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The Intifada and the 1936-39 Uprising: A Comparison

Kenneth W. Stein*

Which of the two uprisings¹ is described below?

Over the last several years, Palestinians have been engaged in civil disobedience and political violence in various parts of the Holy Land. It began spontaneously, when unorganized Palestinian youths, frustrated at the ongoing political stalemate and ever-expanding Jewish presence, rose up against the occupying administration. As a general strike unfolded, local and national committees were formed in the areas of the largest Palestinian concentrations. Soon, the traditional national leadership—a loose umbrella organization under a charismatic leader who, while opposed by many Palestinians and demonized by Zionists, had come to symbolize Palestinian resistance through a combination of armed struggle and politics—sought to reassert its authority and take control of events. After the uprising began, nationalist leaders were deported from Palestine by the occupying authorities. The revolt was also beset by a certain amount of intra-Arab strife, with strident Palestinian nationalists using various forms of intimidation—including death threats and assassinations—against Palestinians accused of collaboration with the Zionists. And despite the persistence of the unrest, many Palestinians continued to earn

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their livings in predominantly Jewish neighborhoods, urban areas, and rural settlements.

The years preceding the uprising had been marked by growing frustration on the part of the Palestinians: in the absence of a viable military option, their repeated boycotts, pressures, demonstrations, and even riots had failed to secure any progress towards their goal of self-government and self-determination. There was rising alarm at growing numbers of Jews in their midst and increased settlement activity, feeding Palestinian fears of physical expulsion from what they considered to be their homeland. Their despondency over the future was all the stronger in that the great power dominant in the region, despite earlier promises about limiting Jewish settlement and immigration, seemed consistently to support the Jews, whose lobbying skills in foreign capitals were formidable and who were seen by many decisionmakers as a strategic asset enhancing the great power's regional presence; the Jews in Palestine also enjoyed powerful support from the Jewish community in the Diaspora. In the period preceding the uprising, there was also a certain amount of cynicism concerning the Arab states, which although supportive of the Palestinians at the declaratory level and supplying some logistical and financial support, in fact were far more concerned about their own agendas; the Hashemites across the Jordan, in particular, were openly at odds with the preeminent Palestinian leader, maintained less-than-secret contacts with the Zionists, and showed a particular interest in the future territorial disposition of parts of Palestine. The Palestinians' own leadership, meanwhile, though fully committed to the cause, was rent both by personal animosities and strategic or tactical differences over the right mix of political and military options. Adding to the Palestinian frustrations was economic hardship borne of unemployment and underemployment, the drying up of traditional sources of capital import, and dramatic price drops, particularly in agriculture. Against this background, elements of a militant Islam were on the rise.

After the uprising began, concerted diplomatic efforts by the Palestinian leadership led to a meeting by Arab leaders in support of Palestinian self-government and collective opposition to Jewish expansion in Palestine. Internationally, there had been, even prior to the revolt, a growing perception that a measure of self-determination should be granted to the Palestinians; the great power, too, wanting simultaneously to protect Jewish security, to continue its strategic presence in the region, and to maintain access to Middle Eastern oil, was increasingly cognizant of its dual obligations to both Jews and Palestinians. Dividing the country into Jew-

ish and Arab states had been suggested, but neither the great power nor the Zionists were convinced about timing and the Zionists were moreover divided into two ideological currents—one seeing all of Palestine and even lands east of the Jordan River as integral parts of Eretz Yisrael, and the other willing to make a territorial compromise about sharing Palestine. Another suggestion was limited self-rule for the Palestinians, with the occupying power to maintain control over security and foreign affairs, but the Palestinians made it clear that they would not participate in a political solution involving anything less than their right to govern themselves and determine their own future. As the uprising continued, the occupying power refused to adopt a policy of accommodation under duress and insisted that the uprising end before serious political discussions could begin, while the Palestinians wanted the great power—whose attention in the meantime was increasingly occupied by changes in eastern Europe—to coerce the Jewish community in Palestine into making political concessions.

Is this not a description of both uprisings?²

Palestinian Leadership

Prior to the outbreak of the two uprisings, the Palestinian political elites—led respectively by Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem and titular head of the Arab community in Palestine, and Yasir Arafat, head of the PLO—focused on high politics, maintenance and control of their political communities, fractious organizational issues, and the growing Islamic dimension in Palestinian national awareness.

As a consequence, both leaderships were somewhat surprised by the outbreak of the uprisings, despite the fact that in the years preceding each there had been increasing incidents of violence and deepening tensions between the Jewish and Arab populations. In the 1930s there had been one-day strikes, Palestinian evictions from land, and sporadic attacks against Jewish settlers.³ In the early 1980s, too, there had been strikes, demonstrations, attacks against Jewish settlers, and land disputes.⁴ Although both leaderships, then and now, vehemently opposed Jewish land settlement and Jewish immigration and neither was indifferent to its political constituency, both failed to understand how the duration of duress and the level of regular personal suffering were steadily eroding the patience of Palestinians under foreign rule.⁵ The absence of a fully accurate assessment by the leadership of the depth of disillusionment among

the *fellahin* in the 1930s, and the lack of a true understanding by the contemporary leadership of the anger and frustration among the Palestinian population caused by two decades of Israeli occupation, explain to some degree why both were caught off guard when local violence turned into a prolonged general uprising. Perhaps more surprising to the current leadership was the fact that a sustained challenge to Israeli authority could be mounted by what seemed to be a disjointed network of women's and student groups, trade unions, local charitable organizations, and other loosely-knit professional associations. The mass mobilization during the intifada was not akin to the formal organization which had traditionally characterized the PLO.

In the years prior to and during the early stages of the two uprisings, both leaderships sought to advance Palestinian political demands through inter-Arab and international action. The Mufti hosted the Islamic Conference in 1931 in an effort to focus international attention on the Palestinian issue. Arafat, for his part, traveled extensively, engaging in the highest levels of diplomacy with heads of state and using UN sympathy for the PLO in his pursuit of international legitimacy.

When the uprisings broke out, the two key Palestinian leaders were very concerned with fending off challenges to their leaderships. In the preceding years, both leaderships had undergone severe political fragmentation. In December 1934, the Palestine Arab Executive came to an end as an unofficially recognized organization representing Palestinian political interests vis-à-vis the British. The death of Musa Kazim al-Husayni, the head of the Arab Executive, generated an immediate splintering of the political leadership into a half dozen separate political parties, reflecting deep personal animosities and representing local geographical interests in Palestine. Hajj Amin al-Husayni (already challenged by the more radical *Istiqlal* party and the so-called "moderates"⁶) was an immediate beneficiary of Musa Kazim's death, since it ended an unpleasant competition with his uncle for ascendancy in and control of Palestinian politics. At the outbreak of the 1936 revolt and general strike, the Mufti took advantage of the unrest to concentrate authority in his hands and deny it to his adversaries.

More recently, particularly after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (and especially between 1983 and 1986), Arafat's leadership was personally challenged by a variety of groups and individuals. These included Arab heads of state and such Palestinian formations as the Abu Nidal group, the dissident faction of Fateh under Abu Musa, Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and the

Palestine National Salvation Front, an umbrella organization opposing Arafat's policies and leadership. The outbreak of the intifada gave Arafat an opportunity to tighten his control over the external leadership of the Palestinian community, a process which had begun in 1987 with a formal reconciliation between the major PLO factions. Arafat utilized the intifada as a vehicle to prevent further organizational splintering while seeking to reaffirm the PLO's status among Palestinians and the world community as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

In terms of policy focus, during both periods the Palestinian leaderships concentrated on proposals, ideas, and resolutions offered primarily by others in response to the Palestinian quest for self-determination. Thus, in early 1936, the Mufti and other Palestinian leaders were debating whether to accept a British proposal for a Legislative Council in Palestine, while in the years from 1978 to 1987, the PLO leadership debated the Camp David Accords, the Venice Declaration, the Reagan Plan, the Fez Plan, the Brezhnev Plan, the Jordanian-PLO accord, and a variety of UN resolutions on Palestine. One difference worth noting, however, is that while the Mufti had earlier developed a working relationship with the British, Arafat and the PLO had no formal channels with the Americans, and such contacts as did exist were sporadic and distant.

Both leaderships were reactive to events when the uprisings broke out. Equally important, both remained politically defensive in the early stages even while seeking to engage the great power in political discussions and somehow to capture the political initiative unleashed by the unrest. In 1937, the leadership replied to the Peel Commission partition plan. In 1988, the PLO leadership replied to the Shultz initiative, which aimed at telescoping in time the previously proposed Camp David Accords, and to an Israeli plan for the election of Palestinian representatives for the formation of a delegation for negotiations.⁷ But by the end of 1988, the PLO sought to take the diplomatic offensive as it recognized the legitimacy of a two-state political solution, renounced terrorism, and conditionally accepted Israel's existence linked to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. No such political solution was offered by the Mufti in the midst of the 1936-1939 uprising. The Mufti and the Arab Higher Committee rejected the adoption of the May 1939 White Paper which truncated Jewish development and promised a unitary state in Palestine in ten years. In 1936-39, the political leadership saw Britain's concessions as insufficient, while on the second occasion the political leadership accepted Zionist presence and created a diplomatic initiative out of the intifada.

After the outbreak of each uprising, the Palestinian leadership sought to strengthen, to reassert, and to reaffirm control over its community; it sought to enhance its status organizationally, and at least initially, to gain international publicity for its cause. The Arab Higher Committee was physically and socially far more distant from the peasant bands who dominated the 1936-39 uprising than was the PLO, which was the consensus nationalist symbol for virtually every non-religious organization in the West Bank and Gaza Strip prior to and during the intifada. Moreover, each uprising gave the political elite renewed bargaining power with the occupying administration.⁸

Fifty years ago, the Arab Higher Committee took the reins of the revolt within two weeks of the 15 April 1936 outbreak of violence. Though the Arab Higher Committee was not always able to enforce adherence to its directives and tactical choices in either the first phase of the general strike, which lasted until October 1936, or during the more violent second phase, which lasted intermittently from the fall of 1937 until the spring of 1939, the Mufti used the uprising to solidify his status within the Palestinian political community.⁹ But while he personally asserted himself, the Mufti found it difficult throughout the various phases of the 1936-39 revolt to control the rebel bands which were its backbone. The Mufti and the Arab Higher Committee wanted "the bands to continue their activities against the British and Zionists, but they did not wish to see them grow sufficiently strong and cohesive to challenge their [Arab Higher Committee's] authority and possibly disregard future instructions to halt their actions."¹⁰ By comparison, it seems that while the PLO came into a fully influential position in co-piloting the intifada with the various local elites in the West Bank and Gaza only by the second or third month of the uprising, the PLO was able to maintain more than a considerable effect on political and street action within the West Bank and Gaza as the intifada unfolded. Even after the Mufti's departure from Palestine in October 1937, the British turned to his designates when they sought to create a dialogue with the Palestinian community during and after the conclusion of the 1936-39 revolt. With striking similarity to this British action in the earlier uprising, the United States turned to the PLO, albeit with conditions, as a legitimate interlocutor representing the interests of the Palestinian community. But unlike the 1936-39 uprising, during the intifada, political leadership outside of Palestine worked more harmoniously with the leadership and rank and file protesters in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Character and Participation

Close comparison of the two uprisings reveals that, at the time of eruption, there were critical differences in the character and composition of Palestinian society. These differences obviously affected recruitment into the uprising. By the time the intifada had broken out, the traditional strength of the Palestinian landowner, urban merchant, and village leader in the West Bank and Gaza Strip had been replaced or was being supplanted by leadership elites based not only on wealth but also on educational achievement, professional attainment, and an accumulated personal résumé of confronting Israeli presence. In the period before each uprising, a better educated and more radical younger generation emerged to confront traditional leaders. But in the earlier uprising, the number of these younger leaders was relatively small in comparison to the majority *fellahin* class and was certainly less influential than the landowning elite. In December 1987, Palestinians of all classes were more politicized and more clarified in their general goals than were the Palestinians in April 1936. Like the 1936-39 revolt, the intifada, as far as the area of the West Bank was concerned, broke out in the towns and spread to the countryside. But unlike the 1936-39 revolt, the intifada did not have the townsmen dropping out and abrogating engagement against the occupying force to the *fellahin* as the predominant, if not the sole, social component of public protest.¹¹ Although the 1936-39 uprising was fought primarily by uneducated peasants, the intifada was carried out by wide segments of a highly educated population in a coordinated fashion. A great difference in participatory commitment in the intifada was the new role that Palestinian women and students played in going to the streets and in engaging the Israeli authorities, particularly in the West Bank. It was estimated that children were responsible for 85 percent of all incidents during the first two years of the intifada.¹²

There is little doubt that the 1936-39 uprising was largely a marked challenge against Britain's presence in governing Palestine; against the League of Nation's ratified Palestine Mandate, which gave legitimacy to the Balfour Declaration; and against Zionism's twin "evils" of Jewish immigration and Jewish land purchase. But the 1936-39 revolt also developed as an angry opposition to and rebellion against the urban social caste from which the political and social elite had sprung. Then, there were very sharp social distinctions drawn between the upper class urban elite with landowning interests and the impoverished lower class *fellahin* population.¹³ During the intifada's unfolding, many social and class dis-

inctions among rural, urban, refugee, and non-refugee Palestinian communities were further blurred in the West Bank and Gaza; whether those distinctions will be removed permanently remains to be determined during the period after the intifada's conclusion. In neither uprising was there evidence to suggest that a distinct social class consciousness developed as a result of the unrest. Certainly in the 1936-39 period there was a greater number of factors that motivated individual participation, including those which were racial, religious, anti-colonial, and familial. Some participants were simply brigands. What appeared as an outburst against Britain and Zionism in 1936-39 degenerated into a pronounced interne-cine communal conflict, if not a civil war.¹⁴

Well before the outbreak of the 1936-39 revolt, social bonds had begun to fray within the Palestinian community, partially because of the intrusive changes brought about by Zionist growth and by British administration. In the 1930s, the existence of most Palestinians was significantly bounded and geographically limited to their *hamula* or village and by its social and financial dependence upon urban notables and money lenders. The effect of the 1936-39 uprising stimulated a further weakening in the social moorings which had traditionally sustained and connected rural dependence upon the urban elite. In the aftermath of the 1936-39 revolt, Palestinian social bonds were weakened by the emergence of a younger bourgeoisie and merchant class, located primarily on Palestine's coast, who challenged traditional leaders. The decimated traditional urban elite who had guided the Palestinian political community in the late Ottoman and Mandatory periods retained minimal influence over a disjointed Palestinian community.¹⁵ Palestinian social upheaval and political fragmentation easily enabled surrounding Arab capitals to intervene in Palestinian affairs during the 1936-39 uprising. Absent an emerging and coherent Palestinian leadership, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Transjordan had an unchallenged opportunity to speak on behalf of the Palestinian cause in the late 1930s, and during and after World War II. By comparison, a distinct motivation for the development of a collective Palestinian anger that emerged prior to the outbreak of the intifada was the Palestinians' definite sense of abandonment by the Arab world. Unlike the period prior to the 1936-39 uprising, West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians had already disengaged from a Jordanian option prior to the intifada. Palestinian alienation was amply evidenced at the Amman Summit in November 1987 when attention was concentrated on the Gulf war and not on the Palestinian issue.

A major difference between the intifada and the 1936-39 revolt was the level of individual commitment to a collectively defined Palestinian nationalist feeling which had begun to develop during the twenty years of Israeli administration of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Rather than fraying social bonds, the intrusive legal changes and financial demands imposed by the Israeli administration generated a localized social cement. Palestinians were deeply entangled in the tentacles of Israeli economic and personal control over their lives. Prior to the intifada, the struggle by Palestinians was not against their political leaders or against a social caste, but against a collective subordination to Israeli rule.¹⁶ Israeli military presence and administrative dominance stimulated a collective Palestinian response of steadfastness, or *sumud*, the communal struggle to stay on the land and maintain Palestinian social, economic, and educational institutions.¹⁷ The intifada was unlike its predecessor in that it became a participatory undertaking for most segments of Palestinian society, with organizational mechanisms established to articulate people's demands and to answer, in some measure, their needs. During the intifada an atmosphere of self-reliance, self-sufficiency, and mutual interest developed across class lines,¹⁸ a natural extension of what had occurred within Palestinian society in the years immediately prior to the intifada.

The 1936-39 uprising was an admixture: a peasant revolt, driven by distinctively personal frustrations and motivations and overlaid by a nationalist veneer. While both uprisings were a negative reaction to Zionism and foreign presence, the intifada contained a positive assertion of a more mature, broadly based, and clearly articulated national consciousness. The intifada emitted a sense of confidence, self-esteem, and significant international sympathy for the Palestinian quest for self-determination and for removal of Israeli rule. In the earlier uprising, the individual rather than the community expressed itself against Zionism. Both uprisings were sparked by a fear of lost destiny; in the 1936-39 revolt the emphasis was on a sense of sporadic individual encroachment, displacement, and economic deprivation rather than on a developed collective sense of a peoplehood being systematically denied or wronged. In 1936-39, rebel bands were organized along family, clan, and village lines. Some Palestinians who recalled the 1936-39 uprising associated their "national" identity with a need to restore their personal honor because their village lands were lost.¹⁹ Significantly, Palestinians during the intifada possessed a broader view of their territorial affinity, geographically defined as at least the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Unlike the 1936-39 revolt, the intifada tended to galvanize an already

existing Palestinian national consciousness across class, clan, and geographic lines.

Organizational aspects of the two uprisings were noticeably different. Through its various phases, the 1936-39 uprising was more spontaneous and less organized. It was an unsystematic, undisciplined, and unstable insurgency, often prone to anarchic lapses.²⁰ Most rebel bands and the individuals that comprised them were virtually independent actors. While there was little coordination between the bands, there were few ideological distinctions between them. In the intifada, on the other hand, participants and leadership represented essentially four political ideologies within the Palestinian community. They collectively made decisions through constructive dialogue. Issues that were potentially divisive to carrying out tactical aspects of planning and coordination were intentionally postponed lest they detract from the communal coherence generated by the intifada.²¹ In the years prior to the outbreak of the intifada, a wide variety of professional groups, women's and student organizations, trade unions, and religious associations had formed, comparable on a smaller scale to the Young Men's Muslim Associations which had developed prior to the 1936-39 revolt. But in this last, the degree and extent of organization made these communal groups an interwoven network which formed the participatory base for maintaining the uprising.

By comparison, the intifada was more than civil disobedience, but less than an armed revolt that characterized portions of the 1936-39 uprising. In the earlier uprising, the urban leadership had little success in imposing itself on leaders of individual bands. Those local leaders refused to assimilate into a larger structure in order not to forfeit their independence. In the name of the uprising, local leaders and *fellahin* participated in the 1936-39 uprising by engaging in acts of violence, sabotage, and attacks on life and property.²² By comparison the intifada was more controlled and more organized in a decentralized fashion. Palestinian intifada participants aimed at the Israeli occupation as their central target, rather than attacking Israelis or physical symbols of the occupation, such as Jewish settlements and British strategic objectives as was the case in the 1936-39 uprising. At the end of the second year of the intifada, while more radical elements of the PLO leadership repeatedly threatened to "upgrade" the intifada with the use of guns and weapons against the Israelis, the clearly prevailing view was not to use such weapons.²³

Distinctive and characteristic of the intifada were the varying layers and frequency of consultation between the uprising's leadership and its participants. There were pamphlets and brochures published during the

1936-39 rebellion, but there was none of the detail, complexity, timeliness, regularity, and care which characterized the composition of calls or communiqués regularly issued during the intifada by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU).²⁴ By comparison, the UNLU was more responsive to the population's needs and requests than was the Arab Higher Committee, in part because the intifada's protests against the Israelis were finely tuned to each locality and to an understanding of what might be the population's limits of personal and economic sacrifice. Unlike the 1936-39 uprising, organization of the intifada was enhanced by the benefits of mass communication—copy and facsimile (fax) machines, telephones, radio broadcasts, easy vehicle access to all parts of the West Bank and Gaza, and an attendant international media. All were gainfully used to advance communal interaction and cooperation.

The Islamic Dimension

In addition to the personal grievances that pained Palestinians before the outbreak of both uprisings, the looming resurgence of Islamic values and sensibilities helped to catalyze and radicalize the individual Palestinian's motivation to action against both Britain/Zionism and against Israel. In the several years prior to both uprisings, a definite Islamic dimension played a role in mobilizing antipathy against the "foreign invaders" of Palestine. On both occasions, a distinctly Islamic component was interlaced with the more secular and politically moderate mainstream of Palestinian national thinking. Although organized into relatively small cells which preserved their autonomy, Islamic groups maintained contacts with the more dominant Palestinian elite who were leading the national movement. In each uprising, Islamic groups contributed in some measure to the general radicalization of the Palestinian political community. In the case of the 1936-39 revolt, the Islamic component dissipated; but during the intifada, the Islamic elements, at least after the second year, continued to play a formidable role in fashioning and participating in the political aftermath.

In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Syrian-born Shaykh Izz al-Din al-Qassam took up residence in Haifa, organized an armed resistance based upon small cells, preached holy war against the Jews, and sought a purified Islam similar to that championed by Rashid Rida in Cairo. He was not controlled by either the most radical *Istiqlal* interests or the Mufti, but he most certainly worked against the interests of the secular landowning

elite that dominated the national movement at the time.²⁵ Perhaps to preempt the quickly rising popular peasant support for Shakyh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the Mufti issued *fatwas*, religious legal injunctions, against Zionism. He also summoned a conference of Muslim villagers in December 1934, convened two '*ulama*' conferences, and preached the protection of Palestine against the Jews. At an '*ulama*' conference held in January 1935, a *fatwa* was issued which was signed by 248 religious figures. The significance of the *fatwa* was not in the numbers who signed it but in its content, which was clearly more anti-Jewish than anti-Zionist.²⁶

In contrast to al-Qassam, the Mufti did not invoke the cry for a *jihad* against Jews, as he could have done after the outbreak of the 1936 uprising, and especially after al-Qassam's death at the hands of the British in October 1935. Al-Qassam's death then, unlike any one incident prior to the outbreak of the intifada, personalized the feelings of frustration and deep despair felt by the peasant and working classes. One author suggests that al-Qassam's death showed that militant activity was an appropriate mechanism of rebellion by the lower classes against the landowning establishment and against the Zionists and British.²⁷ Al-Qassam's death was an exhortation to action for many peasants, particularly in northern Palestine where he died. In the decades prior to the outbreak of the intifada, Islamic religious leaders in Gaza organized several different Islamic groups, mostly in the very poor areas of the Gaza refugee camps.²⁸ Some groups like Hamas were organized after the intifada began. The local precursors of the Palestinian Islamic groups included the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and in Palestine in the post-World War II period. The effects of Israeli occupation reaffirmed the historically based uncompromising attitudes toward Zionism and toward Jews which had been traditionally held by the Muslim Brotherhood.

Major differences are evident in the degree of Islamic texture in the fiber of the two uprisings. In the 1936-39 period, an Islamic orientation was successfully absorbed by the Mufti before the uprising; alternative Islamic leaders were only minor figures compared to Hajj Amin after the outbreak. Although used in the earlier period, the mosque network was not organizationally or effectively developed to provide educational, charitable, and religious services to the underclass populations, particularly as compared to the Gaza Strip during the intifada. Moreover, prior to the intifada, the PLO and some Islamic groups like Islamic Jihad operationally converged their activities in the West Bank and Gaza. Islamic Jihad had an emotive influence which impelled people into the streets prior to the intifada.²⁹ Additional general support for an Islamic underpinning dur-

ing the intifada came from the contemporaneous Middle Eastern environment, where many significant and highly committed groups were organizing that saw Islam as the primary and guiding alternative to secular nationalist regimes. For the purpose of maintaining a solid political position and organizational unity, the "external" PLO political leadership sought to engage and coopt coordination from the increasingly popular Palestinian Islamic groups, not always with success. Elements within Hamas, for example, wanted to liberate all of Palestine and were opposed to the PLO's compromise of a two-state political solution.³⁰

Duration and Effects

Unlike its precursor, the intifada was not interrupted by a major halt in disturbance. The 1936-39 uprising was captive to Palestine's agricultural calendar as well as to intervention by Palestinian and Arab political leaders. The first phase of the general strike started at the end of the citrus-picking season of 1935-36 and ended prior to the citrus harvest of 1936-37. The second phase did not begin until the summer of 1938 when the regular harvest was over. Unlike the 1936-39 uprising, the intifada's duration demonstrated stamina and a low but continuous level of intensity.

Both uprisings show ample evidence that some local leaders were assassinated for collaborating with the Zionists/Israelis. In both instances, intimidation and assassination of those not fully sympathetic with the cause occurred later on in the uprisings. There is evidence that suggests that the Mufti carried out such personal vendettas indirectly through intermediaries in hopes of settling scores against those who opposed his leadership and against those who supported the suggested partition of Palestine in 1937.³¹ In 1938, for example, there were campaigns of physical violence waged directly against village *mukhtars*, and against landowners who had previously sold land to the Zionists; there was also regular intimidation by rebel bands against villagers to force them to provide supplies, weapons, and food necessary to keep the bands active. It is not known in each case why an accused collaborationist was killed, but there is ample evidence that the PLO and the unified leadership of the intifada publicly condemned the uncontrolled violence against people accused of collaboration. In the 1936-39 period, 494 Arabs were killed by other Arabs, which comprised approximately 16 percent of the total number of Arabs killed during the revolt. By the end of the second year of the in-

tifada, about one-fifth of the Palestinians killed were victims of other Palestinians,³² and the level of intra-Palestinian skirmishing was clearly escalating during the latter half of that year. In both cases, it seems that collaborationist killings were carried out for a variety of reasons: personal and political animosities, local land disputes, perceived laxity in commitment to the national cause, and even banditry. However, motivations for the intifada collaborationist assassinations were generally not based upon family identity or social class, which were very evident causes for the intra-Palestinian killings in the 1936-39 period.

A comparison of the political action taken by the respective Palestinian political leaders during the uprisings provides a marked contrast. When both uprisings began, the Mufti and Arafat were in the amorphous center of the Palestinian political spectrum. In the 1936-39 period, the Mufti, in failing to control the pace or direction of the undisciplined violence, became more resistant to political compromise. When he could not control the bands in the summer of 1936, he invited the intervention of Ibn Saud, Emir Abdallah, and Nuri al-Said. The Mufti assumed an increasingly radicalized view of Britain and Zionism, reaching a point that made any accommodation with either party virtually impossible. This radicalization occurred in part because the Mufti needed to reassert his political authority over a highly fragmented Palestinian community, especially after he was exiled from Palestine in October 1937. Any signs of accommodation would have put him closer politically to both the Palestinian moderates and the Hashemites, which would in turn have forced him to share decisionmaking prerogatives. Also, in the Mufti's case, any embrace of Emir Abdallah beyond merely seeking his intervention to stop the uprising would have given additional credibility to his Palestinian rivals who were openly supported by the Transjordanian leader.

By comparison, when the intifada broke out, Arafat and his dominant wing of the PLO were already considered centrist within the Palestinian political community. Since 1974, the PLO had accepted the notion of a state in any area liberated from Israel.³³ Only after July 1988, when the Hashemites withdrew their interest in controlling Palestinian territory west of the Jordan River, did Arafat begin to intimate a willingness explicitly to accept a two-state solution and the intifada became the PLO's prime engine making this possible. Unlike the Mufti, Arafat could assert a political accommodation without being forced to adopt some form of Hashemite hegemony over Palestinian decisionmaking. At that point, as one PLO Executive Committee member commented, the intifada became "an incentive to take action in the region . . . [as] an activator, a catalyst,

to attain peace."³⁴ Consequently, the Palestinians made their most conciliatory public gestures toward Zionism ever, including the PNC's November 1988 resolution to accept a two-state solution based upon the November 1947 partition resolution, and Yasir Arafat's public recognition of Israel in December 1988 leading to the diplomatic dialogue between the PLO and the United States. The PLO labeled the combination of these events as its "peace initiative," a term which certainly had been unthinkable among the Palestinian leadership half a century before.

In February 1939, the St. James Palace conference followed the earlier uprising and diplomatic efforts were undertaken by Britain to bring Zionists and Palestinians together. However, the publication and implementation of the 1939 White Paper, which severely limited Jewish immigration and land acquisition in the early 1940s, though viewed by Palestinians as a political victory against Zionism, was still considered insufficient. While certainly not satisfying Palestinian aspirations for Arab majority self-rule, the application of the White Paper and the intervention of World War II helped neutralize additional Palestinian political demands to the British and against the Zionists.

By comparison, the limited continuation of the intifada after two years remains a carefully husbanded political currency, savored and nurtured by the Palestinian political leadership. With the focus of the international media diverted elsewhere at the end of the intifada's second year, and with some frustration among Palestinians that the intifada has not yet advanced Palestinian statehood and not persuaded the United States to pressure Israel into political and territorial concessions, there is evidence to suggest that the maintenance of the intifada has become more precious to the political leadership in 1990 than perhaps it was in December 1987. Khalid al-Fahum, the former Palestine National Council speaker and current chairman of the Palestine National Salvation Front, which opposes Arafat's leadership, remarked in August 1989 that "if the intifada were terminated, we [the Palestinians] would not have bargaining power."³⁵ Several months later, Salah Khalaf, a leading member of Fatah and considered the number two man in the PLO, noted that, "We Arabs have nothing other than this intifada in our hands. Through it we reactivate political action. So if, God forbid, the intifada suffers a setback, I do not know what our position as Arabs will be."³⁶ In 1939, the Palestinian leadership had little choice but to settle for the White Paper and the promise of a unitary state within ten years. Whether the present Palestinian leadership will accept a similar promise remains, of course, to be seen; but there persists the concern that a political process such as elections in the

West Bank and Gaza Strip could be used both to end slowly the intifada and to uncouple it from the achievement of the articulated goal of an independent Palestinian state.³⁷ As there was in 1939, there is a fear among Palestinian leaders half a century later that if a transitional period is begun, it will not ultimately result in an independent Palestinian state.

A major reason why the PLO leadership had the option to use the intifada as a force for diplomatic action was the relative political autonomy within the Arab world which the Palestinian leadership enjoyed prior to and during the intifada. The independence of political decision-making is a lesson that the present Palestinian leadership learned from the earlier uprising. While the present leadership is eager to have Egyptian President Mubarak act as a diplomatic lubricant in the negotiating process with the United States, it is concerned that Egypt might begin to usurp the Palestinian prerogative of independent decisionmaking. PLO leaders want "to differentiate between the Egyptian [diplomatic] role, which [was] welcomed, and an attempt to represent the Palestinians and speaking on their behalf."³⁸ In the 1936-39 period, the Arab Higher Committee sought the intervention of Arab states to end the revolt in order to protect its own image and to preserve its own status as leader of the Palestinian community. In the midst of the respective uprisings, Arab leaders met in Bludan, Syria in September 1937, in Algiers in June 1988, and in Casablanca in May 1989. During these conferences, greater venom was directed at Zionism and Israel than at the important powers, Britain and the United States. Most historians recognize the Bludan Congress as a benchmark for the Arab world's initial intervention in the Palestine problem.³⁹ The Algiers and Casablanca Arab summits, on the other hand, affirmed or ratified Arab League political support for an independent political course set by the PLO. By adopting a conciliatory political option in the midst of the intifada, the PLO leadership demonstrated its desire to retain firm control of the diplomatic and political direction of the national movement; to maintain the unity of the PLO and therefore avoid the emergence of a leadership alternative in the West Bank and Gaza; and certainly to sustain the prerogative of independent Palestinian decisionmaking free from the control of Arab capitals such as Damascus, which wished to contain the Palestinian diplomatic initiative with Israel. But it must be stressed that the Arab world during the period prior to and during the intifada was, in comparison to fifty years before, much less inclined to be concerned with the control of the Palestinian issue. In the 1936-39 period, Arab leaders in states surrounding Palestine

primarily intervened to help end the various phases of the uprising in order to promote their own political purposes.⁴⁰

While the 1936-39 revolt set the precedent for Arab meddling in Palestinian affairs, the willingness during the intifada of some Arab capitals, most particularly Amman, to disassociate themselves from a territorial competition for the West Bank provided the Palestinian leadership with a political option it had not enjoyed previously. But Arab world distance from the Palestinian question, particularly in the restrained form of merely verbal political and meager financial support, has been, to date, bittersweet. The November 1987 Arab summit conference in Amman, meeting just a month before the outbreak of the intifada, displayed, if not abandonment or indifference to the Palestinian question, then certainly a lack of substantive commitment. While the PLO leadership enjoyed broader political options during the intifada, it also lamented the disinterest which the Arab world demonstrated toward tangible support of the intifada. Particularly during the intifada's second year, most of the Arab world, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, failed to meet the financial obligations toward the uprising as promised at the Casablanca summit in May 1989.⁴¹ Khalid al-Hasan, a Fatah Central Committee member, remarked after that summit that "the Arab stand no longer exists. It is no use saying that the Arab stand is disunited, fragmented, or tentative—it is now less than zero. As far as the Palestine question and the intifada are concerned, there is no Arab stand."⁴²

Finally, it should be noted that on the occasion of each uprising, substantial international exposure was given to the Palestinian issue. But in 1938-39 and again in 1988-89, other more pressing international issues considerably reduced the initial publicity. In 1938 and 1939 Britain turned its attention almost exclusively to Europe and the changes being wrought by the emergency of fascism. In 1988-89, within the Middle East, the intifada became a secondary issue to events in Lebanon, especially to Syria; internationally, the Palestinian issue became an issue of only marginal interest as historic challenges to socialism occurred in the U.S.S.R., China, and eastern Europe. In the 1936-39 period, Britain postponed any decision to leave Palestine that might have ensued had the partition notion been adopted. It changed its plans not because of the uprising, but because of global considerations. During the intifada, while the United States put forth the 1988 Shultz initiative as an ambiguous start to negotiations, Washington withdrew active support of the initiative and therefore some of its attention to the Palestinian issue, not for considerations of global politics, but because it was not yet convinced that the two sides

were willing to overcome their respective ideological constraints and to engage in direct and substantive negotiations. But like Great Britain, the United States realized the importance of engaging in a dialogue with all sides. As a cumulative result of the intifada, the Hashemite disengagement from the West Bank, and Arafat's willingness to denounce terrorism and recognize Israel, Washington opened that dialogue. Like Great Britain in 1939, Washington was, at least by the intifada's second anniversary, not able to start direct Palestinian-Zionist/Israel talks. Fifty years ago it was the Palestinian leadership that refused to sit with the Zionists; now it is the Israelis who refuse to sit with the PLO leadership.

Conclusion

Because this essay is inherently limited by the ongoing nature of the intifada, any substantive conclusions are speculative. The most prominent prognosis, of course, is that the chances for ensuing negotiations between the parties after this current uprising are greater than they were in 1939. Both Palestinians and Israelis are more mature about accepting, albeit with reservations, the other's legitimacy. Both communities are more intertwined with one another physically and economically than fifty years ago; the intifada has catalyzed the interaction through confrontation. Both communities look to an outside arbiter to broker mutually acceptable procedures. Both sides remain partially bound by fossilized ideologies, but have developed some pragmatic resiliency as a result of the intifada and events which preceded and accompanied it. For the Palestinian community, the main danger is that further disharmony may evolve if no satisfactory political process unfolds. Such disunity could be augmented by several factors: the loss of the intifada's discipline; Israeli deportations of political leaders; an unexpected change in political leadership; the reinvigoration of the Palestinian-Islamic movement by the November 1989 parliamentary election results in Jordan; and the results of local Palestinian elections which, if held and not properly managed, could be more divisive than harmonizing in their end result. In addition, the PLO's organizational structure could be threatened by a political process which, though headed toward a negotiated settlement, might simultaneously contribute to an erosion of PLO "external" leadership dominance over the Palestinian political community.

The aftermath of the 1936-39 revolt saw an almost total disintegration of the local Palestinian political leadership in the decade that followed.

For the current external leadership and the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, how and when the intifada ends are of utmost importance to the future nature and composition of the Palestinian leadership. It is ironic that although Palestinian leadership enjoys almost total autonomy in the inter-Arab political system today, something it did not enjoy fifty years ago, its West Bank and Gaza constituents have greater dependency upon the Jewish economy than there was during the 1936-39 uprising. For the PLO to survive as a dominant political force, it will not only have to make some accommodation with Israel, but it will also have to find ways to extend formal coordination with the amorphously defined Palestinian leadership in the occupied territories, who have become the *center of gravity* for Palestinian nationalism. Unlike its equivalent in the 1936-39 revolt, participants in this Palestinian national assertion are broadly based, pluralistic, interested in political compromise, acceptable to Israeli political leaders, and apparently a durable component of the Palestinian community. The emergence of the West Bank and Gaza Strip leadership, albeit one that still defers to the PLO, has been one of the most significant political results of this uprising.⁴³



1. For convenience sake, the term "uprising" is used to describe the events both of 1936-39 and of the present period. The 1936-39 uprising has been variously described by historians as a "revolt" and "rebellion." The term *intifada*, meaning shudder or tremor, comes from the Arabic verb meaning, "to be shaken off."
2. For excellent general descriptions of the 1936-39 uprising, see W.F. Abboushi, "The Road to Rebellion: Arab Palestine in the 1930s," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Spring 1977), pp. 23-46; Yehuda Bauer, "The Arab Revolt of 1936," Part I, *New Outlook* (July/August 1966), pp. 49-57 and Part II, *New Outlook* (September 1966), pp. 21-28; Tom Bowden, "The Politics of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936-1939," *Middle*

Eastern Studies (May 1975), pp. 147-174; Ghasan Kanafani, "Thawrah 1936-1939 fi Filastin" [The 1936-1939 Revolt in Palestine], *Shu'un Filastiniyah* (1972), pp. 45-77; Zvi el-Peleg, "The 1936-1939 Disturbances: Riot or Rebellion," *Wiener Library Bulletin* (1978), pp. 40-51; Yehoshua Porath, *The Palestine Arab National Movement, 1929-1939*, pp. 109-273; Subhi Yasin, *Al-Thawrah al-'Arabiyyah al-Kubra fi Filastin* [The Great Arab Revolt in Palestine], (Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1967.)

For a recent comparative examination of the intifada with the 1936-39 uprising, see M. Khalid al-Azhari, "Thawrah 1936 wa Intifada 1987" [The 1936 Revolt and the 1987 Intifada], *Shu'un Filastiniyah*, October 1989, pp. 3-26.

3. Pamela Ann Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians 1876-1983* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 62-3.
4. For examples of the frequency and growing intensity of Israeli and Arab inter-communal unrest in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem area, see the Chronology section, "Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Middle East Journal*, Vols. 41-42, (1987-1988).
5. For an assessment of the personal rather than "nationalistic" opposition to Israel, present in the minds of many Palestinians prior to the outbreak of the intifada, see Emile A. Nakhleh, "The West Bank and Gaza: Twenty Years Later," *The Middle East Journal* (Spring 1988), pp. 209-226. For an assessment of Palestinian *fellahin's* declining economic condition and its relationship to the 1939-39 Palestinian revolt, see Kenneth W. Stein, "Peasant Destitution and Rural Change: Contributing Causes to the 1936-39 Arab Disturbances in Palestine," in a contribution to Farhad Kazemi and John Waterbury's forthcoming edited volume, *Peasants and Revolutions in the Middle East* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida), 1990.
6. Philip Mattar, "The Mufti of Jerusalem and the Politics of Palestine," *Middle East Journal* (Summer 1988), p. 234.
7. Remarks by Khalid al-Hasan, Fatah Central Committee Member, *al-Watan* (Kuwait), 13 October 1989, p. 20.
8. Marlowe, *Rebellion in Palestine*, p. 169; Tom Bowden, "The Politics of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936-1939," pp. 173-174; Zvi el-Peleg, *Hamufti Hagadol* [The Grand Mufti], (Israel, 1989), pp. 46-58; Zvi el-Peleg, "The 1936-1939 Disturbances: Riot or Rebellion," p. 43; Philip Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin Al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement*, (New York: Columbia University Press 1988), pp. 65-85.
9. Porath, *The Palestine Arab National Movement From Riots to Rebellion*, pp. 48-9.
10. Yuval Arnon-Ohanna, "The Bands in the Palestinian Arab Revolt, 1936-1939: Structure and Organization," *Asian and African Studies* (1981), p. 234.
11. Arnon-Ohanna, pp. 229-30.
12. Interview with Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, *Wochenpresse* (Vienna), 15 December 1989.
13. See George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, (New York, 1963), p. 405.
14. Bowden, "The Politics of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine 1936-1939," p. 147.
15. See Issa Khalaf, *Palestine Arab Factionalist Politics and Social Disintegration, 1939-1948*, unpublished doctoral thesis, Oxford University, 1985, Chapters IV, V, and VI.
16. See for example, George Abed (ed.) *The Palestinian Economy: Studies in Development Under Prolonged Occupation* (London, 1988).
17. See Nakhleh, "The West Bank and Gaza: Twenty Years Later," p. 213.
18. Yezid Sayigh, "The Intifadah Continues: Legacy, Dynamics, and Challenges," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 3 (July 1989), pp. 20-49; and interview with Mona Rishmawi and Fateh Azzam, Executive and Administrative Directors respectively of *al-Haq*, Atlanta, Georgia, 7 December 1989.
19. See Theodore Swedenburg, *Memories of Revolt: The 1936-1939 Rebellion and the Struggle for a Palestinian National Past*, unpublished doctoral thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, August 1988.
20. Bowden, p. 169. See also High Commissioner Sir Harold MacMichael to Malcolm MacDonald, Colonial Secretary, 2 January 1939, Co 733/398/75156.
21. Interview with Mona Rishmawi and Fateh Azzam, Executive and Administrative Directors respectively of *al-Haq*, Atlanta, Georgia, 7 December 1989.
22. Excellent descriptions of the peasant bands in the 1936-39 uprising are provided in Yuval Arnon-Ohanna, "The Bands in the Palestinian Arab Revolt, 1936-1939: Structure and Organization," *Asian and African Studies*, pp. 229-47; and Bowden, "The Politics of the

- Arab Rebellion in Palestine," pp. 147-74.
23. See remarks by Salah Khalaf, Fateh Central Committee member, 8 December 1989, Radio Monte Carlo, as quoted in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report Near East and South Asia* (FBIS-NES), 11 December 1989, p. 5; and in *al-Tadamun* (London), 5 February 1990.
 24. For examples of the notices posted during the 1936-39 uprising, see Yuval Arnon, *Fellaheen Bamered Ha'aravi Beeretz Yisrael 1936-1939* [Peasants in the Arab Revolt in Eretz Yisrael 1936-1939], (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1978), pp. 176-79. For rebel band commanders documents and their detailed analyses, see Ezra Danin and Ya'acov Shimoni, *Te'udot Vedemuyot Meginzay Haknufiyot Ha'araviyot BeMeora'ot 1936-1939* [Documents and Portraits from the Records of the Arab Bands in the Revolt of 1936-1939] (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1981). For an analytical summary of the calls issued during the first year of the intifada by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, see Karen Schneiderman, "The Calls of the Palestinian Uprising," *Emory Journal of International Affairs* (Spring 1989), pp. 31-8; and Shaul Mishal, "Paper War-Words Behind Stones: The Intifada Leaflets," *Jerusalem Quarterly* (Summer 1989), pp. 71-94. The first twenty-nine calls were republished in Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (ed.) *Intifadah: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* (MERIP, 1989), pp. 327-99.
 25. Nels Johnson, *Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism*, (London: Keagan Paul International, 1982), pp. 42-4; See also Shai Lachman, "Arab Rebellion and Terrorism in Palestine, 1929-1939, The Case of Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam and his Movement," in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia Haim (ed.) *Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel*, (London: Cass, 1982) pp. 52-99.
 26. Uri M. Kupferschmidt, *The Supreme Muslim Council: Islam Under the British Mandate for Palestine*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987), pp. 240-54.
 27. Johnson, p. 45.
 28. For a sampling of the numerous articles focusing on the Islamic components present and developing during the intifada, see the forthcoming article by Elie Rekhess focusing on Islam in the intifada in Robert O. Freedman (ed.) *The Intifada and Its Impact on Israel, the Arab World, and the Superpowers* (Florida International University Press, forthcoming 1991). See also Rekhess's article, "The Rise of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad," *Jerusalem Post*, 21 October 1987; Robert Satloff, "Islam in the Palestinian Uprising," *Orbis* (Summer 1989), pp. 389-401; and Marti Steinberg, "The PLO and Palestinian Islamic Fundamentalism," *Jerusalem Quarterly* (Fall 1989), pp. 37-54. Interview with Shaykh Khalil Quqa, Gazan leader of Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), in *al-Anba'* (Kuwait), 8 October 1988; and Oren Cohen, "This is Hamas," *Hadashot*, 7 October 1988, pp. 24-5.
 29. Satloff, "Islam in the Palestinian Uprising," pp. 394-6.
 30. See remarks by Salah Khalaf, *al-Anba'* (Kuwait), 4 December 1989.
 31. See Swedenburg, pp. 160-73.
 32. *Ha'olam Hazeq*, 25 October 1989.
 33. Salim Tamari, "The Palestinian Movement in Transition," unpublished manuscript.
 34. Remarks by PLO Executive Committee member Mahmud 'Abbas, *Al-Quds al-'Arabi* (London), 14-15 October 1989. For an excellent analysis of what changes the intifada and associated events brought to the PLO, see Adam Garfinkle, "Plus Ça Change . . . in the Middle East," *World Affairs* (Summer 1988), pp. 3-15.
 35. Remarks by Khalid al-Fahum, *al-Anba'* (Kuwait), 10 August 1989.
 36. Remarks by Salah Khalaf, *Ukaz* (Jeddah), 16 November 1989, as quoted in FBIS-NES, 27 November 1989, p. 5.
 37. See Palestinian document on elections, *al-Fajr* (Jerusalem), 1 May 1989.

38. See remarks by Salah Khalaf, *al-Watan* (Kuwait), 15 December 1989; see also *Voice of the Mountain* (Lebanon) 9 June 1989 as quoted in FBIS-NES, 13 June 1989, p. 4. It reported that "several factors can be adduced why the revolution of 1936 was aborted, but the most important of these was the fact that the Palestinian leaders of the time accepted the advice of the Arab regimes."
39. Elie Kedourie, "The Bludan Congress on Palestine," *Middle Eastern Studies* (January 1981), pp. 107-25; Philip Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate The Politics of Arab Nationalism*, (Princeton, 1987), p. 555; Yehoshua Porath, *In Search of Arab Unity 1930-1945*, (London: Cass, 1986), pp. 168-70.
40. See Khoury, pp. 535-62; Gabriel Sheffer, "The Involvement of Arab States in the Palestine Conflict and British-Arab Relationship Before World War II," *Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 10 (1974), pp. 59-78; Gabriel Sheffer, "'Arav Hasa'udit Vebe 'ayot Eretz Yisrael Bitekufat Hamered Ha'aravi, 1936-1939" [Saudi Arabia and the Palestine Problem in the Period of the Arab Revolt, 1936-1939] *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. 22 (1972), pp. 137-51.
41. See remarks by Yasir Arafat, *Al-Hawadith* (London), 24 November 1989, pp. 20-2.
42. Remarks by Khalid al-Hasan, Fatch Central Committee member, *al-Watan* (Kuwait), 13 October 1989, p. 20.
43. On the difference between the PLO leadership and the leadership/participants of the intifada Salah Khalaf said, "I admit that the generation of intifada, is entirely different from the generation of the PLO leadership. In other words, it is different from my generation. It is even better and more efficient than we are. Yet, this intifada is our child. I am very proud of this child because it is better than its parents." See remarks by Salah Khalaf, *Der Spiegel*, 29 August 1988, pp. 131-36.