Instruction
Burberry Shifts Its Strategy in Japan
Burberry, the icon British luxury apparel company best known for its high-
fashion outwear, has been operating in Japan for nearly half a century.
Until recently, its branded products were sold under a licensing agreement
with Sanyo Shokai. The Japanese company had considerable discretion as to
how it utilized the Burberry brand. It sold everything from golf bags to
miniskirts and Burberry-clad Barbie dolls in its 400 stores around the
country, typically at prices significantly below those Burberry charged for
its high-end products in the United Kingdom.
For a long time, it looked like a good deal for Burberry. Sanyo Shokai did
all of the market development in Japan, generating revenues of around $800
million a year and paying Burberry $80 million in annual royalty payments.
However, by 2007, Burberry’s CEO, Angela Ahrendts, was becoming
increasingly dissatisfied with the Japanese licensing deal and 22 others
like it in countries around the world. In Ahrendts’s view, the licensing
deals were diluting Burberry’s core brand image. Licensees such as Sanyo
Shokai were selling a wide range of products at a much lower price point
than Burberry charged for products in its own stores. “In luxury,”
Ahrendts once remarked, “ubiquity will kill you-it means that you’re not
really luxury anymore.”* Moreover, with an increasing number of customers
buying Burberry products online and on trips to Britain, where the brand
was considered very upmarket, Ahrendts felt that it was crucial for
Burberry to tightly control its global brand image.
Ahrendts was determined to rein in licensees and regain control of
Burberry’s sales in foreign markets, even if it mean taking a short-term
hit to sales. She started off the process of terminating licensees
before leaving Burberry to run Apple’s retail division in 2014. Her hand-
picked successor as CEO, Christopher Bailey, who rose through the design
function at Burberry, has continued to pursue this strategy.
In Japan, the license was terminated in 2015. Sanyo Shokai was required to
close nearly 400 licensed Burberry stores. Burberry is not giving up on
Japan, however. After all, Japan is the world’s second-largest market for
luxury goods. Instead, the company will now sell products through a limited
number of wholly owned stores. The goal is to have 35 to 50 stores in the
most exclusive locations in Japan by 2018. They will offer only high-end
products, such as Burberry’s classic $1,800 trench coat. In general, the
price point will be 10 times higher than was common for most Burberry
products in Japan. The company realizes the move is risky and fully expects
sales to initially fall before rising again as it rebuilds its brand, but
CEO Bailey argues that the move is absolutely necessary if Burberry is to
have a coherent global brand image for its luxury products.
Sources: Kathy Chu and Megumi Fujikawa, “Burberry Gets a Grip on Brand in
Japan,” The Wall Street Journal, August 15-16, 2015; Angela Hrendts,
“Burberry’s CEO on Turning an Aging British Icon into a Global Luxury
Brand,” Harvard Business Review, January-February 2013; Tim Blanks, “The
Designer Who Would be CEO,” The Wall Street Journal Magazine, June 18,
2015; G. Fasol, G., “Burberry Solves Its ‘Japan Problem,’ at Least for
Now,” Japan Strategy, August 19, 2015.
Case Discussion Questions
Why did Burberry initially chose a licensing strategy to expand its
presence in Japan?
What limitations of the licensing strategy became apparent over time?
Should Burberry have expected these drawbacks to arise?
Was terminating the Japanese licensing agreement and opening wholly owned
stores the correct strategic move for Burberry? What are the risks here?
To what extent does internalization theory explain Burberry’s experience
in Japan?