

Unit 6

Value Theory

Introduction

Critical thinking about values is an especially difficult task, since the subject matter is very unclear in the first place, and then in addition people can get very agitated in arguing about values, and so fail to be as epistemically rational as they might otherwise be. There is far more to say about value theory than could possibly be covered even in a complete book dedicated to the topic, so once again we will have to make do with a sketch of some of the basic concepts, and leave things at that. It will help if we stay focused on the minimum that must be understood if one is going to be able to argue reasonably about values.

Learning objectives

When you have completed this unit you should be able to:

1. describe what evaluative terms are;
2. identify what value systems are under discussion in ambiguous contexts;
3. state what sorts of points are relevant to discussions of different value systems; and
4. identify genuine disagreements from mere contests of will in discussions of value.

Assigned reading

Earle Gray. "Why Business Must Not Be Socially Responsible."

How to proceed

1. Read study notes for unit 6.
2. Do the assigned reading.
3. Answer the following questions.
 - What is Gray's main conclusion?
 - What are the main premises (or subconclusions) that lead him to his main conclusion?
 - Identify all of the evaluative terms used in these premises (and subconclusions) and in the main conclusion. To what value system does each term refer: morality or practical rationality?
 - Evaluate Gray's argument, giving special attention to whether or not his claims about values are true.
3. Once you have thought about these questions, submit your answers by clicking on **course discussion** on the course web site and compose your message. Fellow students will give feedback, and perhaps ask questions. In addition, your

instructor will respond to comments from students, and may ask for clarification on student views stated in the discussion.

Study notes

Basic value theory

“Value theory” is the name for the branch of study that considers, not just things known as “value systems,” but more generally right and wrong, goodness and badness, fairness and unfairness, justice and injustice, and so on. In addition to these high-minded notions, value theory extends to all forms of evaluation, however exotic or mundane they might be. It considers the rules of evaluation found in etiquette, honour, and artistic merit, it considers standards that apply to meat and milk and eggs, occupational safety standards, the distinction between health and disease, laws, professional codes, business policies, and more.

In principle there can be endlessly many value systems or evaluative standards, but in practice only a few are usually brought up in controversial contexts. They include morality, epistemic rationality, practical rationality, politeness, and artistic merit. In general, when people use terms like “good,” “should,” “ought,” and so on, they have these or similar value systems in mind. Something that is good is morally good, or a rational belief, or a rational action, or it is polite, or it is beautiful or a great artwork, or something of the sort.

Identifying evaluative statements

Although we have just mentioned evaluative systems one by one, it would be more convenient to have a general principle allowing one to determine which terms are evaluative terms and so which arguments are arguments concerning values. Convenient, but unfortunately impossible. For as with many other things, there are no simple, mechanical procedures here that you can use to tell you the right answer. Instead, there are heuristics—approximation techniques that you can use as fallible guides.

Consider a few statements that involve evaluative systems in one way or another.

1. What you did to your little sister was wrong.
2. Her heart is defective.
3. He is the rudest man I know.
4. She is brilliant.
5. His chocolate soufflé is a very good one, I hear, though I don’t like chocolate myself.

Sentences 1 and 5 stand out as clearly involving evaluations, because they use the words “wrong” and “good.” Words like these are generic evaluative words. *Right* and *wrong*, *good* and *bad*, *should* and *shouldn’t* and so on: these are words that evaluate things in the most obvious way possible. And to say that something is right or wrong, good or bad, etc., is to put a value on it: to evaluate it, in other words. Any statement that uses such words is likely to be evaluating something. There are exceptions, of course. Sentence 6 is not evaluating anything:

6. The wind should stop by tomorrow.

But that is because “should” is being used in a different sense here, to mean “the wind is predicted to stop tomorrow” rather than “there will be something wrong with the wind if it doesn’t stop tomorrow”. In general, terms like “right”, “good”, “should” and so on can be taken to indicate that some sort of evaluation is going on.

Other sentences, like those in 2–4, are also evaluative, but they are less obviously evaluative. To say that a heart is *defective*, for instance, is to say that it does not measure up to some standard, the standard according to which hearts are built by nature. To say that a man is *rude* is to say that he does not measure up to the standards of social interaction in his society. And to say that a woman is brilliant is to say that her beliefs measure up very, very well against the standard of epistemic rationality itself, at least in some area in which the woman is especially brilliant. These sorts of examples suggest that we can always ask, “is there some standard something is being measured against?” when we want to know if a statement is evaluative. If there is such a standard, a standard such that something would in some sense be bad or wrong if it failed to live up to that standard, then an evaluative statement is being made.

Evaluating arguments involving values

The most important thing to remember when discussing values is what evaluative systems you are using. Are the values moral? Artistic? Self-interest? This is sometimes trivial—if you say, “this meat is bad” you don’t mean that the meat is immoral. But it is often not trivial to figure out what value system is under discussion, and that can complicate an argument greatly. For instance, if you say “there’s something wrong with this painting,” you might mean that the painting lacks artistic value, or that it is morally objectionable, or that it is impolite to display the painting where it is displayed; these would clearly be very different claims. If a painting lacks artistic merit, that might be trouble for the artist’s career, but it is probably not going to get people very excited, while if the painting is morally objectionable that is quite another matter.

The words “right,” “wrong,” “good,” “bad,” “proper,” “improper,” “should,” “should not,” “normal,” “abnormal,” and others like them are often used in unclear ways, because they do not tell you on their surface what value system or norm the author/speaker has in mind; they are ambiguous. In a situation where it is not clear what sort of evaluative standard you have in mind, you can clarify what you mean in one of two ways:

1. Use a clearer term. So, instead of saying “wrong” you could say “immoral”, instead of saying “good” you could say “honourable”, or whatever is appropriate in context.
2. Add a further term. So instead of just saying that something should not be done, say that, morally speaking, something should not be done. Or instead of saying “that’s appalling” say “that’s appallingly unsanitary.”

Note: clarifying what you are arguing about is not the same thing as defining your terms. I cannot define “morality” and I cannot define “art” (and neither, I suppose, can you), but that does not mean we cannot argue intelligently about morality or art, and it certainly does not mean that I cannot try to get clear on whether we are

debating morals or artistic values. This inability to define key terms is no different than what happens in science or in everyday life, however, so we need not think that the problem is peculiar to value theory. For instance, no scientist can yet give a perfectly correct definition of “gravity,” but scientists still argue about it and make progress. Likewise, no one can define “love,” but people still argue about whether or not particular acts are compatible with love, and find out important things about who loves who.

Many people think it is not possible to get anywhere when arguing about what is good or right. “You have your opinion,” they say, “and I have mine. There’s nothing more to say.” However, if it is not possible for reasonable people to come to agreement, then it is not at all clear that they can be disagreeing. The mere fact that you are *disagreeing* seems to imply that, in principle, you could come to agree. Disagreeing is not just having a fistfight or shouting match, after all. It involves agreeing that there is a fact of the matter, and not agreeing about what it is. If it were not in general possible for reasonable people to agree when arguing about values, then that would throw into doubt whether people really had anything to disagree about, and so whether they were really making statements that were true or false. But since many claims about etiquette, morality, art, and honour (to name a few) seem clearly true or false, then it seems that at least some of our claims about value systems must be fact-based, and thus (in principle!) the sorts of things about which reasonable people should often be able to agree.

It is important to distinguish two sorts of disagreements about values. In the first sort, people are trying to talk about the same value, but disagree about how it evaluates some particular thing. For instance, many people in Canada in 1890 did not think it was moral for women to vote, although some disagreed. Those who were against women voting thought that women could not be well-informed, or that they would be swayed by irrational emotions more than men, or that involvement in politics was a burden to women rather than a benefit. These arguments were reasonable, in the limited sense that they were relevant to the morality of women’s suffrage. If political involvement were genuinely a great burden, then it would be morally irresponsible to make more people than necessary involved in politics, for instance. The arguments from the other side likewise concerned themselves with morally relevant points, such as the claim that worries about women becoming less feminine were morally insignificant when compared to the significance of having a voice in a democratic government. And both sides made empirical claims about what would or would not happen to the family unit, to voting patterns, to child rearing, etc., which, if true, would be morally significant. Thus, both parties held the same value as paramount, but they disagreed on how to best serve this value. Eventually, it became clear to the relevant people that morality required that women be granted the vote, and when the motion was finally passed in Parliament it was passed overwhelmingly.

In the second sort of argument over values, people are talking about two different values, and place opposite emphasis on them. For instance, some people say that some art should not be displayed because it is rude to do so—some people will be offended by the art work—while other people say that the same art should be displayed because it is important art, made by a brilliant artist. This is not a conflict

between people who disagree about how to apply some particular value. Both sides should agree that there is something impolite about the public display of art that offends some people, and both sides should agree (assuming it is true) that the work of art lives up to high artistic standards. The real conflict is not over how to apply a single value, but over which value will take precedence.

Conflicts of the first sort are debates about the facts—about the evaluatively relevant facts—while conflicts of the second sort are not debates about facts. Instead, conflicts of the second sort are battles between people over what will happen, battles in which one side prefers one value to govern what will happen, while the other side prefers that some other value control the outcome. It is conflicts of the second sort that make us throw up our hands. In such conflicts, reasonable people cannot be expected to come to agreement, because they are not really disagreeing about what is true. Fortunately, reasonable people can often find some way to resolve the conflict without resorting to a fistfight—perhaps, by finding that they hold some other value in common, such as civility, and finding that they prefer to see a civil resolution of the conflict rather than have a fistfight—but such a resolution only resolves the immediate problem; it does not make the conflict go away.

Often, it is not clear whether a conflict over values is really of one sort or another. People may mix moral arguments with arguments from etiquette or honour, and not make clear which, if any, evaluative system is central to the argument. Likewise, people may just not be sure what values they care about more. This confusion, though unfortunate from a critical-thinking perspective, provides some reason to be optimistic about the power of rational argument to settle evaluative disputes. For instance, if you are thinking of going shoplifting for fun, and I try to talk you out of it for moral reasons, that looks like a conflict that is not really a disagreement, one that reasoning cannot help us to resolve. However, it might be that you value morality more than you think, and my arguments will remind you of that fact, in which case my argument may actually rationally persuade you that you do not really prefer to go shoplifting on balance. Thus, it may sometimes be the case that even when debate appears pointless, really it is very helpful. That said, it must still be acknowledged that this will not always be the case.

Moral arguments

So far, this discussion of values has been one of how to argue about values in general. The same points apply whether one debates the merits of a painting, a political speech, or a new sewage treatment plant, and so there is something fairly useful in this abstract discussion. However, discussion about how to argue about values in general does not provide particularly clear guidance when it comes to arguing about what is moral, or what is beautiful, or what is healthy. To be honest, a course on critical thinking is not the right place to learn about these things. Ethicists, aestheticians, doctors, and the like are the experts on these matters, and ideally you would go to several experts, or texts written by experts, if you really cared about a debate on one of these topics but found that you did not know enough about the value in question to have high confidence in your opinions. Some values get discussed more than many others; we will begin with morality. This is perhaps the value at the centre of more public debates than any other, and so it

deserves extra attention. Of course, everything I say in what follows is controversial to some degree, but I will try to stick mostly to less controversial ideas to give you some insights into morality generally shared by many philosophers.

In philosophical discussions, the words “morality” and “ethics” are generally used interchangeable. Some people think of morality as something very local—the mores of one’s social group—and of ethics as something more universal, but the words “mores” or “local norms” are better suited as names for the little codes of conduct that each group has that do not quite count as matters of etiquette.

Morality defined

Morality is a rule, or set of rules, for the actions of any creature intelligent enough to have the basic concepts needed to understand the rules at all. In other words, morality tells us what we should *do*. Actions in accordance with morality are permitted by it, and some are better than others; actions not in accordance with morality are forbidden by it, and some are worse than others. Actions by creatures without the capacity to understand morality, and non-actions in general, are outside the direct scope of morality, though they may indirectly be relevant (my car cannot do something immoral, but I can leave my car parked across both lanes on a treacherous bend in a highway, and then I would have done something immoral using my car).

Philosophers distinguish three main questions about morality. First, what does morality tell us to do in general? Second, what is the moral thing to do in some very specific case, such as when a woman considers having an abortion, or when a man wonders to which charitable organisation he should give his free time? Third, what is responsible for morality’s existence? The rules of chess were invented by people—is the same true for the rules of morality? If not, what takes the place of human writers of the rules? No philosopher can justify very high confidence in any interesting answer to any of these three questions, at present—there are many theories, each with impressive but imperfect supporting premises, and no one has produced the ultimate arguments which should convince everyone. Even so, you may find a few of the following thoughts of interest.

Aspects of morality

Morality tells us to take three things into account: we should help people get what they want out of life, we should be fair, and we should not do certain very harmful things to people. At least, this much seems plausible to me, and I will try to make it plausible to you. The first aspect of morality can be called “**beneficence.**” In crude terms, it is a call to make people happy, though of course there is an imperfect connection between getting what you want out of life and being happy. In the first place, the connection is imperfect because you might get something you really value, such as affection from a normally distant parent, but be too sad about something else to feel happy as a result. Even so, the parent who finally showed affection would be doing something good by doing so. In the second place, happiness is not all there is to what people want out of life. If someone stuck an electrode into the pleasure centre in your brain you might feel happy even though you would not be getting much of what you want out of life (love, for instance, or a chance to write a great novel). In general, though, giving people what they want makes them happy, and if you make people happy you can assume you gave them

what they wanted. Morality tells us that, in general, the more we do this, the better. Giving half of your income to charities that improve living conditions in the third world is, without a doubt, a really nice thing to do. It may make you a little less happy, but it makes many other people much better off. Likewise, morality asks you to do small versions of the same thing, such as recycle your garbage in order to save future generations from serious environmental problems.

The second aspect of morality is fairness, or justice. Everyone who has had brothers or sisters will be very familiar with the idea of fairness, so it hardly needs detailed explanation. Fairness seems to involve something like considering only relevant differences when deciding to treat people differently, though of course saying which differences are relevant is exactly the problem. Justice, some would say, is just fairness built into social systems. Justice is more than having laws and a prison system: it is also having a proper tax policy, the right sort of government (some sort of democracy, we generally assume), public institutions that are free of racism or sexism or other forms of unfair treatment of people (or as close to free as we can get them), and so on. There is not yet any agreement on what sort of government is truly just. For example, should taxes be used to redistribute wealth? We might say yes, because it is unfair for some people to be much richer than others, when everyone is of equal moral value, or we might say no, because it is unfair to reward people equally for different work. This is a tough question, and just one of many. An interesting fact about fairness is that sometimes, it would seem, being fair conflicts with being beneficent. There would be something morally wrong with forcing our poor citizens to fight our wars for us, even if it would make people happier on balance, for instance. After all, it would be unfair to treat people badly when they have done nothing to deserve it. So what would help satisfy the interests of many would be unfair, and wrong as a result. Perhaps fairness puts a limit on what things we may do to help people get what they want. That would certainly seem to fit some common notions of morality. For instance, it seems immoral to steal something from a person, even if you are going to give it to someone else who will appreciate it much more, and that might be because theft is unfair to the person being stolen from, even if average happiness in the world goes up as a result. It should also be said, though, that fairness also seems to have its limits. For instance, if Hitler had surrendered instead of shooting himself, then the Allies would have faced the question of what to do with him. Some people think that it would have been perfectly fair to torture Hitler in the most cruel and prolonged way possible, given the terrible things he had done. Paying back what was done to you, though not more, is generally fair. But it would still have been immoral to torture Hitler, just because it is immoral to torture anybody. There are some things morality just forbids you to do, no matter how much someone deserves them.

These things morality forbids make up the third aspect of morality. Morality commands us not to do certain things, such as torture, cause other sorts of suffering without a very good reason, tell lies (without good reason?) and so on. It is difficult to know how to group all of these things together, but they form a separate set from the things we ought not do because of concern for fairness or beneficence. I will stick to torture as an example. Torturing anyone is wrong, it seems to me, for any reason. (By "torture", I do not just mean making someone uncomfortable. I mean the terrible things that everyone knows about—whether

involving thumb screws and the rack, or electric cattle prods.) Sometimes, you can save a hundred lives by torturing one person (in some situations in war, for instance). In that situation, more people could get what they really want out of life if their lives were saved than not if the torture were performed. Nonetheless, torture would not seem the right thing to do. It would be understandable if someone were to give in to temptation in such a circumstance, but it still seems that the person would have given in to doing something wrong. Socrates apparently said that it is better to suffer a wrong than commit it, and this was a wise thing to say, if Socrates meant that it was morally better. Sometimes, morality asks you to endure something bad, because your only way out is to do something evil, and morality can never accept that.

Philosophy can not tell you just now whether these three aspects of morality are really distinct aspects, whether they are the only aspects, or how, exactly, morality requires us to balance them. And it is far beyond the scope of a course on critical thinking to even try, but these points have at least given you something to think about.

Applying ethics

What about abortion, then? Or capital punishment, or euthanasia, or tax rates, for that matter? Or gun laws, or large-scale hog plants, or a million other difficult ethical issues? These are the realm of applied ethics. Applied ethics, as the name suggests, takes some ethical theory as its starting point, and applies it in some particular case to come up with a moral recommendation about what to do. Actually, this is over-simplifying somewhat. Sometimes, a piece of applied ethics will attempt to show that the same conclusion is morally required by one's ethical theory whatever (reasonable) ethical theory one holds, and sometimes a piece of applied ethics will not presuppose any general moral theory, but just a limited moral principle. Still, you get the idea.

In doing applied ethics, one of the biggest difficulties is often having the full facts in front of you. Someone says that making abortion legal on demand in the first trimester will lessen our respect for human life in general. How can you test such a claim? It seems very difficult to determine if the claim is true or false. Yet surely it is relevant. After all, if people had less respect for human life, there would probably be more murders and other things decreasing human happiness, which might offset the happiness felt by women not forced to be mothers when they are unwilling or incapable. Though would it? Arguments in applied ethics sometimes get bogged down in arguments over claims like these, claims that would seem impossible to justify with any high degree of confidence. At the same time, applied ethics is what is most interesting for many people, because it does not deal with abstract theory, but with concrete decisions people face every day, or every time they go to vote, for example.

As a rule, insights in applied ethics come one situation at a time. Each ethical situation must be evaluated on its own merits, the possible consequences for people's interests must be weighed up as well as possible, all possible considerations of fairness must be made, questions must be asked about which actions are permissible ever, and so on. As a result, I have no general advice when it comes to thinking about applied ethics.

Existence/beginnings of morality

That leaves the final big topic surrounding morality: what makes it exist? Morality is a rule or system of rules, and every rule has something behind it that makes it a rule. The rules of chess were created by individuals, the rules of etiquette are created by social pressure, the rules for how our bodies should function are created by evolutionary design, and so on. Where do the rules of morality come from? There are four popular answers.

First answer

Morality comes from God or the gods. On this view, morality is something made up by a certain divine individual or group of individuals. God, or the gods, say “do this!” and so make it true that there is a rule telling us what to do. One odd feature of this view is that it makes it hard to understand why God or the gods created the moral law. If the moral law was created in order to get us to be moral, that sounds like God/the gods knew what morality demanded before giving the law to people, in which case morality would exist before the divine command did, refuting this view. On the other hand, if the moral law was created for some other reason than the promotion of morality, that would seem to degrade the moral law. If the God of Moses created the moral law just in order to get some attention in the Middle East, or just to make sure that the people worshipping him did not kill each other and so die out, that would seem to degrade morality—God would have done something morally wrong in creating morality! If, say, Zeus created the moral law on a whim, that would not be quite as bad (morality would not serve any selfish purpose), but then, it would not seem to be much better either. This is a deep philosophical problem that has troubled many people otherwise attracted to the view that morality comes from divine command. As a result, it is not a very popular view among philosophers of any religion.

Second answer

Morality comes from social convention. On this view, morality is something made up by a certain society, or group of societies; it is like etiquette. On some versions of this view, morality is just like etiquette: what is polite in one society is rude in another, and what is moral in one society is not what is moral in another. In principle, there could be a society in which morality required people to torture athletes over thirty to death, just as, in principle, there could be a society in which etiquette required you to vomit on a guest after dinner. If that sounds too crazy, but you still like the idea that morality is a human invention, you can try on the other version of this view. The other version says that “morality” is the name for our particular rule system (the one we, you, and I care about) but that other, similar rule systems would not be morality. They might be honour codes, or rules for living, but only our own system can properly be called “morality.” This view faces exactly the same problems as those faced by the previous, divine command theory. If morality is a set of rules invented by people, then people invented the rules for non-moral reasons (which would seem to degrade morality) or for no reason at all (which also seems problematic). Just as in the case of divine command theory, society could not have invented morality in order to get people to treat each other properly, because it is morality itself that determines what is proper (morally speaking, of course).

Third answer

Morality comes from the inner requirement to be consistent. You would not like to be tortured, and you know you are not so different from the enemy soldier. Why, then, do you think you can torture the enemy soldier? You are being inconsistent. And since inconsistency is against the very laws of logic itself, we can say that the requirement not to torture another person comes from the laws of logic, plus basic facts about the psychology of every human being (no one wants to be tortured). And this sort of reasoning can be generalized to cover every sort of moral requirement. At least, this is a popular sort of argument these days in philosophy. I have presented a rather crude version of it, but I think you can still see its appeal. “Do unto others as you would have them to do unto you” is a rule whose force we can feel easily enough; to do otherwise might seem inconsistent. One difficulty with this view is that it is rather hard to pin down the exact inconsistency. After all, I do not think the enemy soldier is *exactly* like me, because I think he is the enemy. That is why I am willing to do things to him that I would not want done to me. So it might seem that I am not exactly being inconsistent. And if I am not being inconsistent, then the force of logic can hardly make me act otherwise. One might also ask where the laws of logic come from—a hard question indeed!

Fourth answer

Morality comes from somewhere, but who knows where? This is a very popular answer, but not enough for the intellectually curious.

Practical arguments

Moral arguments are arguments over what we should do, but they are not the only possible sorts of arguments over what we should do. Sometimes, we are interested not in what is moral, but just in what is practically rational.

Suppose, for instance, that you and I are debating what giant automobile maker Daimler-Benz (owner of the Chrysler and Mercedes-Benz brands, plus others) should do over the next five years, and you think that it should focus on expanding its sales of SUVs, which are highly profitable. I, on the other hand, think that there will soon be strong restrictions on carbon emissions (for environmental reasons), so I think that Daimler-Benz should work on developing new electric and gas/electric hybrid cars. That way, they won't be caught unprepared for the big change. Our argument is perfectly reasonable, but one of the things that we are taking for granted is that we are not talking about whether or not Daimler-Benz should put 50% of its profits into making sure that its third-world labourers are not exploited. In some sense, maybe that is what Daimler-Benz should do: in the moral sense. After all, that would affect the welfare of tens of thousands of people, whereas your idea and mine will just make some money and some fancy cars. Morally speaking, supporting fair treatment of workers is obviously a better idea than developing new SUVs. But that is just not what we were talking about. We were talking about what Daimler-Benz should do *practically speaking*, and that is something else.

What, exactly, is practical rationality? One standard theory goes as follows: practical rationality is acting so that, as far as you can tell, you optimize getting what you want, both in the short term and over the long run. When you and I discuss whether or not Daimler-Benz should focus on the SUV market, we are

discussing whether doing so is, as far as the company can tell, what is most likely to get the company what it wants. After all, what a company wants is profit (and growth, market share, and so on), and focusing on selling SUVs might or might not be reasonably expected to make the company money.

Practical rationality is not just for companies, of course. People can be practically rational, or practically irrational, in all sorts of ways. If I know that it is in my best interests to go to the dentist, but I avoid going, I am probably being irrational. (I might save myself some pain now, but it will just hurt more later and I certainly do not want that.) Likewise, if I can see that going out for drinks before going to dinner with my wife's family is likely to lead to me saying something rude, and I do not want to say anything rude, then it will probably be quite rational of me to have the dinner first, and go out for drinks after.

There is a certain amount of controversy in philosophy over whether moral actions are always practically rational. Some would say that you always have to act morally, so any discussion about how you should act must take morals into account. Practical rationality tells you how you should act, so it is constrained by morality. Among such philosophers, it is common to hold that the thing I have been calling "practical rationality" is more correctly called "instrumental rationality," because it is all about determining the right means to your ends. But other philosophers think that what I have been calling "practical rationality" is the only thing worthy of that name. Such philosophers think that, for some people, it is not rational to be moral. (For instance, it might not be practically rational for a criminal to turn herself in to the police, if she does not want to repay society for the harm she has done.) In such cases, these philosophers say that it would be morally good to do the moral thing, but practically irrational. There is no simple resolution of this particular controversy, so I will leave it at that.

Practice exercise 7

Consider the following sentences and decide what sort of evaluative claim is being made. Is the claim moral? Epistemic? Artistic? Practical? Something else? Or is it not an evaluative claim at all? Answers are in the Answers to practice exercises section.

- a. People shouldn't buy cosmetics that were cruelly tested on helpless animals.
- b. Television has more high-quality shows now than it did back in the 1960s.
- c. Laser light displays at rock concerts can cost thousands of dollars.
- d. It would be good if Canada would break off diplomatic relations with countries that practice torture.
- e. An owl lives in the tree in my back yard.
- f. Getting a permanent blood stain on it ruined my sweatshirt.
- g. For the average person, buying a top of the line computer is a silly move.
- h. You'd have to be pretty stupid to believe in Santa Claus after age eight.
- i. The washing machine in my apartment building never works properly.
- j. In order to protect them from the problems of unwanted pregnancy and parenthood, we should sterilize people who are mentally disturbed.