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Philosophy Critical Thinking

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Question 1

Descartes formulates his conceivability argument for substance dualism. He argues that what is conceivable is rationally feasible, and what is inconceivable is logically inconsistent. It is plausible – and so logically viable – for someone to live without a body. If that is the case, then possessing a body is not a necessary attribute of that person. On the other hand, it is unthinkable and logically incoherent for somebody to exist without a mind. If this is the case, then having a sense is necessary, implying that the person is an immaterial, thinking object.

Similarly, Campbell et al. (2017) argue that Chalmers' argument holds a similar premise. He begins his argument against materialism by allowing for the existence of zombies. A zombie, according to Chalmers, is similar to humanity molecule for molecule and comparable in every low-level quality stated by full astronomy. However, he misses subjective awareness. He believes that such a zombie is plausible. A being physically similar to him in every aspect but without the mental processes that comprise conscious experience is feasible. He claims that if these zombies are conceivable, it is logically plausible for the zombie to exist. If he can exist conceptually, then physical states should not be necessary for subjective experience. As a result, materialism must be untrue.

Likewise, according to Kripke's Modal Argument, it is merely conceivable to exist physical duplicates of ourselves having no conscious experiences, at the same time what is reasonable is possible. Thus, if any case phenomenal-physical identity statements are necessary, physicalism cannot be accurate. Kripke presumes that the paradigm occurrences of explainable intuitions of constraint are inferences about theoretical allegiances, making me think it is sounder

than the other two arguments. In addition, the appearance that those identities are contingent be demonstrated to be the result of mischaracterizing what indeed appears feasible makes it sounder.

Question 2

Benjamin Libet conducted research that appeared to prove that the brain registers a person's intention to move before they consciously decide to move. Participants in Libet's study were instructed to do an introductory activity such as pushing a button or flexing their wrist. They were asked to sit in front of a timer and record the instant they became consciously aware of the choice to move, while EEG electrodes connected to their heads recorded their brain activity (Braun et al., 2021). Libet repeatedly demonstrated subconscious brain activity associated with the action, a shift in EEG signals dubbed readiness potential by Libet, for an equivalent minimal second previously. However, the subjects were conscious of the choice to interchange. The purpose of Gholipur's systematic review was to describe the evidence of Carnitine impacts on the nutritional status of CKD patients. The meta-analysis included peer-reviewed RCTs on Carnitine delivery at any dosage in CKD patients with at least four weeks of follow-up. Thus the feature of scientific reasoning in Gholipur's analysis is that the study appeared to support Wegner's theory that decisions were formed by the brain first. Then individuals become conscious of them, at which time people ascribe their deliberate purpose to the deed. Protein-energy deficiency was a prevalent concern in chronic renal disease patients (CKD). Scattered findings suggested that Carnitine supplementation might relieve patients' disease manifestations while also significantly improving nutritional metrics.

On the contrary, Gholipur's work is a challenge to interpreting Libet's finding as undermining free will because, according to Libet's results, judgments were created

subconsciously by the brain and only subsequently made it into awareness when the decision signal became robust enough. In contrast, Gholipur argues that chronic renal disease might affect the formation of decisions within the brain affecting free will. Likewise, people's conscious experience of making a decision, which Libet's experiment seemed to imply was merely an illusion, appeared to reflect the actual time brains indicated decision making explaining the challenge presented by Gholipur's argument.

References

Braun, M. N., Wessler, J., & Friese, M. (2021). *A Meta-Analysis of Libet-Style Experiments*. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews.

Campbell, D., Copeland, J., & Deng, Z. R. (2017). *The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments*. The Philosophical Quarterly, 67(267), 223-240.

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