable. The metamorphosis and development of this term are worthy of a philological-historical study extending beyond the bounds of the present article.⁸

In the 19th century, the word *effendi* (as used in the Arab-speaking vilayets of the Ottoman Empire) acquired the meaning of official in the Ottoman bureaucracy, which was then undergoing a process of change and modernization in the framework of the Tanzimat reforms (1839-76). Such an official customarily wore Western clothing, and covered his head with a fez, and was generally required to have a modern Western education.⁹

The weakening of the Ottoman regime in the 18th century and the elimination of the military elites—the janissaries and the Mamelukes, who had originated outside the area—in the early 19th century led to the strengthening of the local notable families: local Ottoman bureaucrats; merchants who established trade connections with the West and the urban landowners; the traditional religious aristocrats, the *sādāt* or *ashrāf*, and, in the vilayets of Basra and Mosul, some of the ulama. Some of these may have been descendants of the janissaries and the Mamelukes, or of Ottoman officials who had settled in the cities of the Arabic-speaking vilayets. The sons of these families were the first to receive a non-traditional education and to find their place in the growing new Ottoman bureaucracy, whose ranks were more widely opened to the local populace at the time of the Tanzimat and during the rule of ‘Abd al-Hamid II (1876–1908).¹⁰ (Also receiving a Western education at the time were the sons of Christian notable families and young Jews from wealthy households; many of the latter attended the Alliance Israélite Universelle School, which opened in Baghdad in 1864.)¹¹

Following the passage of the Ottoman Land Code in 1858, many urban notable families acquired estates outside the cities. This trend of urban notables transforming themselves into landowners continued into the period following the foundation of the Iraqi state, in combination with a similar interest on the part of tribal notables who took over the lands of their tribes.

It was thus that the initial significance of the term *effendi* came into use in Iraq, Palestine, and Syria—meaning a Westernized land-owner, generally living in the city in which his sons (or perhaps he himself) held positions within the administration or were in some way close to the ruling circles. The Westernization of these landowners was primarily in the areas of clothing, language, and education; only to a much lesser extent did it concern the promotion of modernization in agriculture and the economy.

As the prominent characteristics of an *effendi* were modern education and Western dress, the change in the composition of the stratum whose members were educated in the Western fashion, wore Western clothing, and took over more and more positions in the bureaucracy and commissions in the army and the police, led to changes in the social connotations of this concept in the 20th century. The expansion of the educational systems since the second half of the 19th century, the accelerating process of urbanization, and the inherent inability of the traditional educational and social frameworks of Islam to provide the quality and quantity of training appropriate to these changing realities and to the ideological challenges of modernization all led to demands for a Western education for the sons of many traditional middle- and lower-middle strata: the sons of craftsmen and merchants in the marketplace, lower-echelon members of the ulama, and even peasants and petty tribal notables. The concept of *effendi* was subsumed into the notion of an individual who had attained any Western education whatsoever (from the completion of a grade or two, all the way up to university), adopted Western dress, and deviated to some extent from traditional frameworks. However, the *effendiyya* themselves generally did not develop a class consciousness in the Western sense or any widespread awareness of group identity; at times, they even maintained their traditional identities and loyalties, weakened and undermined though they might be. The fact that education and dress were the chief characteristics of the *effendi* enabled the preservation of this

double meaning of the term: generally a new-middle-strata Westernized person, but at times a rich landowner belonging to the elite but with Western ways and habits. (In Egypt, unlike the Fertile Crescent, a certain degree of awareness of distinctive identity arose among the *effendiyya*, by contrast to the *bāshawīyya*, a term derived from “pasha” and referring to the elite of wealthy notables. Ehud Toledano, in his research, described the emergence of an elite-identified *bāshawīyya* in mid-19th-century Egypt.)¹²

The rapid expansion of modern education and Western dress codes in the 1920s and 1930s makes it difficult to define exactly who was included in the concept of *effendi*. Was a merchant from the market, who had studied for a year in the first grade of a modern elementary school and had replaced his *galabiyya* with a *farangi* suit, also entitled to that title? According to the concepts and customs of society in Baghdad and Mosul, and even in Nablus and Jerusalem, such a person could at times consider himself to be an *effendi*, and good manners dictated that, in such a case, he be addressed by that title.

The most important, central, and active portion of the *effendiyya* was that of the students in secondary schools and institutions of higher education. In Egypt, where modernization—which, in turn, helped develop education and higher education—was farther advanced than in the Fertile Crescent, the students had been the most organized, cohesive, and politically influential sector of the *effendiyya* since World War I.¹³

British officials and diplomats understood the concepts of *effendi* and *effendiyya* in the sense of the Westernized middle strata. The incontrovertible proof of the adoption of these concepts into the British political lexicon is manifested in the correspondence between the British foreign minister Ernest Bevin of the Labor Party (1945–51) and British ambassadors and chargés d'affaires in Arab capitals in 1947.¹⁴ The correspondence was in the framework of Britain's efforts to formulate a policy that would enable it to preserve its influence in the Middle East, in a new reality characterized by growing inter-bloc global polarization, Britain's own post-war weakness, and the dismantling of its colonial empire. Bevin estimated that, in order for Britain to be able to preserve its status as a Great Power, it must stop relying on the politicians and the conservative elites of the Arab states. Only by gaining the sympathy of the *effendiyya* and by fostering and gaining influence over the politicians who expressed the needs of the *effendiyya* could Britain rehabilitate its status as a power—but not on the old colonialist basis. Winning the hearts of the *effendiyya* was vital to holding the menace of communism in check while keeping the United States from undermining Britain's position in the Arab countries. As part of his outlook on modernization and development, Bevin viewed the *effendiyya* as a rising social force with which Britain must ally itself. Bevin made this trend clear in letters to British ambassadors and chargés d'affaires in Arab capitals, asking that they write him memoranda on the state of the *effendiyya* as a rising social class in the Arab states. The following passage, taken from a letter from Bevin to the British representative in Damascus, is typical of messages sent at that time to each British embassy and consulate in the Arab countries:

I have been giving some thought to the problem of the effendis in the Middle Eastern countries. I think that the term “problem” is justified, for reports received from various posts give

the impression that the effendis (by whom I mean the educated and semi-educated products of Eastern universities and schools) are in what may be called the "advanced" Middle Eastern countries of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and the Lebanon, in a state, as it were, of transition. They seem, in fact, to be rapidly developing into a professional middle class destined to claim for itself a definite position in the social order of the Arab world and to play an increasingly important part in shaping the political destinies of the Middle East. The new learning would, indeed, already seem to be causing something of a social revolution among the Arabs, with its attendant unsettling effects.¹⁵

In his reply to one such message in 1947, the British ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird, wrote:

So far as Iraq is concerned the effendis can, I think, be divided into three groups. The first includes those Iraqis who have either had a genuine western education in the west, or who come from sufficiently wealthy families to obtain without difficulty the better jobs in the Government or commerce. From this class chiefly come the Ministers, directors-general, mutasarrif, &c. The second class is made up of the rest of the literate town dwellers who have had rather scrappy western-style education in Iraq, the school teachers, clerks in Government offices, shop assistants, lawyers, journalists. The third class, which is separate from the first two by means of its occupation, consists of the junior army officers.¹⁶

This exchange of communiqués constituted the most basic discussion of the *effendiyya* held by the British Foreign Office. Another, different kind of mention of the *effendiyya* may be found in a communiqué written by the British ambassador in Baghdad, Troutbeck, to Sir Anthony Eden, following a conversation with Iraqi Foreign Minister Fadhil al-Jamali in early 1953. In that conversation, Jamali emphasized the necessity of making changes in British-Iraqi relations, and specifically of creating a new political and military relationship between the two countries. Troutbeck's comment, which ascribed Jamali's thinking to pressure on the part of the *effendiyya*, reflected a contemptuous attitude toward the *effendiyya*, in accordance with the trend exhibited by the conservative British foreign minister and government.¹⁷

In research literature, there is a rather strong parallel between the terms *effendiyya* and "new middle class."¹⁸ However, while the latter term is derived from Western sociological and historical research and thought, and its various definitions have emphasized economic status, social origins, and employment, the term *effendiyya*, which grew out of social experience, had less to do with economic status and social origins, than with education, culture, style of dress, and Westernized behavior. Among the researchers of the Fertile Crescent states, there were some who adopted anthropological research methods that embraced the term *effendiyya*.¹⁹

Both terms—"new middle class" and *effendiyya*—are defective as tools for historical analysis. The concept of *effendiyya* suffers from vagueness, the lack of a precise definition, and the absence of a theoretical overall system. That of "new middle class," which was formulated according to Western socio-historical experience following the advent of capitalism, admittedly acquired a complex theoretical system during its process of change in the 20th century, but it is not necessarily appropriate to a non-European reality.

The voices of the *effendiyya* themselves in the Iraqi press and literature deserve special examination, which is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present article.

Despite the defects and weaknesses of both concepts, their combined use—when accompanied by clarification of their meaning—may constitute an efficient tool for

use in historico-social analysis and in writing the history of the Middle East between the 1920s and the 1950s.

THE GROWTH OF THE *EFFENDIYYA* AND THE RISE OF ARAB NATIONALISM IN IRAQ

The most direct and influential factor in the growth and expansion of the *effendiyya* was the establishment of the modern schools. Admittedly, the growth of the *effendiyya* was also strengthened by the changes that had taken place in Iraq since the Tanzimat, with the expansion of market economy, principally trade with the West; in urban employment patterns following the establishment of governing and administrative institutions; and the development of the press and contacts with the West. However, the growth of the educational system, which provided local personnel with training for involvement in these changes, played the central role in the expansion of the *effendiyya*.

On the eve of World War I, the educational system in the vilayets of Iraq was extremely restricted, with a total of some 7,000 elementary-school pupils. The first high school in Baghdad had been established by Midhat Pasha in 1869.²⁰

Secondary education was principally available to the sons of wealthy notable families, whose status had increased on the basis of jobs in the Ottoman administration, trade with the West, and (in some cases) ownership of land. Gradually, however, the sons of the traditional urban middle strata—junior members of the ulama, small and medium-size merchants, officials, and junior officers—also began to receive secondary education. Some of the sons of these classes went on to study at the military academy and serve as officers in the Ottoman army.

Only after the end of World War I and the establishment of the State of Iraq by the British in 1920 did the educational system begin to develop at full speed. From 1920 to 1958, the network of elementary schools continually expanded, as did the number of high schools and institutes of higher education. Table 1 depicts the number of students in Iraq in selected years.²¹

The first college was founded in Baghdad in 1908. Four more colleges were founded during the next thirty-five years: a college of law in 1921, a college of education in 1923, a college of medicine in 1927, and a college of engineering (which had been established as a school in the 1920s) in 1942. An additional nine colleges were founded during the 1940s and 1950s. Many of these colleges served as a basis for the establishment of Baghdad University in 1957.

The growth of the *effendiyya*, the weakening of the traditional social frameworks, the urbanization process and the concomitant expansion of the poor strata at the edges of the large cities, and the strengthening of the ruling elite were the main social processes that characterized Iraq under the monarchy. The growth and expansion of the *effendiyya* laid the groundwork for the absorption of modern political concepts, the appearance of a sense of national identity, and the rise of Pan-Arab nationalist ideology to exert its influence on political life. Awareness of Arab identity and Pan-Arab nationalist ideology was promoted both by the need of the *effendiyya* for a solution to their identity and value crises, following the collapse of the traditional frameworks of identity and belonging and the exposure to Westernization and

TABLE 1 *Expansion of modern education in Iraq*

No. of Students	1914-15	1927	1934	1937	1946-47	1950-51	1954-55
Elementary Schools	7,055	26,700	63,150	86,300	121,000	210,000	395,000
High Schools (junior + senior)	1,818	not available	4,868	8,860	not available	32,700	41,484
Colleges		465	333	697	3,200	3,729	5,241
High School Teachers' College			697	675	3,216		

modernization, and by the activity of the Pan-Arab nationalists active in the formation of the educational system in Iraq.

Since the State of Iraq was established, its schools had served as an instrument for the propagation and internalization of Pan-Arab nationalist ideology. The leaders and designers of Iraq's educational system in the 1920s and 1930s were a number of Pan-Arab nationalist activists who had made a vital contribution to the development and expansion of Pan-Arab nationalist ideology throughout the Arab world. Despite their differences in opinions and views, the directors-general of the educational system—Sati^c al-Husri, Sami Shawkat, and Fadhil al-Jamali—contributed a great deal to turning Iraq's educational system into a tool for nationalist indoctrination. Sati^c al-Husri, who was one of the most prominent (perhaps *the* most prominent) Pan-Arab nationalist ideologists, believed in education as the most efficient means of creating a new Arab society.²² The central concept in his writing, *al-^cUrūba* (Arabism) is a term of Pan-Arab meaning. It was his writings that made the most definitive contribution to the generation and crystallization of Pan-Arab nationalist terms and concepts.

The nationalist directors of the educational system in Iraq employed teachers belonging to the category of political refugees from Palestine and Syria. These exiles, who reached Iraq after having been forced to flee from Palestine and Syria because of their roles in the anti-British and anti-French outbursts, were full of Pan-Arab nationalist spirit and fostered the nationalist consciousness of their students. These propagandist teachers, such as Anis al-Nasuli of Syria and Darwish al-Miqdadi and Akram Zu^caitar of Palestine, wrote textbooks on Arab history that were integrated into the curriculum of Iraqi schools.²³ True, the number of these teachers was generally quite limited; yet, considering the small number of high schools in Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul, their influence was tremendous. A significant proportion of the *effendiyya* who studied in the government secondary schools during the 1920s and 1930s were exposed, during the formative years in which their modernist outlook took shape, to the influence of a teacher-propagandist imbued with fervor and a sense of nationalist destiny, who propagated responses to the questions and distresses born of accelerated modernism and fragmentary absorption of Western ideas and concepts. Pan-Arab nationalist topics that extended beyond the bounds of Iraq, such as the Balfour Declaration, the struggle against the French in Syria, and various nationalist-militaristic ceremonial patterns, became an integral part of Iraqi education as early as the 1920s.²⁴

High-school students and their teachers were a leading element in the outbursts of nationalist demonstrations, starting as early as the late 1920s. The objection to the treaty with Britain (which limited Iraq's independence), relations with Britain in general, and the Palestine question—all of which served as grounds and fuel for the nationalist demonstrations and riots, and which formed the means used by elite politicians to strengthen their own status and promote inter-personal power struggles—became formative experiences for the students, young members of the *effendiyya*. Anti-British nationalist feelings constituted fertile soil for the ideas planted by nationalist Pan-Arab activists and educators, who developed and propagated Arab nationalist ideology and its Pan-Arab component.

The memoirs of educated Iraqis who were secondary-school students in Baghdad during the late 1920s frequently mention the demonstrations during the visit by the British industrialist and Zionist activist Sir Alfred Mond (founder of Imperial Chemical Industries) in 1928.²⁵ Students and teachers played an important role in the demonstrations of solidarity with the Palestinian Arabs that broke out in 1933, following the riots in Jaffa, and in 1936–39, during the Palestinian Arab revolt in Palestine.

Among the factors contributing to the success of the Pan-Arab nationalist teachers and activists in using the school system to influence the consciousness and ideological trends of the *effendiyya* was the acute identity distress and value crisis suffered by its members, who had deviated from the traditional frameworks of society and thought and had absorbed—in a partial, fragmentary manner—various Western ideas and concepts. This situation made the *effendiyya* ripe for absorbing a nationalist-ideological response whose emphasis was on national identity and throwing off the feeling of weakness and inferiority vis-à-vis the West. Arab national identity and its political conclusion, Pan-Arab ideology, provided an easily accepted response to the distresses of the *effendiyya*, being founded on the conflicting sources of Arab nationalism: on one hand, the concept of secular nationalism and the modern set of ideas resulting from Western historical development; on the other, the historical heritage and cultural experience of Islam and other traditional bases of identification, such as sect, region, and tribe.

As Iraq was the artificial creation of the British, with no unifying common denominator for its heterogeneous population, Arab identity—which extended beyond the borders of Iraq and was formulated and propagated by influential figures in the Iraqi school and political system—became dominant among the graduates of the modern educational system, the *effendiyya*. Although in the 19th century the contacts between the Iraqi vilayets of Baghdad and Mosul became stronger, and the Ottomans sometimes joined them by appointing a single governor, the vilayets remained separate and their population diversified. Admittedly, since the last days of the Ottoman Empire, a sense of local patriotism had also developed among the natives of the Wadi Rafidain twin river valley in Baghdad and Basra. Local territorial-nationalist trends were explicitly expressed during the Bakir Sidqi–Hikmat Sulayman government (October 1936 to August 1937) under the slogan “Iraq for the Iraqis.”²⁶ However, these Iraqi territorial-nationalist feelings and the struggle for complete independence from Britain were nowhere metamorphosed into ideologically defined Iraqi nationalism in the political and ideological climate of Iraq. Rather, Arab nationalism, which was

founded in ideology and based on history and common language, combined modern nationalist concepts with a strong infrastructure derived from the cultural heritage of the Arabic language, as well as from the role of Arabic and the Arabs in the history of Islam, which was well known to anyone in Iraq with a Muslim education. The contradictions among the population of Iraq and the strength of its various local tribal-ethnic identities kept any feelings of Iraqi distinctiveness that might have existed from developing into a dominant nationalist trend in Iraq. For the Baghdadi elite and *effendiyya*, mostly Sunnis with some Shi'is, Arab nationalism was a means of bridging the ethnic gaps in an attempt to build a common denominator with all those elements interested in reinforcing the Iraqi state, but fearful of the ethnocentric, centrifugal trends of the Shi'is and the Kurds, as well as of the anarchistic, decentralistic tendencies of the tribes. After all, 75 to 80 percent of the population of Iraq consisted of native speakers of Arabic. For the conservative elite, Arab nationalism was a modern socio-political tool adopted for the mobilization of the *effendiyya* and the preservation of the Iraqi state. The patronage networks, the dominance in the economic and political arena, together with the British interest in the status quo and the harnessing of Arab nationalism and Pan-Arab ideology as political means, enabled the conservative elite to remain in power for four decades.

THE WEAKNESSES OF THE EFFENDIYYA IN IRAQ

It was admittedly true that the *effendiyya* grew steadily with each year's crop of high-school graduates, each advance in media dissemination, and each newly adopted pattern of Western dress. However, as a stratum it suffered from several basic weaknesses: (a) lack of class consciousness and organizational weakness; (b) lack of leadership; and (c) dependence on the state apparatus as a prime source of employment.

The entrepreneurial-industrial bourgeoisie, which could have served as a potential partner in the *effendiyya*'s interest in development, industrialization, and modernization, was extremely weak in Iraq. The conditions of the world economy and the lack of favorable socio-economic conditions within Iraq itself contributed to the country's industrial backwardness. Iraq, like most of the non-European parts of the world, lacked the particular socio-ideological-political conditions which enabled Western Europe to develop into a specialized commercial-industrial society with a strong bourgeoisie, whose interests and sometimes contradictory orientations exerted an influence on state policy. The few industrialists and politicians aware of and interested in the need for accelerated development and industrialization were connected with the conservative ruling elite.

Despite the weakening of the traditional social frameworks and the erosion of the status of the traditional tribal, ethnic, and religious notables, these frameworks were still quite strong. Notwithstanding the *effendiyya*'s deviation from the traditional social frameworks, many of them also retained their affinity with those frameworks. This affinity to old vertical (tribal, ethnic, familial) frameworks made it difficult for the *effendiyya* to coalesce as a stratum or class with its own identity and specific interests. The idea of class struggle, which sprang up and won acceptance primarily in Europe, did not take root in Arabic-speaking societies at either the level of social

awareness or that of intellectual and ideological creativity. The acute nature of the identity crisis on one hand, and the preservation of the old social patterns on the other, interfered with the acceptance of the concept of class and class struggle.

The frustration and distress of the *effendiyya* were channeled into anti-British Pan-Arab nationalism, which became their means of political expression. The acuity of the identity distress that made the *effendiyya* ripe for absorbing nationalist ideas and slogans also helped the elite politicians to enlist many of the *effendiyya* through the use of such slogans, with no need for socio-economic plans and programs that might have undermined the status quo or damaged the interests of the elite and its allies, the tribal notables.

It was true that the expansion and concurrent frustration of the *effendiyya* and its need for a response to its identity distress made it into fertile soil for the establishment of nationalist organizations. These, however, were led by nationalists from among the elite, and were accordingly subject to manipulation by elite politicians.

The *effendiyya* did not develop a leadership from among its ranks, nor did it unite around those elite politicians who supported reform and change, such as Kamil al-Chadirchi. This lack of leadership was due not only to the weakness of its class consciousness and the preservation of old social affinities, but also to the ability of the more talented and successful members of the *effendiyya* to integrate into the elite. The conservative ruling elite was relatively open-minded, enabling an *effendi* who had become wealthy or climbed the bureaucratic ladder in the service of the state to find a place within it. A senior official with the ability to form connections, or a member of the liberal professions who had acquired wealth, could succeed in becoming co-opted by the elite, despite his humble family origin. Among the members of the *effendiyya* who came from such humble origins but acquired political influence and status, found their place among the elite, and acquired key positions in the Iraqi regime were Salih Jabr (prime minister, March 1947 to January 1948), Fadhil al-Jamali (prime minister, September 1953 to March 1954), 'Abd al-Qarim al-Uzri (a prominent economist and minister of finance in al-Jamali's government), and others. However, without strong familial or tribal backing or backing on the part of any senior politician of the elite, it was extremely difficult for a member of the *effendiyya* who was not wealthy but had political ambition to find a place in the political system.²⁷ As Iraq in the 1920s and 1930s suffered from a lack of educated persons and members of the liberal professions, such persons generally enjoyed economic success and were motivated by their own personal interest to ally themselves with the existing elite. This co-option of the more successful members of the *effendiyya* was a phenomenon more common to Iraq (and, to a lesser degree, Syria) than to Egypt. The social origins of most of the Sharifians, who had come to Iraq with Faysal I, stemmed from middle- or lower-middle-strata families. The members of these families, in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, chose a military career as a means to personal advancement.²⁸ The Sharifians slid more or less unobtrusively into the ranks of the elite notables—admittedly with some degree of friction—and became part of the ruling class in Iraq. Thus, this group, which shared some of the characteristics of the *effendiyya*, became an integral part of the conservative land-owning elite. In this way, the potential leadership of the *effendiyya* was effectively neutralized. Those of its members who did take on the leadership of political movements

contributed to the crystallization of political forces whose influence was felt only after army officers led by Qasim and 'Arif put an end to the monarchy in 1958.

The apparatus of the state—that is, the bureaucracy, the educational system, and the military—constituted the principal source of employment for the graduates of Iraq's secondary schools. The slow development of industry and other modern branches of the economy during the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s led to the widening of the gap between the number of graduates with hopes for decent employment and a good standard of living and the limited supply of jobs.

The status of civil service as the prime employer of Baghdad's educated young men caused them to depend on the state and the bureaucratic system headed by members of the elite. This dependence was at times exploited by the government, which held the threat of unemployment as a sword of Damocles over the heads of high-school and college students when nationalist demonstrations exceeded the level tolerated by the elite politicians.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE *EFFENDIYYA* ON POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN IRAQ

Despite its weaknesses and lack of class consciousness, the *effendiyya's* importance in determining the social conditions of Iraq's political arena increased throughout the Hashemite period (1921–58).

Without the *effendiyya*, it would not have been possible to operate the institutions and apparatus of the modern Iraqi state. It was the members of the *effendiyya*—officials, teachers, health workers, engineers, and even (as of the late 1930s) military officers—who staffed the bureaucracy, the school system, the public-health system, the post offices, and the command positions of the army.

Those members of the *effendiyya* who were most consistently affected by modern political thought patterns and concepts became the disseminators of those concepts by means of the school system, the press, and contacts with less-developed and more traditional strata. The members of the *effendiyya*, once aware of their modern Arab national identity and of the Pan-Arab ideology behind it, became fervent proponents of these ideas.

The constant expansion of the school system supplied jobs for the *effendiyya* and increased the group's scope and influence. The development and expansion of the Iraqi press in the 1920s and 1930s was enabled by the significant and constant increase in the number of persons interested in reading newspapers and understanding the significance of the modern political concepts adopted into the Arabic language.²⁹

Starting in the last half of the 1930s, the radio also became a factor in the extension of Arabic to include modern concepts and terms reflecting Western influence. The technological advances of the 1950s, which reduced the price of radios and made them more readily available, increased the importance of radio as a means of influence. This process—which affected not only the Arab states—was clearly reflected in the extensive use of radio as a tool for propaganda and political attacks against the conservative Iraqi monarchy by the radical regime of the Free Officers in Egypt in 1954–58.

The concentration of the *effendiyya* in the large cities and primarily in Baghdad, the focus of political life in Iraq, as well as their comparatively high degree of political involvement and sensitivity, gave them a uniquely important role in political life. Starting in 1927–28, the youth of the *effendiyya*—the high-school and college students—had been the hard core of innumerable political assemblies and demonstrations in Baghdad. These demonstrations and assemblies were generally inspired and organized by politicians from the elite, or even by the palace itself, in order to put pressure on Britain over the Anglo–Iraqi treaty, as well as within the framework of the internal struggles among the various factions of elite politicians. These demonstrations, which at times turned into riots, were taken up by the poor of Baghdad, some of whom were only too glad to exploit the opportunity for looting and smashing. Nonetheless, the foundations of the protest movement were composed of members of the *effendiyya*. True, the elite politicians contributed to the tension and nationalist radicalization by means of their belligerent utterances, intended to bolster their nationalist image in order to obtain their own power goals.

In the autumn and winter of 1927–28, the younger members of the *effendiyya* played a central role in the demonstrations and riots over the struggle between the Sharifian politicians and Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun (a highly educated notable from a tribal background), who adopted a more compromising attitude toward Britain. The desire of the nationalist Sharifian politicians to bring about ‘Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa‘dun’s dismissal, along with Faysal I’s convoluted maneuvers among the politicians with regard to the British, led to exploitation of the unrest among the *effendiyya* for purposes of political pressure. The zenith of those demonstrations took place during the visit of Sir Alfred Mond, which became a convenient excuse for nationalist extremism.³⁰ An important role in the organization of these riots was played by the members of the *al-Taḏāmun* club, who operated among teachers and students.³¹ The British suspected that club of being supported by the Communist International. In any event, the club members, who had hoped to exploit the demonstrations for their own ends, let them get out of control, and the police had to use force in order to suppress them.

The rising importance of the *effendiyya* in the political conditions of Iraq is attested to by the words of King Faysal I to Sir Francis Humphrys in 1932, in which he explained the reasons for his wish to convene a Pan-Arab congress in Baghdad, in response to the prevailing mood among the “intelligentsia”—that is, the *effendiyya*.³² Faysal was admittedly seeking to justify his Arab–nationalist policy in the eyes of the British, in order to enlist support of his ambition to regain the throne of Syria; however, the reasons he cited reflected the change in the operating conditions of Iraqi politicians that had come about with the rise of the Pan-Arab nationalist tendency among the growing *effendiyya*.

Indeed, the rise of the *effendiyya* and their nationalist trends had brought about a great change in the Iraqi political arena. Many politicians, themselves belonging to the elite, now had to devote great efforts—involving such modern political means as nationalist ideological slogans and political and semi-political organizations—to enlisting the support of the *effendiyya*. At the same time, they continued to rely on traditional means: purchasing the loyalty of the notables, shaykhs, and religious

leaders in order to enlist the traditional sectors of society, whose members still constituted a majority.

In the second half of the 1930s, the large cities of Iraq were characterized by growing Arab nationalist sentiments, accompanied by the reinforcement of anti-British and pro-German trends. The *al-Ikhā al-Waṭanī* government, headed by Yasin al-Hashimi (March 1935 to October 1936) encouraged and fostered the Arab nationalist trends that expressed the outlooks of its leaders and responded to the need to enlist the *effendiyya* in their cause. Contributing to the strengthening of these trends were the heads of the educational system, who fostered nationalist-militarist spirit and fascist tendencies within Iraqi schools.³³ In the large cities of Iraq, starting in 1935, nationalist clubs such as *al-Muthannā* in Baghdad began to spring up, as did nationalist-fascist youth movements, and the activity of the nationalist *al-Futuwwa* youth movement was increased even further. The exacerbation of social tensions and personal frustration among the *effendiyya* as a result of the widening gap between the number of high-school and college graduates and the available job opportunities contributed to the radicalization of its members. In the absence of any class consciousness, the tension and frustration occasioned by socio-economic factors proved fertile soil for the growth of nationalist-authoritarian ideas inspired by similar trends prevailing in Europe and fostered by the nationalist Iraqi government headed by Yasin al-Hashimi.

The rise of the Nazis to power in Germany and the fascist trends sweeping throughout Europe were reflected in the strengthening of anti-British tendencies among Iraqi nationalists, and aroused hopes that Britain would be defeated in the impending war. (The intense activity of the German diplomat Dr. Grobba was important in reinforcing these trends in Iraq.) Even those politicians whose attitudes were moderately pro-British, and whose speeches in Parliament warned against and tried to soften the trends of growing anti-British extremism—such as Jamil al-Midfā'i, prime minister from August 1937 to December 1938, and Tawfiq al-Suwaydi, his foreign minister—were forced to make a show of nationalist conformism for the benefit of the nationalist officers and other nationalists whose power was drawn from the tendencies of the *effendiyya*.³⁴

This nationalist extremism reflected the increasing power of the *effendiyya* as a political and social force and had a reciprocal effect on the rise of the Pan-Arab nationalist officers. The most prominent of these was Colonel Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, who, after the ouster of the Iraqi-nationalist-territorial Bakir Sidqi-Hikmat Sulayman government in August 1937, became the focal point of power in Iraq.³⁵

The rising strength of the nationalist officers in Iraq between 1937 and 1941 admittedly coincided with the weakness of the civilian institutions and organizations, the feebleness of the constitutional-parliamentary system, and the dependence of the politicians and the state on the strength of the military in the face of constant danger of tribal Shi'i and Kurdish rebellions. Nonetheless, the pro-nationalist atmosphere in the street, reflecting the expansion and fervent nationalism of the *effendiyya*, contributed to the trends expressed by the nationalist officers.

The pro-German Rashid 'Ali movement, which brought about head-on collision and war between Britain and Iraq in 1941, was led by a handful of nationalist elite

politicians. It was headed by Rashid ʿAli al-Gaylani and assisted by the extremists Yunis al-Sibaʿwi and Naji and Sami Shawkat, as well as by Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh and the nationalist officers—and, of course, the mufti of Jerusalem, al-Haj Amin al-Husayni.³⁶ However, the anti-British policy that led to the attempt to depend on Germany, although implemented by a few officers and politicians, was nurtured by the nationalist anti-British trends of the *effendiyya*, which had become dominant in the streets of Baghdad. The frustration of the *effendiyya*, which resulted from their identity crisis and their economic and social distresses, with the added tensions posed by the British–Iraqi relationship in general and the limitations on Iraq’s independence in particular, was transformed into a militant hatred of the British.

The *effendiyya* of Iraq were not strong enough to found civilian political organizations and parties that could serve as a counter-weight to the army and provide a basis for a democratic–constitutional regime. The adoption of democratic–liberal ideas, values, and concepts by both the *effendiyya* and the elite was intermittent and superficial. Nationalist–authoritarian trends and messages were more appropriate to their identity crisis, as well as to the feeling of insult and resentment against Britain. Given this situation, and in view of the lack of a strong, independent bourgeoisie, the *effendiyya* were incapable of constituting a social basis strong enough to establish a democratic–liberal parliamentary–constitutional regime. Nevertheless, their nationalist trends were powerful enough to create a political atmosphere in the streets of Baghdad that lent backing to the militant–authoritarian trends and influence of the officers.

Following the end of World War II, socio-political tension rose in Iraq and the economic crisis deepened. The level of economic distress among the poorer strata amounted to starvation.³⁷ Due to financial difficulties, the government had trouble paying regular salaries to civil servants, and the lower and middle echelons of these employees became increasingly frustrated and embittered. The bureaucratic apparatus and the civil service found it harder and harder to provide employment to high-school and college graduates. The increased frustration and bitterness among the *effendiyya* helped the nationalist forces—the *al-Istiqlāl* party; the National Democratic Party (descended from the *al-Ahālī* group, which had been active in the 1930s and whose platform was Iraqi-nationalist but not Pan-Arab), whose activity had been reinstated in 1946; and the communists—to expand the scope of their activities.³⁸ The question of the agreement with Britain, which in itself constituted a focal point for nationalist activity, and the echoes of the British–Egyptian Treaty negotiations, intensified the nationalist unrest. The tension and unrest resulting from the economic crisis and the nationalist activity concerning the treaty with Britain and the Palestine question reached a peak in the autumn and winter of 1947–48.

Since June 1947, Salih Jabr had been prime minister of Iraq. Jabr, a Shiʿi technocrat, had been the protégé of two senior Sharifian politicians: Rustum Haydar, who was murdered in 1940, and Nuri al-Saʿid. Jabr, who came from a poor Shiʿi family (his father was a carpenter), was one of those lower-class Shiʿis who had started out as members of the *effendiyya* and managed to attach themselves to the elite by climbing the ladder of government bureaucracy, by getting involved in the political establishment, and by marrying into an influential family. (Jabr married the daughter

of the Amir Rabi'ā, one of the wealthiest Shi'ī tribal leaders.) Unlike his patron Nuri, Jabr supported limited socio-economic reform. Since the beginning of his term as prime minister, he had tried to exploit the difficulties of the British–Egyptian treaty negotiations in order to bring about the early signature of a new Iraqi–British treaty intended to ensure economic and military assistance to Iraq, to make its position superior to that of Egypt, and to attain for himself the status of central political figure in Iraq.³⁹ Jabr exploited the submission of the UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) report on 31 August 1947 in order to obtain for Iraq and for himself a central leadership role in Arab matters. In the inter-Arab arena, Jabr's initiative was intended to give Iraq superiority over Egypt and to emphasize Iraq's importance in the eyes of the British. In the domestic Iraqi arena, this activity was meant to create a smoke screen, enabling his government to sign a treaty with Britain that had aroused nationalist objections. The fanning of nationalist tension on the Palestine question was intended to distract the attention of the *effendiyya* and the poor strata from the economic situation and from the new treaty with Britain. But when, in January 1948, Jabr signed the draft treaty in Portsmouth, severe demonstrations and riots broke out in Baghdad, which led to the fall of his government and shook the entire political system of the Iraqi elite. The nationalist tension fostered by Jabr in the autumn of 1947 broke out and focused on the main nationalist issue—the treaty with Britain. Jabr was hated and opposed by many of the elite politicians, who, though Jabr was also connected with the elite, viewed with suspicion the idea of a Shi'ī prime minister. Other politicians, hostile to Nuri al-Sa'īd, sought to hurt Jabr, whom they viewed as Nuri's protégé. Politicians and activists from the nationalist *al-Istiqlāl* party and the National Democratic Party, as well as communist elements, played a central role in inciting the riots. This activity helped transform the unrest and political frustration of the younger members of the *effendiyya* and the grinding hunger of the poorest strata into violent rioting. However, the politicians soon lost control of events, and the young members of the *effendiyya*, some of them active in *al-Istiqlāl*, became the leaders of the riots (called *wathba*). The chaotic, uncontrolled situation that prevailed in Baghdad in the last half of January 1948 aroused profound anxiety and panic among the elite and made the royal palace fear an impending revolution. The heads of *al-Istiqlāl* and the National Democratic Party, themselves politicians from the elite, attempted to calm the masses, but to no avail.⁴⁰ Young members of the *effendiyya* from their own parties and communist activists had become a leading, uncontrollable factor. The riots and demonstrations, which led to Jabr's ouster and the rejection of the draft treaty in late January, continued in February, March, and even April 1948, and gradually increased in intensity. The *effendiyya* and the poor strata lacked the leadership, organization, internal cohesion, and plans of action that could translate their power into long-term political and social achievements. However, the events of the winter of 1948 had the result of transforming the *effendiyya* and the poor classes, who had long suffered from economic distress, into factors threatening the stability of the regime.

Fear of renewed nationalist riots following the declaration of a Jewish state in Palestine, as well as fear that reports of agreements between King 'Abdallah of Transjordan and the Jews would call down nationalist wrath against the Hashemite

Kingdom, were among the motives of Regent ʿAbd al-Ilah in acting in favor of military intervention on the part of the regular Arab armies in Palestine following the declaration of a Jewish state.⁴¹

Despite its weaknesses, the *effendiyya* became a factor increasingly capable of affecting the conditions under which the politicians operated in Iraq, starting in the 1930s. The manipulative use of nationalism by the politicians and the weakness of the internally divided elite gave the *effendiyya* a power that was expressed in terms of nationalism. Control of this power was sometimes lost by the politicians who sought to exploit it; this loss of control, in turn, threatened the political system and the status quo. Elite politicians, to a greater degree, became prisoners of the nationalist extremism that they themselves had fostered among the *effendiyya*. True, the tension between the ruling elite (based principally on the Sunni Arab minority and on Shiʿi landowners) and the centrifugal trends exhibited by the Shiʿis and Kurds was the basic characteristic of politics in Iraq. However, under the special circumstances prevailing in political life in Baghdad, the nationalist *effendiyya* became a factor whose centrality to the survival of the elite politicians made it more and more necessary for them to resort to manipulations and complex maneuvers.

THE POLITICIANS AND THE ELITE BETWEEN THE *EFFENDIYYA*, THE TRIBAL LEADERS—LAND-OWNERS, AND NATIONALISM

Throughout the entire Hashemite period, from its establishment by the British following World War I, the political system within Iraq was characterized by internal tensions between the chiefly Sunni Arab elite, who included the old families of notables and the Sharifian politicians, and the Shiʿis and Kurds—as well as equally distressing tensions between that conservative elite and the tribal land-owners on one hand, and on the other the nationalist *effendiyya* and its demands for social, economic, and political change. The ruling elite in Iraq was interested in reinforcing the power of coercion and centralist government as a tool against the centrifugal trends of the Shiʿis and Kurds and against the tendencies of Shiʿi, Sunni, and Kurdish tribes to preserve as great a degree of autonomy as possible. At the same time, however, there was a gradually increasing trend among the elite and the tribal leaders to assume ownership of extensive land areas and to preserve the new socio-political status quo which brought them lands, power, and other benefits. The integration of the tribal leaders, who had become land-owners, into the political system as clients of the Baghdad politicians and the reinforcement of their interest in the Iraqi state and the domestic status quo reduced the Shiʿi tribal threat by neutralizing their traditional leadership.

The tendency of the Shiʿi notables to take over the lands of their tribes was the result of the strengthened relationship between the economy of Iraq and the world economy, as well as of the Tanzimat reforms and, primarily, the Ottoman Land Code (1858) and their initial application in the vilayet of Baghdad and the Basra area by Vali Midhat Pasha (1869–72). At the same time, families of urban notables exploited their status in the new Ottoman administration and took advantage of the Ottoman Land Code to purchase land outside the cities. In the course of the British conquest in World War I, the trend of transforming the tribal leaders into land-owners was

continued, following the granting of juridical and administrative powers to those leaders by the British military authorities.⁴² The Iraqi state encouraged the takeover of tribal lands by the tribal leaders, with a view to buying their loyalty. At the same time, elite politicians and the Hashemite royal house itself exploited their status to purchase land assets. The Sharifian politicians, who (as the sons of middle- and lower-middle-strata urban families) had owned no land in 1921 when they came to Iraq as the officers and associates of King Faysal I, now exploited their status within the state for purposes of enrichment and takeover of lands.⁴³

King Faysal I, who invested efforts in overcoming the anarchic and centrifugal trends of the tribes by buying the loyalty of the tribal leaders, aimed to control them, while seeking to preserve their power as an additional source of support for his rule.⁴⁴ The regent, ‘Abd al-Ilah (1939–53), continued King Faysal’s trend toward increasing the representation of land-owning tribal notables in Parliament. The integration of the tribal leaders–land-owners into the Iraqi state transformed them into a strong base for the conservative ruling elite.

Given the increased importance of the *effendiyya* as a factor in political life in Baghdad, and the reinforced common interest of the elite and the tribal leaders–land-owners in preserving the socio-political status quo within Iraq, the latter were more and more extensively represented in Parliament; in fact, even Faysal I had worked toward increasing their representation. Following the suppression of the pro-German nationalist Rashid ‘Ali movement in 1941 (which had admittedly been led by the nationalist officers under al-Sabbagh and by a handful of nationalist elite politicians, but had constituted an outbreak of anti-British nationalism by the new political forces—the *effendiyya* and the deprived urban masses), Nuri al-Sa‘id again increased the representation of the tribal leaders–land-owners, most of whom had remained hostile to the urban *effendiyya*. The percentage of members of Parliament from among the land-owning tribal notables (including Kurdish land-owning notables) amounted to 20.5 percent in 1933, 18.9 percent in 1937, 31.9 percent in 1943, 33.3 percent in 1947, and 36.3 percent in 1953.⁴⁵

The conservative elite politicians stubbornly opposed any change in the method of parliamentary elections, which—as it was—guaranteed them control of the outcome of the elections and, to a great degree, of who would be elected. The indirect, two-stage election process, whereby the members of Parliament were elected by electors rather than directly by the people, ensured that most members of Parliament would be acceptable to the palace, the government, and the ruling elite.

In addition to enlisting the support of the *effendiyya* through modern political means, nationalist ideology, and modern political language, the elite politicians also needed the support of the tribes. Yasin al-Hashimi and the politicians who headed the *al-Ikhā al-Waṭani* organization, which had appealed to the *effendiyya* with nationalist slogans and won its support by objecting to the treaty with the British, sought the support of the tribes on attempting to rise to power in 1935. The support of the *effendiyya* alone was not strong enough to bring Yasin al-Hashimi to power. An alliance between the members of *al-Ikhā al-Waṭani* and a strong tribal leader named ‘Abd al-Wahid al-Sikkar, which led to a tribal revolt, caused the fall of the moderate governments of ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi and Jamil al-Midfai and the establishment of a government headed by Yasin al-Hashimi in March 1935.⁴⁶

In the winter of 1948, when the politicians lost control of the situation in Baghdad and the riots against the treaty with the British threatened to undermine the status of the elite and the regime itself, the threat arose of a tribal-Shi'i reaction. Shi'i tribal leaders, with the encouragement of conservative Baghdad politicians, threatened to bring their tribes into Baghdad to enforce order.⁴⁷ Salih Jabr, who was forced to resign, was replaced by Muhammad Sadr, a Shi'i politician, in efforts to reassure the Shi'is. Muhammad Sadr was a conservative veteran politician, well accepted by the Shi'i tribes and, at the same time, honored by the Baghdad *effendiyya* as a nationalist fighter, thanks to his participation in the anti-British revolts in 1920. Soon after, however, Sadr became prime minister. Despite the fact that during his premiership the Iraqi army invaded Israel in May 1948, he lost the respect that the *effendiyya* had had for him due to his cooperation with the British. Even such a national hero was soon tainted by his unavoidable close contact with the British following his rise to power.

The phenomenon whereby the elite, or at least its conservative politicians, sought the backing of the tribal forces was encountered during the 1950s in Syria, as well. In the autumn of 1954, the radical-nationalist *al-Ba'ṭh* party and other leftist-radical-nationalist forces, which had obtained the support of the *effendiyya*, the army officers, and even part of the urban poor, won a considerable victory in the Syrian parliamentary elections. At that point, the conservative veteran politicians of the People's Party, *Ḥizb al-Sha'b*, and the supporters of conservative, pro-Western Prime Minister Faris al-Khuri allied themselves with the tribal bloc in Parliament. The tribal leaders and the land-owning urban politicians feared the demands for agrarian reform and the leftist trends of *al-Ba'ṭh*, the communists, and the officers.⁴⁸

The maneuvers and manipulations of the Iraqi politicians between the two opposing social sectors—the *effendiyya* and the tribal leaders—land-owners—were reflected in the political parties that they founded in Iraq in 1949 and 1951. Nuri al-Sa'īd, despite his disgust at party politics, rallied his land-owning supporters to form the Constitutional Union Party, whose members were land-owning notables and educated, high-echelon members of the liberal professions.⁴⁹

After his rift with Nuri, Jabr established the Popular Socialist Party, which tried to imitate India's Congress Party, emphasizing the need for development, industrialization, modernization, and a neutralist foreign policy. The term "Socialist" was included in the name of the party in response to the radical trends among the *effendiyya* and the prevailing tendencies worldwide. At the same time, Jabr, exploiting his own Shi'i roots, promised his party the support of the land-owning Shi'i tribal leaders.⁵⁰

The elite's reliance on the land-owning tribal leaders intensified its conservative trends and ran counter to the need of the *effendiyya* and the urban poor for basic social, economic, and political change. This conflict between the needs of the *effendiyya* and the dominant, conservative interests and world views of the elite and the tribal leaders—land-owners made it difficult for politicians to cope with the economic and social distresses, as socio-political change was liable to injure their standing and undermine their influence among the tribal leaders.

Admittedly, there were also a few elite politicians who were aware of Iraq's vital need for change and supported the distribution of state lands to the *fellahin*, in-

dustrialization, and involvement of the *effendiyya*. But they were very few indeed. Conspicuous among them was Kamil al-Chadirchi, a rich land-owner with moderate socialist views, who figured prominently in both organizations that shared these trends—*al-Ahālī* in the 1930s and the National Democratic Party starting in 1946.⁵¹ Despite their close ties to the conservative Nuri al-Saʿid, who objected to any change,⁵² Jabr and Fadhil al-Jamali, two senior Shiʿi politicians, also sought a way to involve the *effendiyya* and aimed for development and modernization, with a view to halting the rise of radical leftist forces. In accordance with these socio-political trends, Jabr tended to maintain connections with members of the British Labor Party, and Fadhil al-Jamali (American-educated and married to an American) sought to adopt a pro-American orientation—in contrast with Nuri al-Saʿid, who maintained connections with the more conservative circles in Britain.⁵³ Since 1949, with the intensification of the Cold War and the beginnings of the “neutralist” trend, Jabr began to support a neutralist orientation for Iraq in the global arena. The intensification of the conflict between Iraq and Egypt under the Free Officers, and the formation of a link between the Egyptian–Iraqi conflict and the global arena, reinforced the conservative trend among the Iraqi elite led by Nuri al-Saʿid and Regent ʿAbd al-Ilah and helped to dictate a conservative domestic and foreign policy for Iraq.

Both characteristics of nationalism in Iraq during the 1930s and 1940s—anti-British sentiments and Pan-Arabism—were fostered and exploited by the politicians, who sought to use the *effendiyya* in the power struggles in Baghdad. Nationalist politicians such as Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid ʿAli, who had established *al-Ikhā al-Waṭani* in the 1930s as a tool in the struggle against the treaty that Nuri had signed with Britain, and who had gained status in the eyes of the *effendiyya* as anti-British nationalists, simultaneously sought acceptance by the British themselves. True, Yasin al-Hashimi, Rashid ʿAli, and other politicians with a nationalist, anti-British image sought to bring about change in Iraqi–British relations in order to remove the restrictions on Iraq’s independence. Yet at the same time, they sought to ensure Britain’s continued support of Iraq against its strong neighbors Iran and Turkey, and to preserve the socio-political status quo in Iraq to ensure the status of the Sunni Arab elite to which they belonged. True, the politicians made fierce anti-British speeches at political assemblies, demonstrations, and sessions of Parliament for the benefit of the *effendiyya*; yet at the same time, they often hastened to reassure the British representatives with whom they sought to maintain good personal relationships that their real attitude was not anti-British and their supposed extremism was only intended for domestic political purposes. Yasin al-Hashimi, who was known for his nationalist views and his opposition to the treaty with Britain and was considered hostile and anti-British by British officials, took pains to calm the British ambassador and to promise friendship with Britain. Even King Faysal I claimed to the British that al-Hashimi’s extremism stemmed from the fact that it had been his rival, Nuri al-Saʿid, and not al-Hashimi himself who had signed the treaty with Britain in 1930.⁵⁴

Anti-British Pan-Arab nationalism was the most convenient and readily available means of enlisting the *effendiyya*’s support of those conservative elite politicians who neither wanted nor succeeded in bringing about socio-economic change, which could provide a response to the distresses of the *effendiyya* and the poorer strata. The Palestine question, which had been part and parcel of the growth of Pan-Arab

ideology in Iraq since the late 1920s, was also exploited by Pan-Arab nationalist politicians, who sought to build themselves a nationalist image among the *effendiyya* without risking conflict with the British over bi-lateral Iraqi-British issues. However, the symbolic importance of the Palestine question as an expression of Pan-Arab nationalism meant that the politicians became prisoners of their own verbal extremism on that question. Central political figures whose attitude to the Palestine question was, in actual fact, pragmatic or indifferent, and who were even prepared to resign themselves to partition in 1945–48, were committed to extremist positions for fear that any expression of moderation or pragmatism would expose them to attacks by their rivals on a nationalist basis.⁵⁵

Both anti-British nationalism and the Palestine question became a trap for the elite politicians, who enlisted the support of the *effendiyya* by encouraging and fostering its nationalist trends, in view of their inability to cope with the economic and social distresses.

The phenomenon of leftist-revolutionary nationalist radicalism in the 1950s throughout the Arab world deprived the Iraqi politicians of their effective means of obtaining the support of the nationalist *effendiyya*. Ever since the crystallization of the Pan-Arab trends of the revolutionary regime in Egypt in 1954–56 and the rise of leftist Pan-Arab nationalist forces headed by Syria's *al-Ba'ath*, Pan-Arab nationalism—until then the means used by the conservative elite and notables to preserve their status within Iraq and to promote their regional aspirations in Syria and throughout the Arab world—became the means of the revolutionary radicals, who sought to expunge that elite. The intensification of the socio-economic gaps within Iraq, the weakened support of the tribal land-owners due to alienation between them and their tribesmen who had become serfs and laborers,⁵⁶ and the reinforcement of radical social trends among the *effendiyya* and the urban poor all weakened the elite and prepared the ground for a military *coup d'état* and a socio-political revolution led by Qasim in 1958.⁵⁷

Nationalism in Iraq began to develop in the 1920s, along with the rise of the *effendiyya* and the efforts by the elite to adapt to the new reality without losing status. The *effendiyya*, which prepared the ground for the growth of nationalism and state-building processes in Iraq, admittedly did not produce its own political forces capable of seizing control of the government and forcing socio-economic change. Yet those members of the *effendiyya* who were armed, organized, devoted to the cause, and close to the seat of power—the officers—were the ones who brought down the monarchy in 1958.

Growing social forces may at times exert considerable influence on political processes and events, even if the consciousness of these forces is not developed to the point of constituting a “class in itself,” and its political and intellectual means of expression are channeled into nationalist or religious ideology. The paradox of the *effendiyya* in Iraq was that, while it was a rising social force with a dominant influence on political life, it had no special self-awareness or political identity. The conservative ruling elite enjoyed power by virtue of its control of the state apparatus, its dominance of the economy, and its constituting the basis of the status quo supported by Britain. Yet the strength of that elite diminished, as it was unable to adapt to the changes of modernization and remained bogged down in its own conservative

interests. The need of the *effendiyya* for a solution to its identity-related distresses, and the need of the elite for a unifying common denominator in order to continue maintaining the Iraqi state, constituted the basis for the growth of Arab nationalism and Pan-Arab ideology in Iraq. Despite the contrasts and contradictions between the *effendiyya* and the elite, the relationship between these strata was the basis for Arab nationalism and for the diffusion of Pan-Arab ideology in Iraq under the monarchy.

In the revolution of 1958, the conservative elite—which, though it had admittedly undergone changes since World War I, was still rooted in the Ottoman period—was more or less wiped out. The political tools adopted by the elite—especially Arab nationalism, which had been intended to enlist the aid of the *effendiyya* and maintain the Iraqi state—turned into a boomerang in view of the radicalization and expansion of the *effendiyya* and the appearance of new revolutionary political forces among the armed sectors of the *effendiyya*, the officers.

NOTES

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²Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); David Pool, "Politics of Patronage, Elites and Social Structure in Iraq" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1972).

³Philip S. Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate, The Politics of Arab Nationalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); idem, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism, The Politics of Damascus 1860–1920* (Cambridge, London, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

⁴Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1958).

⁵Abd al-Azim Ramadan, *Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya fi Misr 1918–1936* (Cairo: Dar al-Katib al-‘Arabi, 1968), 60–82, 130–90; Haggai Erlich, *Students and University in 20th-Century Egyptian Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 1988); Israel Gershoni, "The Evolution of National Culture in Modern Egypt: Intellectual Formation and Social Diffusion 1892–1945," *Poetics Today* 13 (1992); idem, *Egypt Between Distinctiveness and Unity* (Tel Aviv, 1980); idem, "Between Ottomanism and Egyptianism: The Evolution of 'National Sentiment' in the Cairene Middle Class as Reflected in Najib Mahfuz's *Bayn al-Qasrayn*," in *Studies in Islamic Society*, 227–64; Marius Deeb, *Party Politics in Egypt: The Wafd and Its Rivals 1919–1939* (London: Ithaca Press, 1979); Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

⁶Robert Fernea, *The Shaykh and the Effendi* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

⁷Ernest Main, *Iraq, From Mandate to Independence* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1935), 233–36.

⁸Bernard Lewis, "Effendi," *IS*, 2, 687.

⁹Stanford Jay Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers," in *Beginning of Modernization*, 29–39; Toledano, *State and Society*, 71–72, 92–107.

¹⁰Philip S. Khoury, *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism, The Politics of Damascus 1860–1920* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Albert Hourani, "The Arab Awakening: Forty Years Later," in *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (London: Macmillan, 1981), 205; Toledano, *State and Society*, 71. On the elite or traditional social class in Iraq, see also Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*.

¹¹Nissim Qazaz, *The Jews in Iraq in the Twentieth Century* (Jerusalem, 1991), 25.

¹²Toledano, *State and Society*, 68–87.

¹³Erich, *Students and University*; idem, "Students and Universities in the Political Life of Egypt After World War I," *Ha-Mizrah He-Hadash* 19 (1968–69): 50–77.

¹⁴Ernest Bevin to M. Eyres (Damascus), 15 January 1947, PRO/FO/371/522365/E/12303; Bevin to Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird (British ambassador in Baghdad), PRO/FO/371/522365/E/12303. Similar letters were sent to British representatives in Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut.

¹⁵Ibid., Bevin to Eyres, 15 January 1947.

¹⁶Ibid., Sir Hugh Stonehewer Bird (Baghdad) to Bevin, 10 March 1947.

¹⁷Troutbeck (British ambassador in Baghdad) to Sir Anthony Eden, no. 6, 9 January 1953, PRO/FO/371/104678/EQ/1052/4.

¹⁸Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 51–78. On the centrality of bureaucracy as a source of employment for the *effendiyya*, see, for example, Nazih N. M. Ayubi, *Bureaucracy and Politics in Contemporary Egypt* (London: Ithaca Press, 1980).

¹⁹Fernea, *The Shaykh*. (It should be noted that Fernea cited clear characteristic traits for the *effendiyya*: officeholders at the lower end of state bureaucracy); Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society*.

²⁰Abd al-Razzāq al-Hilālī, *Muʿājam al-ʿIrāq* (Baghdad, 1954), part I, 217.

²¹This table was prepared by means of comparison among various sources whose data were not always identical. Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī, *Mudhakkirātī fi al-ʿIrāq*, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1968); Fahim Qubain, *Education and Science in the Arab World* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966); idem, *The Reconstruction of Iraq, 1950–1957* (London: Atlantic Books, 1958), 211; R. D. Mathews and Matta Akrawi, *Education in the Arab Countries of the Middle East* (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Education, 1949).

²²Reeva Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 76–94; William L. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971). Concerning Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī's activity in Iraq from his own personal viewpoint, see Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī, *Mudhakkirātī fi al-ʿIrāq* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1968), both volumes. Concerning his educational-nationalist views, see Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī, *Arāʾī wa-al-Aḥādīth fi al-Tarbiya wa-al-Taʿlīm* (Cairo: Matbaʿat al-Risala, 1944).

²³Akram Zuʿāʿitar and Darwish al-Miqdādī, *Taʾrīkhunā bi-Uṣlūb Qīṣaṣī* (Baghdad: Matbʿat al-Kashaf, 1939); C. Ernest Dawn, "The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20 (February 1988): 67–88; Simon, *Iraq*, 98–99.

²⁴Jamīl Ḥusayn, *Al-ʿIrāq Shahāda Siyāsiyya 1980–1930* (London, 1987).

²⁵Ibid., 203–32; Ṭālib Mushtāq, *Awraq Ayyāmi* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa Liṭbaʿat wa-l-Nashr, 1968), 188; Al-Ḥuṣrī, *Mudhakkirātī*, 2:14. Akram Zuʿāʿitar, a Palestinian activist who began working in the Iraqi school system in the early 1930s, was active in nationalist circles in Baghdad and mentioned the demonstrations against Mond as an example of Iraq's support of the Palestinian Arabs; Akram Zuʿāʿitar, *Yawmiyyāt Akram Zuʿāʿitar al-Ḥaraka al-Waṭaniyya al-Filastiniyya 1935–1939* (Beirut: Muasasat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya, 1980), 51.

²⁶Elihu Sasson, *On the Way to Peace* (Tel Aviv: 'Am Oved, 1978), 55–71. Part of the report by Zionist emissaries to Iraq about the meetings with Hikmat Sulayman and other Iraqi politicians. Michael Eppel, *The Palestine Conflict in the History of Modern Iraq, 1928–1948* (London: Frank Cass, 1994), 54–55.

²⁷Ḥānī al-Fkayki, *Al-Awḳār al-Ḥāzimāt, Tajribi fi Hizb al-Baʿth al-ʿIrāqī* (London: Riad al-Rayyes Books, 1993), 28.

²⁸Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 318–19. A considerable number of the Sharifian officer-politicians came from the middle or lower-middle strata. Thus, for example, Jamil al-Madfaʿi (who served as prime minister four times in the 1930s and 1940s), Jaʿfar al-ʿAskari (who served as minister of defense in the 1930s), Yasin al-Hashimi, and his brother Taha al-Hashimi all had humble origins but found their place in the conservative elite and became part of its backbone. (Admittedly, the al-Hashimi family of Baghdad was a notable family with a certain status; Yasin and Taha al-Hashimi, however, came from an impoverished branch of the family.)

²⁹Concerning the expansion of the press in Iraq, see: Rafāʿi Batti, *Al-Ṣahāfa fī al-ʿIrāq* (Cairo: Jamiʿat al-Duwal al-ʿArabiyya-Muabadat al-Dirasat al-ʿArabiyya, 1957); Mushtāq, *Awraq Ayyāmi*, 36.

³⁰On the February–March 1928 demonstrations and riots in Baghdad, see Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 398–99. High Commissioner for Iraq to Minister of Colonies, no. 820, 9 February 1928, PRO/FO/371/13033/E/702. Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq, 1914–1932* (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), 159–60. ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ḥasanī, *Taʾrikh al-Wizarat al-ʿIrāqiyya* (Baghdad: Dar al-Shuun al-Thikafiyya al-ʿAma, 1988, new edition), 2:51.

³¹Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 398–99.

³²Humphrys (British ambassador in Baghdad) to Simon (British minister of foreign affairs), no. 1164, 21 December 1932, PRO/FO/406/70/E/6888.

³³Simon, *Iraq*, 82–114.

³⁴Akram Zuaʿitar, *Yawmiyyāt Akram Zuaʿitar al-Ḥaraka al-Waṭaniyya al-Filasṭiniyya 1935–1939* (Beirut: Muasasat al-Dirasat al-Filasṭiniyya, 1980), 351. Letter from Epstein, 22 May 1938, CZA S/25/3528.

³⁵Concerning that coup and the trends of the subsequently established government, see Mohammad A. Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1982), 121–49.

³⁶Lukasz Hirsowicz, *The Third Reich and the Arab East* (London and Toronto: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 103–92; Walid M. S. Hamdi, *Rashid Ali al-Gailani and the Nationalist Movement in Iraq, 1939–1941* (London: Darf, 1987); Tarbush, *Military in Politics*, 167–82.

³⁷Mack (Baghdad) to Bevin, no. 104, 29 March 1948, PRO/FO/371/68448/E/4291. Concerning the economic situation in Iraq in the autumn of 1947, see Political Review of Iraq for the Year 1947, PRO/FO/371/68443/E/834. On the economic situation in 1948, and the desperate attempts by the regent and the minister of finance to obtain relief from Britain in the form of food and cash payments to cover the salaries of the civil service, see PRO/FO/624/141, 19 March 1948; see also Mack to Foreign Office, no. 408, 14 April 1948, PRO/FO/371/68448/E/4793.

³⁸The nationalist–rightist *al-Istiqlāl* and the National Democratic Party reorganized in 1946, following the lifting of the prohibition against party–political activity, which had been imposed following the Rashid ʿAli movement.

³⁹About Salih Jabr, see Wm. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 321. See also Busk (Baghdad) to Bevin, 6 September 1946, PRO/FO/371/52402/E/9318.

⁴⁰On the role of *al-Istiqlāl* and the National Democratic Party in provoking the riots and their difficulties in controlling the situation during the *wathba* of 1948, see Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 548; Muḥammad Mahdī Kubbah, *Mudhakkirāt fī Ṣamīm al-Aḥdāth 1918–1958* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1965), 227–31. About the *wathba*, see also Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), 103–4.

⁴¹Eppel, *The Palestine Conflict*, 177–89.

⁴²Marion Farouk Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, “The Transformation of Land Tenure and Rural Social Structure in Central and Southern Iraq, 1870–1958,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 15 (March 1983): 493–95; Albertine Jwaidah, “Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Lower Iraq,” *St. Antony’s Papers* III (1963): 106–36; idem, “Aspects of Land Tenure and Social Change in Lower Iraq During Late Ottoman Times,” in *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East*, ed. Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1984).

⁴³Sluglett, and Sluglett, “The Transformation,” 487–89; David Pool, “From Elite to Class: The Transformation of Iraqi Leadership 1920–1939,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12 (November 1980): 340–47.

⁴⁴Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 100–104.

⁴⁵Ibid., 103. A further discussion of developments among the elite can be found in Ayad al-Qazzaz, “Power Elite in Iraq, 1920–1958,” *The Muslim World* LXI (1971): 267–82.

⁴⁶Majid Khadduri, *Independent Iraq* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 48–51; A. D. Macdonald, “The Political Developments in Iraq Leading Up to the Rising in the Spring of 1935,” *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 36 (1936).

⁴⁷Jamil al-Urfali, *Lamḥat min Dhikrayyāt Wazīr al-ʿIrāq Sābiq* (Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, 1971), 84.

⁴⁸Khalīd al-ʿAzīm, *Mudhakkirāt Khālīd al-ʿAzīm* (Beirut: al-Dar al-Mutahida lil-Nashr, 1973), 2:310–11, 445.

⁴⁹Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 354–57; Troutbeck (Baghdad) to Churchill, no. 108, 22 July 1953, PRO/FO/371/104665/EQ/1016/32.

⁵⁰Concerning Salih Jabr's efforts to reconcile the tendencies of his various supporters—the *effendiyya*, the land-owning tribal notables, and the elite—while exploiting the latter's fear of revolution following the fall of the monarchy, see Beeley (Baghdad) to Furlonge (FO), no. 118, 21 August 1952, PRO/FO/371/98737/E/1017/6.

⁵¹Concerning *al-Ahālī* and the views of Kamil al-Chadirchī, who was a prominent member of that organization and the leader of the National Democratic Party starting in 1946, see Kāmil al-Chādirchī, *Mudhakkirāt Kāmil al-Chādirchī* (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a lil-Tab'a wal-Nashr, 1970). See, for example, the article by al-Chādirchī, *ṣadā al-Ahālī*, 17 October 1949.

⁵²On Nuri's conservative attitudes in the framework of the struggle and challenges of the 1950s, see Troutbeck (Baghdad) to Eden, 3 November 1954, PRO/FO/371/110991/VQ/1015/79; Troutbeck (Baghdad) to R. Allen, 10 February 1954, PRO/FO/371/110998/VQ/1015/12.

⁵³On the differences in orientation of various Western trends, see Fāḍil al-Jamālī, *Dhikriyyāt wa-ʿIbar* (Beirut: Dar al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1965), 105; Mohammad Fadhil al-Jamali, "Iraq Under General Nuri," *Middle East Forum* 15 (1964): 19; Troutbeck (Baghdad) to Eden, no. 260, 1 December, 1953, PRO/FO/371/104677/EQ/10345/3. Also, on Jamali's trends, see PRO/FO/371/104666/EQ/1016/52. Concerning Salih Jabr's trends and the hopes entertained of Jabr by British diplomats inspired by Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin, see Busk (British chargé d'affaires in Iraq) to FO, no. 761, 23 September 1946, PRO/FO/371/52402/E/9957. See also Michael Eppel, "Iraqi Politics and Regional Policies, 1945–1949," *Middle Eastern Studies* 28 (January 1992): 112.

⁵⁴Humphrys (Baghdad) to Simon (British foreign minister), no. 27, 25 March 1933, PRO/FO/371/16903/E/1853.

⁵⁵On the role of the Palestine question in Iraqi political history, see Eppel, *The Palestine Conflict* (see n. 26).

⁵⁶For a report on the crumbling of the tribal structure and the increasing alienation between the tribal notables who had become land-owners and the tribesmen who had become serfs, *fellahin*, or city-dwellers against their will, see W. Thesiger, "The Mass Movement of Tribesmen from Amara Liwa to Baghdad and Basra," in a dispatch from the British Embassy (Baghdad) to the Levant Department, 5 August 1955, PRO/FO/371/115748/VQ/1015/11.

⁵⁷Uriel Dann, *Iraq Under Qasim* (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1969); Robert Fernea and W. M. Roger Louis, eds., *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958, The Old Social Classes Revisited* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991).